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Solidarity Economy in China? 
In contemporary China there exists a social movement that promotes cooperation in the 
countryside. It is called the New Rural Reconstruction Movement (新乡村建设运动 xīn 
xīangcūn jiànshè yùndòng, hereafter NRR or NRRM). However, what one hears about 
China in the West today has often to do either with miracle like economic growth or 
with the violation of human rights and the destruction of the environment. Usually one 
does not learn about bottom-up initiatives trying to build up economic alternatives and 
experiment with cooperation and self-management in China. Even many of those poten-
tially interested in such attempts, for example those social activists and intellectuals 
who are promoting solidarity economy (solidarische Ökonomie) in German-speaking 
parts of Europe,1 do not know about them. Attention is directed mainly to examples 
from South America. As a student of cultural and social anthropology, as well as of 
Chinese studies, I wondered if, in the light of the Chinese experience of both Maoist 
collectivization and post-Mao decollectivization, there were any practices or initiatives 
in China that pointed in the direction of a cooperative and self-managed alternative to 
both central planned economy and capitalist or socialist market economy. 
This was my initial starting point. I heard about the NRRM and from what I read 
about the movement I thought it might be aiming at something similar to what the soli-
darity economy movement is working on. In spring 2011 I went to China eager to find 
out how the experiments in NRR worked out in practice. In this diploma thesis I present 
the results of my fieldwork on some NRR projects in a village in central China. My fo-
cus is on the internal organization of the cooperative projects, on their connections to 
the “outside world”, and on the chances and limitations of the experiments in NRR. 
                                                          
1 The Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of Social and Solidarity Economy defines solidarity 
economy as modes of economy that satisfy human needs based on voluntary cooperation, self-
organization and mutual aid (URL 1). 
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(a) Who is (not) participating in the project? Who is involved in decision-
making? How is the work divided between those involved in the project? 
How are they remunerated? 
(b) How is the NRR project connected with the “outside world”? What roles do 
the state, markets, urban consumers, intellectuals and social activists, as well 
as social networks, play? Where do money, materials and ideas come from 
and go to? 
(c) What are the chances, risks and limitations of the NRR projects? Do they 
help to improve the material and immaterial situation of the peasants? Do 
they foster cooperation between the peasants, as well as between peasants and 
urban consumers, or do they rather create new inequalities within the village? 
Altogether I spent more than eight weeks in a village in central China and con-
ducted ethnographic fieldwork with qualitative interviews and participant observation 
searching for answers to these questions. 
My anthropological research is based on a critical realist perspective on ontology 
and epistemology. In my analysis I combine grounded theory methodology with exist-
ing theoretical works in economic anthropology and in the anthropology of coopera-
tives. I use existing social scientific literature when dealing with historical and greater 
regional, national, and global context relevant to my local example. 
This paper has been organized in the following way: 
The first chapter begins by outlining the broader historical context of rural China 
in which present day attempts to establish new cooperative relations in the village under 
study are rooted. Following historian Alexander Day’s (2007) proposal of understand-
ing 20th century Chinese history as a series of attempts to create cooperation I put a 
special focus on cooperative and collective organization and its dissolution. Chapter 1 
will then go on to give an overview of two different development models, namely the 
neoliberal model and the alternative model of the NRRM. 
Chapter 2 describes the methods used in this research, namely interviews, partici-
pant observation, and a modified form of grounded theory methodology during the pro-
cess of research. It shows how I entered the field and got into contact with my inform-
ants. It also includes reflections on the methods used as well as on ethical questions in 
the process of writing. 
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In chapter 3 I first give an overview about agriculture and disparities in China. 
This bird eyes view enables us to then view the village, the NRR projects, and my two 
main informants in context. 
There exist four different kind of cooperative projects in the village, focusing ei-
ther on cultural, social, economic or financial cooperation. Two of the projects, namely 
the cultural troupe and the seniors’ association, were only active in winter in the agricul-
tural slack season (农闲 nóngxián). I was in the field when there was a lot to do in agri-
culture (农忙 nóngmáng), hence, I did not study those two projects. In line with my 
interest in economic anthropology I focus on economic cooperation. I present my em-
pirical data on these NRR projects in six chapters. 
In chapter 4 I reconstruct the beginning of the NRR experiments by putting to-
gether different narratives that exist in the village about Association for Environmental-
ly Harmless Rice (无公害大米协会 wú gōnghài dàmǐ xiéhuì). It is a short history about 
outside challenges like competition and inside challenges like conflict and corruption 
within peasant cooperatives. Concerning methods this chapter is the exception, as due to 
the topic I could not use participant observation but only interviews. 
In 2008 the Peasant Cooperative Association (农民合作联社 nóngmín hézuò 
liánshè) was established as an umbrella organization for several organizations, including 
the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid (资金互助社 zījīn hùzhùshè), the Profession-
al Cooperative for Edible Mushrooms (食用菌专业合作社 shíyòngjùn zhuānyè hé-
zuòshè), and the successor organization of the Association for Environmentally Harm-
less Rice, namely the Professional Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Products (生
态农产品专业合作社 shēngtài nóngchǎnpǐn zhuānyè hézuòshè). 2 This Professional 
Cooperative is at the center of attention in chapters 5 to 8. It is made up of several sub-
groups. 
In chapter 5 I present the Small Group for Ecological Rice (大米生态小组 dàmǐ 
shēngtài xiǎozǔ) and the Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops (小杂粮生态小
组 xiǎozáliáng shēngtài xiǎozǔ). In this chapter I focus on the meaning of being a mem- 
                                                          
2 Throughout this paper I use the term professional cooperative or peasant professional cooperative to 
refer to the Chinese terms zhǔanyè hézuòshè (专业合作社) or nóngmín zhuǎnyè hézuòshè (农民专业合
作社) respectively. These Chinese terms are translated with various combinations of the terms peasant or 
farmer and specialized or professional, such as farmer professional cooperative or specialized (peasant) 
cooperative. 
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ber, on who controls these small groups, on the role of gift-giving in connection to the 
outside, on the gender division of labor within these small groups and on the peasants’ 
benefits of participating in them, as well as the risks involved. 
In chapter 6 the Small Group for Organic Rice (有机大米种植小组 yǒujī dàmǐ 
zhòngzhí xiǎozǔ) and the Small Group for Organic Wheat (有机小麦种植小组 yǒujī 
xiǎomài zhòngzhí xiǎozǔ) receive attention. The main issues addressed here are the 
combination of organic agriculture and the NRR project as well as the relation between 
the producing peasant and the cooperative. 
The Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs (藕蟹混
养小组 ǒuxiè hùnyǎng xiǎozǔ) is discussed in chapter 7. Concerning the relation with 
the outside world I deal with the question of state support. However, the main focus is 
on the division of labor as well as on class and patron-client relations between those 
involved. 
In chapter 8 I give a short overview of the Small Group for Raising Happy Pigs 
(快乐猪养殖小组 kuàilèzhū yǎngzhí xiǎozǔ). I deal with the question of inclusion and 
exclusion from the cooperative before comparing this project with the others on ques-
tions already raised earlier, such as decision-making and the division of labor. 
Finally I turn to the village’s Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid in chapter 9. 
However, I do not deal with its operations. On my first day in the village the election of 
the council of this cooperative was held. The village cadres, who controlled the other 
NRR projects, were not elected to this council. Hence, I focus on decision-making, 
power and resistance. 
In chapter 10 I view the empirical findings and the grounded theories developed 
during the research process and presented in chapters 4 to 9 through theoretical concepts 
from Substantivism, Marxist political economy, as well as from David Graeber’s (2011) 
anthropological theory of value. Furthermore, I discuss if Gabriela Vargas-Cetina’s 
(2005) concept of “ephemeral associations” and Marc Edelman’s (1999) concept of 
“imagined organizations” are useful for understanding the village’s NRR projects. 
Finally, in the conclusion I summarize the results of my in-depth empirical study. 
Moreover, I propose future research directions, and raise further research questions. 
 
 5 
1 New Rural Reconstruction: 
The Third Cooperative Movement in China? 
In this chapter I first sketch the history of 20th century rural China, focusing on rural 
reconstruction in the time of the republic, collectivization in the Mao-era and decollec-
tivization after Mao’s death. In this short outline China’s rural population is understood 
as being both shaped by existing social structures and as participating actively in the 
transformation and reproduction of these social structures in rural China. This is how I 
also analyze them in the NRR projects under study. The historical background helps us 
to understand the present structural situation for which neoliberals and NRR scholars, 
who can be counted among the New Left in China, propose different strategies for the 
development of the countryside. Both neoliberal and NRR visions for the Chinese coun-
tryside are introduced, the latter one in more detail because this study focuses on practi-
cal experiments in NRR. 
1.1 China in the 20th century: a history of attempts to develop co-
operative social relations 
The contemporary experiments with NRR are not the first efforts to bring cooperation 
and collective organization to the Chinese countryside. Historian Alexander Day even 
suggests the possibility of viewing 20th century Chinese history “as a history of attempts 
to develop cooperative social relations in order to protect and transform a rural society 
in crisis, a crisis always related to global capitalism” (Day 2007:330, 2008b:59). There 
were two big waves of cooperative movements in 20th century China: the Rural Recon-
struction Movement (乡村建设运动 xīangcūn jiànshè yùndòng) around Liàng Shùmíng 
(梁漱溟) and Y.C. James Yen (晏阳初 Yàn Yángchū) in the 1930s, and the collectivi-
zation efforts during the Mao-Era in the 1950s. Maybe the New Rural Reconstruction 
Movement is the opening stage of a third cooperative movement in China. 
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1.1.1 Rural Reconstruction in the 1930s 
Liàng Shùmíng thought that Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, could solve 
moral and ethical questions facing China and the world at that time. In contrast to the 
cities traditional Chinese culture had not completely disappeared in the countryside. 
Nevertheless, he thought that educational reforms initiated by urban intellectuals were 
necessary in rural areas. He was opposed to state involvement in rural reconstruction, 
because the power of the state is based on violence. Without forcing change upon the 
villagers, his young activists set up schools, introduced new technologies and tried to 
organize village life. Liàng was not only critical of the state, but also opposed violent 
revolution as he argued that there were no class contradictions in the villages, only so-
cial differences. Concerning economy, Liàng Shùmíng envisioned producer, marketing 
and credit cooperatives interconnected via decentralized networks. In practice he helped 
to establish several hundred cooperatives in Shandong Province (Alitto 1986; 
Thøgersen 2002). 
James Yen was a liberal and a Christian who went to university in the USA. De-
spite of his different ideological starting point, James Yen also believed that the coun-
tryside was somehow superior to the cities, because there was still mutual help and un-
derstanding. So he also put his hopes for China’s future on the Chinese peasant (Hay-
ford 1990). 
The works and ideas of Liàng Shùmíng and James Yen concerning rural recon-
struction are important points of reference for some NRR advocates (Thøgersen 
2009:11–13), whereas other NRR activists are critical of the earlier movement and look 
for inspiration from overseas models and certain aspects of collectivism under Mao 
Zedong (Day and Hale 2007:3 n. 3). 
1.1.2 Collectivization under Mao 
In contrast to the old and the new movements for rural reconstruction, the collectiviza-
tion efforts in the Mao-era are considered “as somewhat of an aberration in the history 
of twentieth-century rural cooperative movements” by Alexander Day as it was largely 
imposed on the peasants top-down from the state without paying attention to local cir-
cumstances, and as it cannot be separated from the modernization and industrialization 
strategy of the Chinese state. Rural surplus was extracted to aid the urban industrializa-
tion process (Day 2007:331, 2008b:59). 
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In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) 
carried out land reform (土地改革 tǔdì gǎigé) by classifying peasants as landlords, rich, 
middle, poor or landless peasants and by redistributing the land of the former categories 
to the later (Herrmann-Pillath 2009). Afterwards the CCP first organized the peasants in 
seasonal, and then in year-round mutual-aid groups (互助组 hùzhùzǔ) in order to in-
crease economic viability (Walker 1965:5–6). Later on mutual-aid teams were put to-
gether in cooperatives, so-called semi-socialist lower-level agricultural producers’ co-
operatives (半社会主义性质的初级农业生产合作社 bàn shèhuìzhǔyì xìngzhìde chūjí 
nóngyè shēngchǎn hézuòshè), each containing approximately 20 households. Peasants 
allowed the cooperative to use their land and draft animals. In exchange they received a 
portion of the agricultural yields. According to their contribution of labor to the cooper-
ative they received another part of the harvest. In the year 1956 the CCP tried to organ-
ize peasants—no matter whether or not they had already formed a smaller coopera-
tive—into larger collectives, so-called fully socialist higher-level agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives (完全社会主义性质的高级农业生产合作社  wánquán shèhuìzhǔyì 
xìngzhìde gāojí nóngyè shēngchǎn hézuòshè) of about 40 to 200 families. Peasants were 
forced to permanently hand over their land and draft animals to the collective. They 
only received rewards according to contributions of labor. In winter and during other 
agricultural low seasons the collectives organized this labor to build and repair local 
infrastructure, such as irrigation systems and terrace hillsides (Unger 2002:7–9). 
Mao and other CCP radicals wanted to speed up collectivization in 1958 by estab-
lishing ever larger collectives. This resulted in the Great Leap Forward (大跃进 
Dàyùejìn). Local officials anxiously followed Mao’s call and people’s communes (人民
公社 rénmín gōngshè) were set up all over China. One commune usually consisted of a 
rural market town and its surrounding villages; some were even bigger (Unger 2002:7–
9). Private plots were now completely forbidden. Everything had to be given to the col-
lective, even cooking pots. Peasants had to eat at communal dining halls where they got 
food for free. In the euphoria that communism would be realized soon, and in a compe-
tition to achieve the highest output, local rural officials reported miraculous harvests to 
the upper levels, while in reality rural production collapsed due to several factors such 
as missing incentive mechanisms, shortages of labor and capital due to the state’s focus 
on industrialization, as well as natural disasters. The Great Leap Forward was followed 
by a great famine in many parts of the Chinese countryside due to a combination of 
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failures in production, food availability, distribution, demand, and consumption effi-
ciency (Chang and Wen 1997). 
Rural China needed to be, and was, re-organized again. From 1960 to the early 
1980s Chinese peasants were organized in smaller units, namely the production teams  
(生产队 shēngchǎn duì). The Chinese state now tolerated that the collectivized peasants 
additionally worked on small private plots for their own provision again (about five to 
seven percent of the arable land). However, at that time (especially during the 1970s) 
the state tried to suppress free markets where peasants would have been able to sell their 
agricultural products from these private fields. Production teams of about 10 to 50 fami-
lies owned the land and its member households worked on it together. Compensation 
was linked more closely again with labor contribution. Team members elected or infor-
mally chose the team leader. The production team protected the individual families 
against ruin, and organized and paid for public services as well. The production teams 
of a large village together formed a production brigade (生产大队 shēngchǎn dàduì). 
The brigade operated the local primary school, sometimes a basic health clinic and vil-
lage factories or repair shops. It was also responsible for the irrigation system if there 
was one. As the brigade was the lowest level of CCP influence, it was responsible for 
enforcing political campaigns. One level above the production brigades, the com-
mune—now smaller than during the Great Leap Forward—ran the local secondary 
school and sometimes a small hospital. Some of them also owned and ran several small 
rural factories (Unger 2002:9–23).3 
In face of the failure of the Great Leap Forward, China’s collectives experimented 
with a whole variety of different wage systems from 1960 onwards. Work points were 
distributed first according to output, later according to piece and individual task rates. 
Finally, under Maoist remuneration norms the peasants assessed each other in periodic 
meetings and work points were distributed according to moral and political standards 
such as orientation towards the collective. Over time tensions and competition for status 
grew and eventually led to the abandonment of this remuneration mode. Like a reverse 
swing of a pendulum the remuneration systems were changed again, first back to task 
rates and finally back to household contracts (Unger 2002: 73–92). 
                                                          
3 Whether the communes are best seen as a bridge between state and rural society, as Jonathan Unger 
(1989) proposes, or as a buffer between them, as Vivienne Shue (1988) argues, is a point of disagreement 
in Chinese studies (Unger 2002:19–23). 
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Already in November 1953 a state monopoly on the purchase and sale of grain, 
called “unified purchase and sale” (统购统销 tǒnggòu tǒngxiāo), had been introduced 
(Li 2006:45). The collectivized peasants were not only forced to sell their products to 
the state for a very low price, but often the state also told the peasant collectives what to 
plant and where to plant it. Industrial products on the other hand were sold for higher 
prices. Industrialization was made possible by the exploitation of the peasants who were 
not able to leave the countryside due to the household registration (户口 hùkǒu) system. 
In this situation overt forms of political protest were dangerous. China’s peasants had to 
find other ways to resist their exploitation and in many places they made use of what 
James Scott (1985, 1989) calls the “weapons of the weak”, namely everyday forms of 
resistance (Zweig 1989; Li 2006), or at least everyday strategies of accommodation 
(Bianco 2001:257–273), including forms of “collective inaction” (Zhou 1993:66–67). 
1.2 Post-Mao decollectivization and marketization 
After Mao’s death in 1976 there were big changes in the Chinese countryside again. In 
the early 1980s the people’s communes were dismantled and the so-called household 
responsibility system was introduced. The state reduced the quotas the peasants had to 
fulfill and allowed them to have private plots. The peasants started selling the food that 
exceeded the state quota on the markets at unregulated prices. Family farming “elimi-
nated the difficulties associated with collective cooperation by, quite simply, terminat-
ing collective cooperation” (Unger 2002:92). 
Different stories exist about how decollectivization came about. In one narrative 
radical reformers accomplished a perfect example of policy implementation.4 According 
to another account, Chinese peasants spontaneously pushed for decollectivization.5 In a 
                                                          
4 This is how Chinese, as well as Western media, portrayed decollectivization: China’s radical reformers 
analyzed the shortcomings of collective economy and set up experiments in the countryside to test the 
market-oriented alternatives they had in mind. Afterwards they synthesized the local experiences and 
carefully prepared a policy package (Kelliher 1992:234). 
5 Most Western-language specialists in the field of China studies more or less followed a narrative similar 
to Daniel Kelliher’s (1992) on peasant power under a strong state, or Kate Xiao Zhou’s, according to 
which China’s peasants spontaneously took the initiative to decollectivize and to return to family farming 
(Unger 2002:104–105; Zweig 1997:12 n. 32). According to David Zweig, Zhou’s version downplays and 
Kelliher’s version entirely rejects the important role of radical reformers and factionalism in the process 
of decollectivization. He states that the leadership could have stopped decollectivization if they had want-
ed to (Zweig 1997:12–14). To do justice to Kelliher’s argument it should be mentioned that he does not 
completely ignore the role played by the state as he draws a distinction between innovation and imple-
mentation: “local people innovated; the state implemented” (Kelliher 1992:236). Jonathan Unger criti-
cizes Kelliher’s and Zhou’s versions of the story, claiming they lack empirical evidence in the form of 
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third version a complex and unplanned interplay between different levels of the strong 
state apparatus imposed the reform upon all of China’s peasants.6 Yet another narrative 
tries to get closer to the complex reality of decollectivization in a vast country such as 
China by looking for a solution between these extremes. David Zweig for example puts 
stress on the roles of both peasants and radical reformers in the process of decollectivi-
zation (Zweig 1997:12–15,29). A combination of everyday forms of peasant resistance 
and accommodation, collective inaction and initiative from below, policy guidelines 
from radical reformers from above, and the reactions of lower-level rural officials to 
this new political wind led via many local variations to a quite unitary and new agricul-
tural system in the Chinese countryside after 1978, namely the household responsibility 
system under which peasant households individually worked a piece of land contracted 
to them by the collective. They had to fulfill a quota set by the state but were allowed to 
sell on the markets the part of the harvest that exceeded the state quota. 
However, the promotion of marketization and decollectivization through the post-
Mao reforms only replaced one set of problems with another. Whereas agricultural pro-
duction increased, rural public work and social welfare fell into despair (Day 2008b:57). 
History has left its tracks on rural China: Technically the land is still owned by the col-
lective at the village or township level. However, since the abandonment of collective 
agriculture around 1980, China’s peasant households have worked their contracted 
pieces of land individually. Today China’s small peasants sell their products not only on 
local markets, but also on big national and (since China’s accession to the WTO in 
2001) international markets. Due to a huge population and the scarcity of arable land, 
scholars talk about a vast “surplus rural population” (农村／农业剩余人口 
nóngcūn/nóngyè shèngyǘ rénkǒu). In the new post-Mao situation there is not enough 
income for those working in agriculture and living in the countryside, resulting in what 
economists call a huge “surplus of labor-power” (剩余劳动力 shèngyǘ láodònglì) in 
rural China. This makes many millions of Chinese peasants move to the big cities as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
interviews with peasants and officials. He argues that they “essentially adopted the Chinese government’s 
claims that decollectivization was voluntarily initiated by farmers” (Unger 2002:106). 
6 This is the claim of Jonathan Unger; Kathleen Hartford’s is similar (Kelliher 1992:235; Unger 2002:95–
118; Zweig 1997:12 n. 33): “A complex and unplanned interplay between the top and bottom levels of the 
bureaucratic structure, involving ambiguous directives from the top and competitive pressures among 
politically nervous lower-level officials, had culminated in the countryside’s near-total abandonment of 
the collectives. There had been no master plan, no deliberate effort from above to steer all of rural China 
uniformly down a single path.” (Unger 2002:104) According to David Zweig, this version is also not 
satisfactory because any explanation of decollectivization must recognize that peasants pushed for it 
(Zweig 1997:13). 
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migrant workers to look for a job, where they often perform low paid and onerous work 
(Schädler 1998:58–61; Unger 2009). 
China’s rapid economic growth since the beginning of Reform and Opening up  
(改革开放 gǎigé kāifàng) brings with it growing inequalities, social unrest and social, 
as well as environmental, crisis. In the countryside, where reforms started with decollec-
tivization and the reintroduction of markets, the crisis is now especially deep. After the 
formulation of the “three rural issues” (三农问题 sānnóng wèntí) by the intellectual 
Wēn Tiějūn (温铁军) in the 1990s (Wen 2001),7 and after the complaints of a rural ca-
dre named Lǐ Chāngpíng (李昌平) in early 2000 that “the peasant’s lot is really bitter, 
the countryside is really poor, and agriculture is in crisis”, the Chinese Communist Party 
finally turned its attention to rural issues again in 2003: Document No. 1 in 2004 sug-
gests boosting peasant incomes (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2008), and in 2006 the People’s 
Republic of China launched the campaign to “construct a New Socialist Countryside”  
(建设社会主义新农村 jiànshè shèhuìzhǔyiì xīn nóngcūn), a policy framework that is 
more than just a political slogan, but less than a substantial policy change, according to 
Ahlers and Schubert (2009). 
The reason why I summarized rural China’s history, with special attention to col-
lective cooperation, here at length is twofold. First, it is interesting to compare present 
day efforts with the two earlier waves of attempts to establish rural cooperative rela-
tions. Second, the experiences and memories of the second wave still exist in the minds 
and bodies of some villagers, at least in those of the older ones. When the idea to organ-
ize a cooperative in the village under study here was presented at a meeting in 2004, old 
people immediately remembered Mao-era people’s communes (HQH, 2011-06-07:215–
222). 
1.3 Constructing a New Socialist Countryside 
1.3.1 Neoliberal visions for rural China 
The new policy framework to construct a New Socialist Countryside mentioned above 
is also influenced by mainstream economists (主流经济学家 zhǔliú jīngjìxuéjiā)—left 
leaning Chinese intellectuals started to call them “neoliberals” (新自由主义学者 xīn 
zìyóuzhǔyìzhě) in the 1990s (Day 2007:8). They propose further marketization, privati-
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zation and continued urbanization as a strategy to solve the rural problems. For example 
the Western-trained mainstream economist Justin Yifu Lin (林毅夫 Lín Yìfū), who has 
been the chief economist of the World Bank since 2008, argues that rural China just 
needs integration into the market economy and modern technology to develop. He sees 
economic rationality as a universal, the problem of the Chinese countryside being a lack 
of proper universal institutions, namely market institutions. With a unified national 
market for land, labor, inputs and agricultural commodities and proper investment op-
portunities Chinese peasants would act as other entrepreneurs do, trying to maximize 
their economic profit, resulting in higher productivity and efficiency. Justin Yifu Lin 
further argues that there is a crisis of overproduction in China, because national produc-
tive capacity increased, while demand, especially rural consumption, is low. This is 
caused by the lack of a proper infrastructure for consumption in the countryside. To 
solve this problem he proposes that the nation’s labor and consumer goods market 
should be integrated, and that the state should invest in rural infrastructure to boost do-
mestic demand in the countryside. Increased demand would help to maintain economic 
growth. There would be more employment opportunities in the cities and this would in 
turn lead to more rural-to-urban migration (Day 2007:223–235). Justin Yifu Lin’s influ-
ence on national policy is reflected on the semantic level as the title of the campaign 
uses the words “new countryside” (新农村 xīn nóngcūn), a term he uses in his articles 
(Day and Hale 2007:3 n. 2), as well as on the more material level of growing state in-
vestment in rural infrastructure (as I was also able to witness in the village under study). 
1.3.2 Wēn Tiějūn and the three rural issues 
In the 1990s China’s New Left (新左派 xīn zǔopài) started to criticize market domi-
nance over society. Wēn Tiějūn (an earlier advocate of market reforms) became the 
most prominent left (although he does not use this term to describe himself) critic of the 
mainstream model of rural development oriented towards marketization and urbaniza-
tion. Wēn Tiějūn is an agricultural economist and, since its foundation in 2004, dean of 
the School of Agricultural and Rural Development at Rénmín University in Běijīng. 
Earlier in the 1990s China’s intellectuals usually discussed rural China’s problems un-
der the rubrics of agricultural economics (农业经济 nóngyè jīngjì) and rural develop-
ment (农村发展 nóngcūn fāzhǎn). Only after Wēn Tiějūn (2001) had formulated his 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 The term “three rural issues” is explained in the subsection about Wēn Tiějūn below. 
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version of the three rural issues was there a discursive shift to peasants (农民 nóngmín), 
rural society (农村 nóngcūn), and agriculture (农业 nóngyè), putting peasants first. If 
one spoke about the three rural problems earlier (and this was rather rare), peasants 
were usually placed in the last position. Wēn Tiějūn argues that the three rural issues are 
interconnected and should therefore not be discussed separately. For him surplus rural 
labor and the well-being of the peasantry are the keys to understanding current rural 
problems and to finding a suitable development strategy. In his view, non-market exper-
imentation with cooperation and continued pursuit of equality are necessary to avoid 
large-scale social conflict, maybe even revolution, in rural society (Day 2007:195–205, 
2008b:51–53). 
This experimentation with cooperation is necessary, because China can not simply 
follow the Western path of development and modernization, as this was a unique rather 
than a universal way, as Wēn Tiějūn (2007) argues in the article “Deconstructing Mo-
dernity”. Because of different positions within the world system, China cannot copy the 
Western path of colonial exploitation of foreign resources and populations. In order to 
industrialize China had to accumulate primary capital internally in the form of agricul-
tural surplus. Therefore, under Mao China delinked from global capitalism and Chinese 
socialism was used for the primitive accumulation of capital: The state made the rural 
sector subsidize the urban sector. Wēn Tiějūn calls this “State Capitalist Primitive Ac-
cumulation” (国家资本原始积累 guójiā zīběn yuánshǐ jīlěi). Although delinking was 
necessary due to global capitalist relations, it also led to new contradictions. Wēn Tiějūn 
argues that the primitive accumulation of capital for industrialization is now over. He 
calls the reform period after Mao’s death the post-primitive-accumulation period. He 
argues that because of this new situation, a new rural policy is now possible (Day 
2007:206–217, 2008b:53–58). 
In his eyes a new rural policy is also necessary, because by way of historical and 
international research Wēn Tiějūn found out that urbanization, marketization, and pri-
vatization did not solve rural problems in other so-called developing countries. Polariza-
tion of rural and urban did not diminish, on the contrary. Rural poverty increased and 
slums mushroomed. Sometimes even rural rebellion or guerrilla warfare was the conse-
quence. Similar to Karl Polanyi’s discussion of “fictitious commodities”, Wēn Tiějūn 
argues, that land, labor and capital are not commodities in the structural context of the 
Chinese countryside. On the one hand there is a large peasantry; on the other hand there 
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are limited resources. This ratio between land and population leads to a particular char-
acter of land use. In the small peasant economy (小农经济 xiǎonóng jīngjì) farm land is 
a means for survival rather than a factor in production. Thus, under these conditions 
privatization of land is inappropriate. A second problem arises if rural labor is treated as 
a commodity. If treated like a commodity, rural labor is in surplus and cannot find non-
agricultural uses. According to Wēn Tiějūn the outflow of capital to the cities is the 
third big problem for the countryside. His view can be summarized in one sentence: 
China’s small peasant economy is an economy of its own logic and is different from the 
rest of the economy. For him, rural China is basically anti-market (非市场  fēi 
shìchǎng). The concept of small peasant economy Wēn Tiějūn uses stems from Fèi 
Xiàotōng (费孝通 ), who was China’s first anthropologist (Day 2007:217–223, 
2008b:54–58). 
1.3.3 Substantivism versus Formalism 
Alexander Day finds parallels between these Chinese discussions of rural China and the 
debate between substantivists and formalists in the West. He puts Wēn Tiějūn in the 
substantivist tradition of Emile Durkheim, Alexander V. Chajanov, Karl Polanyi, Mar-
shall Sahlins, Teodor Shanin, and James Scott, who all argued that there were substan-
tial differences between the social and economic logics of actors acting in agrarian and 
industrial economies. Justin Yifu Lin on the other hand should be viewed in the formal-
ist tradition of Theodore Schultz and Samuel Popkin, who put forward the argument 
that there is only a single economic logic at work within “traditional” and “modern” 
economies. For them the differences are not substantial, but only institutional. Wēn 
Tiějūn argues that because of the differing logics one cannot use the formal categories 
and reasoning of market economics in the countryside (as Justin Yifu Lin did) to devel-
op a proper rural policy. Market institutions would not transform the rural economy into 
an efficient market economy as Justin Yifu Lin imagines, but would lead to even more 
rural poverty. Wēn Tiějūn refers to the displacement of poverty from the countryside to 
the slums in the cities when he warns of the Latin Americanization of China (Day 
2007:223–235). 
Wēn Tiějūn’s arguments are the theoretical foundation of the NRRM’s practical 
rural experimentation with cooperation and institutional innovation. From the point of 
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view of the activists these experiments should enable the peasants to deal collectively 
with the three rural problems (Day and Hale 2007:3–4). 
1.3.4 The New Rural Reconstruction Movement 
The NRR is a (self-proclaimed) movement led by urban intellectuals and social activ-
ists. Instead of the Western development model—which wants further urbanization, 
marketization and privatization—the NRRM wants to build up rural cooperation to in-
crease the welfare of the rural population. Urban intellectuals and social activists there-
fore initiate NRR experiments in the Chinese countryside. They do so not by coercion 
but by bringing external resources, mainly ideas and funding, to the countryside to mo-
bilize the internal resources of the villages. The participation of peasants in the NRR 
projects is voluntary (Day 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Day and Hale 2007; Thøgerson 2009). 
Before giving an overview of the different streams within the movement I want to 
say a few words about terminology. Since the state proclaimed the new policy to con-
struct a New Socialist Countryside, proponents of the NRRM tend to use the term “con-
struction of a new countryside” (新农村建设 xīn nóngcūn jiànshè)—Alexander Day 
and Matthew A. Hale translate it as “new rural construction” (Day and Hale 2007:3 n. 
2)—rather than the term “New Rural Reconstruction” (新乡村建设  xīn xīangcūn 
jiànshè), which they used before the year 2006, a term that drew a clear connection to 
the earlier movement of the Republican Era as it just added a “new” (新 xīn) to the old 
“Rural Reconstruction” (乡村建设 xīangcūn jiànshè). In contrast the new term uses 
parts of the state terminology. Alexander Day’s interpretation of this shift is that it 
opens greater political space for the movement to grow (Day 2008b:58 n. 32). The 
state’s terminology was in turn influenced by Justin Yifu Lin’s perspective on the “new 
countryside”. As the content of NRR activists’ conceptions of the “new countryside” 
differs greatly from what Justin Yifu Lin is suggesting, I use the term “New Rural Re-
construction” (or NRR) when I speak about the movement. 
Within the NRRM different streams can be identified. Wēn Tiějūn is said to have 
the ability to incorporate the innovative work of others into the movement (Day 
2007:344, 2008b:64). One of the two currents within the movement puts more focus on 
material welfare. It tries to raise peasant’s income through economic cooperation. The 
most prominent proponent of this current is Wēn Tiějūn himself. He sees production 
cooperatives as the most important way to foster rural development. Economic coopera-
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tives can indeed have material advantages for the peasants: It becomes easier for them 
to get loans. They can buy cheaper and sell at a higher price. Mutual aid increases their 
ability to withstand market forces (Day 2007:350, 2008b:67–68; Day and Hale 2007:4; 
Wang 2009:141). 
The other current puts more emphasis on immaterial welfare. Liú Xiāngbō (刘相
波) opposed the fact that the movement raised the peasants’ expectations that coopera-
tion could considerably increase their incomes. Instead he envisioned the movement as 
a way of helping to build a culture of cooperation (合作文化 hézuò wénhuà). Similarly, 
for Hè Xuěfēng (贺雪峰) NRR means cultural reconstruction through community ser-
vices and the arts rather than raising peasant incomes (Day 2007:333–334, 2008b:62; 
Day and Hale 2007:4–5; Hale 2009:139; Wang 2009:141). 
Together with peasants, NRR intellectuals and activists set up different kinds of 
institutions, namely cultural troupes (文艺队 wényì duì), seniors’ (or old people) asso-
ciations (老年人协会  lǎoníanrén xiéhuì), and economic cooperatives (合作社  hé-
zuòshè) to institutionalize different forms of cooperation, namely cultural, social and 
economic cooperation (He 2007). 
Despite their different approaches to NRR, all proponents agree that peasant co-
operatives cannot develop within the competitive market economy without outside re-
sources, such as education, technical support and capital. Lacking capital themselves, 
many activists hope that their projects manage to attract the attention of the government 
and receive government support (Day 2007:347). Concerning the movement’s relation-
ship to the state, it has to be mentioned, that although most activists are not state offi-
cials, they have entangled relationships with the state, trying to both “shape government 
policy and open a political space for experimentation” (Day 2007:321, 2008b:51). 
1.3.5 The spread of peasant professional cooperatives 
It is estimated that there existed more than 200 thousand peasant professional coopera-
tives in China around the year 2009.8 According to Deng et al. almost no peasant pro-
fessional cooperative existed in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1998 the Chinese government 
started to promote rural cooperatives and the number of villages with cooperatives start-
                                                          
8 According to the Ministry of Agriculture 180 thousand peasant professional cooperatives were regis-
tered in 2008. Deng et al. estimate that 185 thousand out of a total of 212 thousand cooperatives were 
registered with local government agencies (Deng et al. 2010:500). According to Zhao 246 thousand coop-
eratives were registered nationwide at the end of 2009 (Zhao 2011:680). 
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ed to increase. The most rapid growth occurred after 2004 and especially after the new 
national law on cooperatives was adopted in 2006 and became effective in 2007 (Deng 
et al. 2010:499–500). 
This new law endowed peasant professional cooperatives with a legal status. They 
are under the leadership of the agricultural bureaus and have to register with the bureaus 
of industry and commerce. The law states that the state should support cooperatives 
through preferential tax treatment as well as through financial and technical support. 
Interestingly, non-peasants like citizens, enterprises, and institutions are allowed to be-
come members of the cooperatives. Furthermore, each member has at least one vote. 
Additionally individual members with a large share of capital contribution or volume of 
transaction are allowed to have up to 20 percent of all votes (Bijman and Hu 2011:103). 
It is estimated that around the years 2008 and 2009 more than 20 million peasant 
households, that are almost ten percent of all rural households, were members of coop-
eratives (Deng et al. 2010:500; Zhao 2011:680). In comparison with these numbers, the 
NRRM operates on a small scale nationwide. Activists told Alexander Day that they 
considered about sixty cooperatives to be somehow connected with the movement (Day 
2007:347 n. 626, 2008b:66 n. 53). 
1.3.6 Alexander Day’s assessment of the movement 
To summarize all of the above, I cite Alexander Day, who suggests viewing the NRRM 
“as a social protective movement responding to the marketization of social relations” 
(Day 2008b:72). However, although NRR projects can be seen as attempts to protect 
peasants against the privatization and marketization of society, many NRR activists 
stress, “that the cooperatives are part of a market economy, not its replacement” (Day 
2008b:68). In the NRR discourse utopian marketization is criticized, but not the eco-
nomic use of markets per se. Exploitation is “understood as the result of unfair competi-
tion between weak peasant producers and big capital” (Day 2007:351). With this formu-
lation NRR places itself in the discourse of market socialism (Day 2007:350–354, 
2008b:68). 
As the NRRM includes attempts to replace, at least partially, market relations with 
cooperative relations, Alexander Day views the movement as an experiment that con-
tinues the theoretical and practical projects of early 20th century Chinese populism and 
anarchism, as well as of some parts of Maoism (Day 2007:355). 
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In the present we can witness peasant movements around the world, for example 
Landless Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil or the Zapatistas in Mexico. From a 
global perspective Alexander Day views China’s NRRM in connection with these peas-
ant movements. They share their doubt that global neoliberal capitalism can include the 
majority of the population of our planet. In their reaction to the utopian marketization of 
society, these social protective movements construct new social relations of cooperation 
that point to a future world beyond exclusion (Day 2007:358, 2008b:50–51). 
Historian Alexander Day’s dissertation focuses mainly on Chinese discourse 
about the peasantry. Day stresses the necessity of in-depth ethnographic studies to be 
able to begin to answer questions about how this new cooperative movement works in 
practice (Day 2007:339–340). Anthropologist Matthew Hale is writing his dissertation 
about several NRR experiments in villages in four provinces, namely in Ānhuī, Shānxī, 
Sìchuān and Guìzhōu (URL 2). My own ethnographic project (this diploma thesis) is 
smaller than Hale’s and focuses only on one village. This does not allow for a compara-
tive study taken on its own, but I hope that it can be another point of comparison when 





In this chapter I first describe how Shǔidàozhuāng Village became my research site. I 
write about my expectations, about how I entered my field of research and about how I 
got into contact with my informants. I present and reflect on the methods I used to gath-
er empirical data, namely participant observation, informal conversations, field notes, as 
well as open and semi-structured interviews. Later I reveal the process of analyzing the 
collected data. As I generated theory following grounded theory methodology I did not 
do data collection first, data analysis second and theory formation in the end. Instead I 
already started to analyze my data and formed theory during my time of data collection 
in the village. In the last section of this chapter I write about how I tried to balance ethi-
cal standards and self-censorship. 
2.1 Arriving at one village: choice and expectations 
China has an uncountable number of villages. As there are less than one hundred practi-
cal experiments of NRR in whole China, the choice of my topic already reduced the 
number of eligible villages drastically. When I asked anthropologist Matthew Hale 
about potential research sites he proposed to do research in Dàhé County in Hénán 
Province. In April 2011 I met Zhū Xiǎojuān in her office in a university in Běijīng. She 
proposed to me the possibility of going to Shǔidàozhuāng and helped me to arrange 
accommodation in the village. 
Her words “home stay tourism” evoked certain expectations about my future stay 
in the village. I thought that I would stay at one family’s home and that I would sleep at 
their place, eat and work with them. She also told me that a student volunteer was in the 
village. I imagined a student volunteer who was enthusiastic about cooperation, cooper-
atives and the NRRM. I thought that the volunteer would show me around after my ar-
rival in the village. Furthermore, I hoped to find a solidarity economy project, a self-
managed cooperative with a lot of participation of peasants, who have a direct say in 
decision-making. 
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With my luggage, these expectations and hopes I arrived in Shǔidàozhuāng in the 
evening on April 18, 2011. This was the time when my expectations started to meet 
reality. I did not stay at a peasant family’s home but at a building called the “coopera-
tion hall” next to the new two-story office building of the village committee. One of the 
two young men who welcomed me was Mǎ Zhìyǒng, the student volunteer Zhū 
Xiǎojuān had mentioned. In fact Mǎ Zhìyǒng was no longer a student. He had already 
graduated with a bachelor in economics and was paid by the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences as part of a project focusing on mutual help between city and countryside. The 
other man was called Fāng Fēipéng. He was a young, local villager who worked for one 
of the small groups of the cooperative. I was also introduced to the NRR intellectual and 
activist Xiè Yǒngmó who stayed in the village for a few more days. In the week before 
my arrival he and his teacher Jiāng Bǎilín had held a training session on financial coop-
eration in the village (FN, 2011-04-18). The three young men gave me a new Chinese 
name composed of parts of their names because it was not easy for the villagers to re-
member my name. 
2.2 The first two weeks: participant observation and field notes 
Although I had prepared several pages of questions before I came to the village, I used 
my first two weeks to concentrate on participant observation to get an overview of what 
was going on in the village and started with interviews later on. 
The method of participant observation can be invisible to the people around you. 
That is because, “all humans are participants and observers in all of their everyday in-
teractions,” as DeWalt et al. point out. What makes participant observation as a social 
scientific method different from this everyday activity is “the systematic use of this in-
formation for social scientific purposes” (DeWalt et al. 1998:259). The degree of partic-
ipation in participant observation can vary. DeWalt et al. differentiate between “nonpar-
ticipation”, “moderate” and “active participation” as well as “complete participation” 
(DeWalt et al. 1998:262–263). In my case participation was most often moderate. In the 
case of the cooperative’s meetings I was present at the scene of action, but did not get 
involved in the discussions actively. When I walked through the village and through the 
fields, I most often only watched the villagers working in the fields or selling their 
products to peddlers or the cooperative. Sometimes I got actively involved and worked 
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together with them as in the cases of preparing the lotus field for the crabs, the packag-
ing of rice, or the planting of rice seedlings. 
The method of participant observation includes not only participation and obser-
vation, but also a third important part. The observations have to be recorded in field 
notes. Writing field notes is not simply the production of data but always already in-
cludes analysis. You cannot write down everything. You have to decide which things 
are of importance for your research. Sometimes you will leave out relevant things. This 
is why different descriptions of the same situation and events are not only possible but 
usual. The quality of the field notes also depends on when they are written. If too much 
time passes between observation and writing there is an increasing tendency to homog-
enize and simplify what happened. On the other hand it is not always possible to imme-
diately take notes as this can have a huge influence on ongoing interaction and observa-
tion (DeWalt et al. 1998:259,270–272; Emerson et al. 1995:1–65). This is how I tried to 
deal with this challenge: Sometimes I took out my notepad on the spot, especially in 
order to remember numbers correctly, sometimes I wrote about the events I witnessed 
after I left the scene. Later when I returned to my own room in the cooperation hall I 
wrote more detailed accounts of what happened based on my notes and memories. 
On my first morning in the village the members of the Cooperative for Mutual Fi-
nancial Aid (or Financial Cooperative) held a meeting and elected the council. This was 
a great opportunity to start participant observation. Because I did not know anything 
about the Financial Cooperative at that time except that it existed, and because villagers 
were talking with a local accent and quite fast, it was hard for me to understand the ex-
act arguments, and sometimes it was not only difficult but impossible for me to get what 
they were talking about. Due to these circumstances my participant observation includ-
ed more observation than participation. After this meeting I talked to different partici-
pants in order to better understand what I had observed earlier. During my time in the 
village I had the chance to participate in several meetings of the cooperative projects. 
In the village I started my days having breakfast together with Mǎ Zhìyǒng, the 
student volunteer. Contrary to my expectations it turned out that he did not really want 
to talk to me about the cooperative. He told me that he had no special interest in cooper-
atives and that his main focus was on ecological agriculture (生态农业  shēngtài 
nóngyè). He had almost no contact with the local peasants. Most of his time he spent in 
his room in the new building of the village committee in front of his computer connect-
ed to the internet (FN, 2011-04-18). Later it became more and more clear to me that he 
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was in fact involved in many affairs of the cooperative. I continued questioning him 
with the response that he said he did not know the answer. Once he told me that I should 
not ask any questions concerning the present because, he explained, the affairs in the 
village were very complicated. However, I could ask whatever I wanted about the past 
of the cooperative. Mǎ Zhìyǒng also called to my attention that Chinese peasants often 
tell lies and that what they do is different to what they say.9 He was different, he ex-
plained. Instead of lying he simply said nothing if he did not want to talk about a certain 
topic (FN, 2011-04-25). Indeed, this was what he did. Sensing that he felt uncomforta-
ble when I bombarded him with questions about the cooperative made me feel uncom-
fortable too. During my stay I wanted to ask him a lot more questions than I actually 
did. 
Luckily, during my first few days in the village I had the chance to talk with the 
visiting NRR intellectual and activist Xiè Yǒngmó, who explained to me recent devel-
opments of the village’s Financial Cooperative. When he went to talk to two council 
members of the Financial Cooperative, he asked me if I wanted to join him. In this way 
I first heard about conflicts in the village and got to know two of my later interviewees. 
Apart from that, I usually set out to explore the village and the surrounding fields 
on my own. During my exploratory walks through the village I chatted with peasants 
about what they were doing and about their daily life in the village. 
Of course I was not the only one who was asking questions in these conversations. 
They wanted to know more about me. They were especially interested in my position 
and wanted to know why, how and with whom I came to their village. I had the impres-
sion that many of them were more relaxed and open when I told them that I came there 
on my own and that I was neither a student of Zhū Xiǎojuān, who had initiated the NRR 
projects in the village, nor invited by Wáng Wěi, the party secretary and village leader. I 
told the villagers that I was interested in the NRRM and in their cooperative and asked 
if they were members. Many of them replied that the “cooperative was theirs” (合作社
是他们几个的 hézuòshè shì tāmen jǐge de). By “them” they meant “those few cadres”  
(他们几个干部的 tāmen jǐge ganbu de), “those from the brigade” (大队他们 dàduì 
                                                          
9 As there is often a difference between what people say and do, anthropologists often combine methods, 
for example interviews, with participant observation. That was what I did in the village. However, in 
retrospect Mǎ Zhìyǒng warning about lying peasants appears in another light. Maybe he had certain ru-
mors about the village cadres and the cooperative in mind. For example I heard from villagers that the 
cooperative allegedly sold ordinary rice as environmentally harmless, ecological or even organic rice to 
urban consumers for a higher price. 
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tāmen). 10 They told me that if I wanted to learn something about the cooperative, I 
should ask Wáng Wěi, the village party branch secretary. I only met a few peasants who 
told me that they were members of the cooperative (meaning the village’s Cooperative 
for Mutual Financial Aid) or that they sold their rice to the cooperative. 
During the first two weeks I tried to get to know some of the villagers and to give 
people time to get used to my presence as well. Although I was not the first not-Chinese 
looking person in the village, villagers were still curious, especially at the beginning. 
Although there were quite a lot of students coming to the village to do research I did not 
have the impression that villagers were tired of being asked questions. Maybe it was of 
advantage for me that I was not-Chinese looking and thus interesting for them. This was 
not the only time when my personal characteristics affected participant observation 
(DeWalt et al. 1998:277–280). I had the impression that people were even more inter-
ested in talking with me when I mentioned that I grew up on a small farm in the coun-
tryside. Concerning gender, I suspect that female researchers would not have been in-
vited to dinners with the male members of the village committee and their friends. Usu-
ally it was only men sitting, eating and drinking together. No women were invited. The 
wife and daughters-in-law of the host would normally just get some food and eat it in a 
separate room. If they joined us at the same table it was only towards the end of the din-
ner. On the other hand, female researchers had probably been able to participate in other 
ways and to find out about things I was unable to discover, especially about what coop-
eration and the cooperative meant to the women in the village. 
On my tours through the village and the surrounding fields I sometimes had diffi-
culties understanding villagers, especially older people who spoke with an accent. This 
is why I once asked one young woman who spoke good Mandarin to help me. However, 
the results were not satisfactory. Instead of talking with me they turned to her and en-
gaged her in small talk. However, the biggest problem was that many of the villagers 
could not tell us anything about the current situation of the cooperative. I felt it was now 
necessary to follow the advise of the young woman and to make an expert interview 
with Wáng Wěi, the party secretary—seemingly the only person who knew anything 
about the cooperative (FN, 2011-05-02). 
                                                          
10 Many villagers used the term “brigade” to refer to the village committee, both to members of the vil-
lage committee and the building, as example in “there at the brigade” (大队那边 dàduì nàbiān). 
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2.3 The last five weeks: interviews and participant observation 
In the following weeks I conducted more than 35 interviews with more than 20 inter-
viewees. The interviews lasted more than 50 hours all together. I took notes and record-
ed these interviews with my digital voice recorder. After the interviews I wrote the in-
terview reports. In these reports I included information about date, location, contact, a 
description of the interview process, special events and a lengthy summary of the inter-
view content as well as further questions for the next interview. 
My interviews were open and semi-structured. The interviews were open in the 
sense that there were no given response options. My interviewees were free to answer 
with whatever they wanted to tell me. The interviews were semi-structured in the sense 
that I did not strictly abide by a ready-made questionnaire (Mayring 2002:66). I had 
prepared several pages with interview questions before I came to the village. I used in-
formation gathered during the first two weeks of my stay to update these questions. Do-
ing my first interviews in Chinese, I felt more relaxed having a set of Chinese language 
questions prepared, but I never strictly followed them. During the interviews new ques-
tions came to mind and some other questions appeared to me to be of less relevance. 
After having done several interviews, I did not use my pre-prepared questions any long-
er. First of all, I became more confident and a few catchwords in German, English or 
Chinese were enough to remember the questions I wanted to ask. Second of all, the pre-
pared questions turned out to be too general sometimes. In order to get to know specific 
details I had to ask detailed questions I could not have prepared in advance without 
knowing the local circumstances. 
The first interviews with different interviewees often lasted between one and one 
and a half hour. The follow up interviews usually were shorter and lasted about half an 
hour. The longest interview lasted for three and a half hours. With my two main inform-
ants I talked for over nine and 14 hours in several interviews. One of my main inform-
ants was Wáng Wěi, the party secretary and chairperson of the village committee. The 
other was Hú Qǐhuá, a council member of the Financial Cooperative. He was a founding 
member of the Association for Environmentally Harmless Rice (or Rice Association) 
earlier in 2004, but was not participating in the cooperative projects anymore, the Fi-
nancial Cooperative being the exception. These two men, who were now in their forties, 
had been good friends when they were younger but now they were in conflict with each 
other because of the development of the cooperative projects and their differing views 
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concerning cooperation. This conflict is visible throughout the picture I draw of the vil-
lage’s NRR projects in the following chapters. As those two are not the only ones in-
volved in this conflict and as there are also other lines of difference and conflict, I al-
ways tried to gather different perspectives on certain situations in order not to end up 
with a one-sided and distorted account. However, the stories I was told moved me and 
my view on what cooperation was or should be was closer to Hú Qǐhuá’s perspective 
than to Wáng Wěi’s. I also felt a bit more comfortable with Hú Qǐhuá. I tried to keep 
this bias and emotion out of the following analysis. Nevertheless I want to disclose this 
information to the reader in order to make sure I indeed managed to do so. 
In addition to the many hours of interviews with those two men, I did interviews 
with other founding members of the former Rice Association, with peasants who invest-
ed in the cooperative, with peasants who were raising the so-called happy pigs, with 
peasants who sold their rice to the cooperative, with the peasant who planted organic 
rice and wheat for the cooperative, with the young man who was raising crabs in the 
lotus fields for the cooperative, with the council chairperson and with members of the 
Financial Cooperative, but also with peasants who did not participate in these projects. 
In addition I also interviewed student volunteers. 
Concerning gender, the number of men and women I interviewed is very uneven. 
Not only my two main informants but also the great majority of my interviewees in the 
village were men, namely 15 out of 19. One reason for this was that there was no single 
woman in the councils of the cooperative projects of the village. The village committee 
had five members. Four of them were men. By law there had to be at least one woman 
on the village committee, I was told. However, during my seven weeks in the village I 
never saw her in the new building of the village committee although I was living next 
door. I heard that she was responsible for birth control. Still, some women were (at least 
indirectly) involved in the cooperative, namely all the wives of the participating men. I 
discuss the gender division of labor within the cooperative in chapter 5. Although I 
talked to some of these women informally the perspectives of women on the coopera-
tive are largely absent. 
After my second week I started with interviews but I did not stop participant ob-
servation and informal conversations. One day there was an activity for urban consum-
ers in the village. Around that time journalists from CCTV, the main state television 
station, spent about one week in the village. Several times local officials, scientists, and 
students visited the village. In fact participant observation proofed to be a very useful 
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way to gather new information and inputs. It enabled me to ask more specific and de-
tailed questions later on in the interviews. Even my mere presence in the village had an 
influence on my interviews. People guessed or knew that I saw and heard certain things 
during my stay—things that they otherwise probably had left unmentioned. Instead of 
leaving certain events (like arguments, rumors, and one fight) uncommented, it seemed 
that they thought it would be better for them if they took a stand and conveyed to me 
their perspective on what had happened. 
In cultural and social anthropology it is common wisdom that “the length of time 
that a person spends engaged in participant observation does make a very large differ-
ence in the kind of findings that may be reported” (DeWalt et al. 1998:288). The dura-
tion of my stay was seven weeks and thus relatively short, especially as I did research in 
the countryside. Even after several weeks in the village there where still many new 
things to discover. It was for example only in my second last week that I took notice of 
the women packaging the rice for the cooperative in the old building of the village 
committee. Generally speaking, what is occuring in the village keeps changing with the 
agricultural activities during a one-year ciycle. I had enough time to see the wheat har-
vest and the planting of rice, but I was not there for the rice harvest. I also could not 
participate in some activities of the NRR projects. For example the old people’s associa-
tion was said to be organizing activities only in the agricultural slack season in winter. 
Anyway, in this case it did not matter so much as my research focus was on economic 
cooperation. 
In November 2011 I returned to the village for a short visit of only four days to 
get updated about what had happened during the summer. Before going to the village I 
visited a new shop in the suburbs of Zhèngzhōu, the capital city of Hénán Province. The 
shop sold products of several cooperatives from Dàhé County including the village’s 
cooperative. This time I did five interviews additionally to several informal conversa-
tions. I took notes but I did not use the digital voice recorder to record these interviews. 
2.4 The process of analyzing 
In my research I did not carry out data collection first, data analysis second and theory 
formation in the end. Instead, following grounded theory methodology in this respect, 
namely the idea of parallel and circular processes of data collection, data analysis and 
theory generation (Charmaz 2001:245,251; Glaser and Strauss 1998; Strübing 2004:14; 
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Truschkat et al. 2005:16–18), I already began analyzing my empirical data and generat-
ing theory during the process of data collection in the village. Based on empirical data I 
wrote memos about hypothesis and preliminary conclusions that came to my mind 
(Charmaz 2001:259–261; Strübing 2004:33–34). Moreover, in the last five weeks I used 
information gathered through participant observation, informal conversations and inter-
views to generate new questions for interviews and informal conversations. On this ba-
sis I also thought about where to make participant observation and whom to interview 
next. In grounded theory methodology this process is called theoretical sampling (Gla-
ser and Strauss 1998:53; Truschkat et al. 2005:2,13–14). 
Generally speaking I did not strictly follow grounded theory methodology in my 
analysis, however, its central element was ever present, namely the comparative method 
(Glaser and Strauss 1998:11,17). In the process of analysis I always tried to compare 
persons, actions, situations, the different small groups, and so on, culminating in a com-
parison between ephemeral cooperatives from Mexico and the ones I studied.  
During my stay in the village I did analyze my material, but not yet in a very sys-
tematic way. Back in Austria I systematized my analysis. First I numbered all my re-
search questions and sub-questions. I assigned one color to my main research questions. 
Then I printed out my materials and started the analysis by identifying what people 
talked about in the interviews, somewhat similar to open coding (or line-by-line coding) 
in grounded theory methodology (Charmaz 2001: 254–256; Truschkat et al. 2005:14–
15; Strübing 2004:19–30). I wrote these categories in German on paper next to the sec-
tions in my material. Hence, an act of translation was already involved in this step of 
analysis. I also used the above-mentioned numbers and colors to mark these sections 
and make it easier for me to find certain sections that could contribute to answering the 
research questions later on. Having the approximate content of the rest of the material in 
mind, I did not wait until similar codes appeared in the material. Sometimes I immedi-
ately tried to find the connections between different codes, called axial coding in 
grounded theory methodology (Truschkat et al. 2005:14–16; Strübing 2004:20–31). 
Sometimes these were connections I had already detected earlier on in the village. 
When reading the materials these ideas popped up in my mind again. I also did not wait 
until I finished these two coding processes before moving on to identify core categories 
and their connections to other codes and categories, called selective coding (or focused 
coding) in grounded theory methodology (Charmaz 2001: 257–259; Strübing 2004:18–
21,31; Truschkat et al. 2005:15). Sometimes I even skipped the whole coding process 
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and immediately started writing, because there was so much information that was useful 
for giving a description of a situation. Indeed, following the instructions of grounded 
theory methodology too closely and rigidly would restrict creativity and hence impede 
the generation of theory (Truschkat et al. 2005:2–3). 
I started reading all of the interviews of my two main informants as those inter-
views contain information on every part of the cooperative projects. As I organized the 
description of my empirical material around the different small groups of the coopera-
tive, I always used those interviews that contained relevant information and then fin-
ished the process of analyzing and writing about one small group, as described below, 
before moving on to the next one. Due to time constraints, as well as to theoretical satu-
ration, I did not code all of my interviews. Theoretical saturation is a concept from 
grounded theory methodology. It refers to the point when no new data can be found to 
further develop a grounded theory on a certain topic (Glaser and Strauss 1998:69; 
Strübing 2004:32–33; Truschkat et al. 2005:18–21). As I knew the empirical data I had 
collected in the village, I could make such a judgment without going through the mate-
rial that was still left. There is certainly still useful information in this material that 
touches upon question I did not deal with in this diploma thesis. 
2.5 The process of writing 
After going through the material for the first time I typed into the computer what I 
thought was important about the small group I was currently focusing on. In this manner 
I got my overall ideas about the small group in order. I built a rough framework with 
more specific questions, small hypothesis as well as some preliminary conclusions. 
The next step was to go through my materials again, identifying relevant passages 
by the numbers and colors I had added in the first step of coding. I added more detailed 
information from interviews and field notes to the rough framework I had constructed 
before, and by doing this refined my hypothesis and conclusions. Hence, this step in-
cluded both analyzing and writing. 
My initial intention was to first write the empirical chapters and generate my own 
grounded theory out of the material. The second step was to set my grounded theory in 
relation to anthropological theories suitable to the material and analyze the empirical 
data presented in the preceding chapters a second time. However, at some points I felt 
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that adding theoretical perspectives was already needed in the empirical chapter, for 
example concerning the question of class and patron-client relations in chapter 7.  
There are different perspectives among those social scientists who promote 
grounded theory methodology concerning if, how and to what extent to use already ex-
isting theories in the generation of the grounded theory. The founding fathers of 
grounded theory methodology, Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser, take an ambivalent 
position concerning existing theories. Therefore, Danermark et al., arguing from a criti-
cal realist perspective, charge them with the accusation that their approach to grounded 
theory is based on an empiricist epistemology (Danermark et al. 2002:136–137). 
As my anthropological research is based on a critical realist perspective on ontol-
ogy and epistemology (Bhaskar 1998, 2008; Danermark et al. 2002; Sayer 1992), I gen-
erated theory about the subject of my study not only along the lines of grounded theory 
methodology (Charmaz 2001; Glaser and Strauss 1998; Strübing 2004; Truschkat et al. 
2005) but in combination with existing theoretical frameworks. In this way I was able to 
come to conclusions I would have not been able to draw based on a pure inductive ap-
proach.11 Hence, I tried to follow the advice of Danermark et al., who argue that there is 
a tendency that a research process is most productive if the open attitude towards the 
empirical data is combined with existing concepts and theories (Danermark et al. 
2002:136–137). 
2.6 What to write and what not to write: ethical considerations 
One day I encountered Zhào Yùgāng, the former chairperson of the Cooperative for 
Economic Development and a council member of the former Rice Association, at the 
bridge in the northeastern edge of the village. Before he agreed to conduct an interview 
with me, he asked me, if I would write about the true story, or about the story Wáng 
Wěi and Zhū Xiǎojuān were telling (IR ZYG, 2011-05-28). 
Zhū Xiǎojuān, who had initiated the NRR projects in the village and who has 
written scientific texts about them without anonymizing the names of the village and the 
actors involved, asked me to make the name of the village anonymous after discussing 
my research before I returned to Austria in summer 2011 (FN, 2011-06-14). Already  
                                                          
11  Glaser and Strauss argue that grounded theory methodology is an inductive approach (Charmaz 
2001:245,264–265; Glaser and Strauss 1998:15). Other authors have argued that this is a self-
misunderstanding and that grounded theory methodology develops in an abductive manner as well 
(Strübing 2004:31–32; Truschkat et al. 2005). 
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earlier on, when I asked her for recordings of the cooperative’s meetings that had taken 
place before I came to the village, she told me that I should make a distinction between 
internal and external affairs of the cooperative in order not to destroy their business 
(FN, 2011-05-03). 
Wáng Wěi, party secretary, village leader, and one of my main informants, once 
told that it was not necessary for me to know too many details about some of the inter-
nal problems of the cooperative projects (WW, 2011-05-15b:256–257). Another time he 
wanted me to switch of my recording machine when he told me about alleged corrup-
tion at the township or county level. Obviously I should not use this information (IR 
WW, 2011-06-08). 
After the interviews Hú Qǐhuá, the other one of my main informants and a council 
member of the former Rice Association, told me that I could write down everything that 
he had told me, especially the things about Wáng Wěi, the village party branch secre-
tary and chairperson of the village committee. He also told me that I could use his real 
name (HQH, 2011-06-07:709–711). He thought he had nothing to lose and he did not 
say anything bad about his country—he used the term guójiā (国家), which means both 
country and state—by telling the truth (HQH, 2011-05-07:576–579). However, he asked 
me not to mention some things he told me about other villagers with whom he was not 
in conflict. He asked me not to mention that he thought that they obeyed whatever the 
village leader said. He did not want to spoil his relationships with these fellow villagers. 
In the following chapters I tried to respect these diverse wishes of my informants. 
However, not writing about existing internal conflicts would make the whole effort of 
analyzing the NRR projects in the village pointless. In order not to harm my informants, 
who where willing to share information with me, I made all the names of the villagers 
anonymous as well as those of NRR intellectuals more deeply involved in the project. 
Furthermore, I made the names of places up to the province level anonymous. 
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3 Zooming In: China, the Village, the Projects 
In this chapter I move from a very general overview of rural issues in China to ever 
more concrete contextual information about the village, the cooperative projects and the 
social actors that appear in the empirical chapters that follow. I start with a very general 
picture about peasants, migrant workers, agriculture and disparities in China. This 
should help to view the village under study, which I present in the second part of this 
chapter, in context. In this first part I also offer a short outline of the administrative 
structure and land ownership in rural China. Before focusing on the village I studied, I 
add an intermediate step by way of briefly introducing the Hénán Province. Readers, 
who are familiar with the basic situation in rural China, might want to skip the first part 
of this chapter. 
In the second part of this chapter I provide the reader with more specific contextu-
al knowledge when I describe the situation of the village. Furthermore, I introduce my 
two main informants at this point as this will help to understand their statements in the 
empirical chapters that follow. Other persons are introduced in these chapters when they 
enter the stage. Finally, I present an overview of the NRR projects in the village. 
3.1 Peasants and agriculture in China 
3.1.1 Agriculture in the Chinese economy 
“China has been a peasant society for millennia” if peasant is defined “as a smallhold-
ing farmer, producing crops for family consumption and for market exchange, using 
family labor throughout the farming cycle” (Little 2009:81). China has still a vast rural 
population. In the early 21st century about two thirds of the population might still fit in 
the category of peasantry.12 However, not all of them are cultivators. Around the year 
                                                          
12 The term “peasant” is now generally used to translate the Chinese term nóngmín (农民). However, the 
controversy whether peasant or farmer is the more appropriate term remains unresolved (Padovani and 
Finnane 2009:78). 
32 Imagined Cooperatives 
 
2000 nonagricultural income already accounted for more than half of the rural income. 
In 1949 the agricultural sector made up more than 60 percent of China’s GDP. In 1998 
it was a mere 18 percent. Today agriculture makes up about 10 percent of the Chinese 
economy. Since 1994 less then one half of the workforce has been active in agriculture 
(Ash 2009:22; Padovani and Finnane 2009:79,81). 
3.1.2 Interregional, rural-urban and intraregional disparities 
China is a vast country with many different agrarian zones (Kolb 2006; Taubmann 
2007). In north China there is the best and mainly flat soil. However, the climate is not 
as favorable as in the south. Winters are colder and there is not a lot of rain. In south 
China there is a lot of rain and agriculture is possible year round. However, in the south 
the quality of the soil is poor (Taubmann 2007:18). 
The income distribution in rural China is unequal. According to the sociologist Lu 
Xueyi from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in 2001 the average annual per 
capita income of the rural population was 2,366 CNY, but 58 percent of the rural popu-
lation’s annual income was below that average (Zhang 2009:316–317). According to 
official data, in 2007 the per capita annual net income for rural households was about 4 
thousand CNY, while for urban households it was almost 14 thousand CNY. However, 
the measurement of personal income in China is difficult. Hence, numbers should be 
used with caution (Herrmann-Pillath 2009a:297–298). Nevertheless, there is agreement 
about significant rural-urban and interregional disparities within China (Zhang 
2009:316; Schädler 1998:61–65; Taubmann 2007:40). The most poverty-stricken dis-
tricts are situated in the southwest and west, as well as in the mountainous area of the 
north-central part of China. In these areas the soil is poor and rain is inadequate. The 
rural districts along the east coast of China are better off due to off-farm entrepreneur-
ship and rural industrialization. The agricultural heartland of central China is situated 
between these two extremes (Unger 2009:310). 
Concerning internal migration there exist regional differences as well. Overall 
there are far more than 100 million migrant workers on the move within China (Dillon 
2009:34; Schädler 1998:66; Taubmann 2007:40; Unger 2009:310). In 2007 some started 
to argue that the wave of migration was slowing down, but whether or not this is a 
steady tendency is not yet clear (Dillon 2009:34). In west and central China it is mainly 
young men who migrate to the cities to work in the industrial sector, while women and 
old people stay in the village where they cultivate the family’s land. In the coastal areas 
  China, the Village, the Projects 33 
peasants from other areas work in the fields of the local rural population as most family 
members from the local rural population in these richer regions work in non-agricultural 
occupations (Schädler 1998:64–65). 
In addition to the just mentioned differences between regions, there are considera-
ble differences within regions and provinces as well (Zhang 2009:316; Taubmann 
2007:43,47). Transport infrastructure and proximity to cities are important factors for 
these differences (Schädler 1998:63–64). According to Herrmann-Pillath, highly aggre-
gate measures “blur the fact that total inequality is most strongly influenced by inequali-
ty within the smaller units of measurement. For example, intrarural income inequality is 
determined less by interregional inequality than by inequality within villages.” 
(Herrmann-Pillath 2009:298–299). Differences are more pronounced within richer are-
as, where wage labor plays a more significant role, as in the villages where peasants 
chiefly practice subsistence agriculture (Schädler 1998:64). 
3.1.3 Land ownership in contemporary rural China 
Arable land in China is limited and shrinking. In 2003 China had a per capita area of 
arable land of only 0,10 hectare in comparison to 0,79 hectare in the USA and 0,21 hec-
tare in India (Taubmann 2007:19–20). 
While land in the urban areas is state property, rural land is collectively owned in 
formal and legal sense. The land in the countryside is also de facto controlled by the 
state, namely by the lowest level of the government structure, the township administra-
tion. Since reform and opening up the peasant households have long-term contracts for 
land use rights. However, the families do not have the inalienable legal right to sell or 
retain their land (Dillon 2009:34–35). The land use right of the peasant family is the 
safety network of the rural population in China (Schädler 1998:61). In 2008 a law was 
passed to allow peasants to trade their rights to use of the land (Padovani and Finnane 
2009:81). In the process of expansion of industry, urban housing and transport net-
works, a lot of agricultural land is bought or requisitioned. Often corruption of local 
officials is involved in these deals and peasants are forced off their land. At the begin-
ning of the new millennium land disputes replaced protests against high taxation as the 
main source of rural unrest (Dillon 2009:34–35). The unpopular agricultural tax had 
been gradually reduced in many places in China, especially in the poorest counties, be-
fore in 2006 the agricultural tax on land was completely abolished. In this new situation 
local government has to find other ways of generating revenue (Dillon 2009:37). 
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3.1.4 Administrative Structure 
The government system of the People’s Republic of China has four levels of local gov-
ernment, namely the province, the prefecture, the county, and the township level. The 
villages are not part of the government system. Every level of the government system 
has a “people’s government” that is elected by the “people’s congress” of the same lev-
el. From the county level upward, the people’s congresses are elected by the lower-level 
people’s congresses. The same four-level division also applies to the territorial appa-
ratus of the CCP. The CCP committees lead all state governmental organs at the corre-
sponding level (Cabestan 2009). 
There is a branch of the CCP, a village committee and a village representatives’ 
assembly in every village (He 2009:213). Since 1987, the central government requires 
rural authorities to implement elections for the selection of village officials. Sometimes 
there is multicandidate competition but in many cases incumbent village officials domi-
nate the election procedures and hence manage to become reelected (Unger 2009:311). 
He Baogang differentiates between the absence of democracy, formalistic democracy, 
semi-democracy and established democracy in the Chinese villages. Both the absence of 
democracy and established democracy are very rare. In most cases village democracy is 
formalistic, however, moving more and more often towards semi-democracy. In many 
villages elections are held, but these are either not competitive or only semi-
competitive. Often elections are manipulated or muddled and, hence, only a formality, 
but some villagers have started to fight for their village citizenship (He 2009:213–214). 
Above the village level there are no direct elections for officials at all. Moreover, many 
village party branch secretaries are not elected but selected by officials from a higher 
level within the CCP (Unger 2009:311). 
3.1.5 Hénán Province 
The village under study in this diploma thesis is located in Hénán Province in the Cen-
tral Plain of China. Hénán province is part of the agricultural heartlands of central Chi-
na. The Yellow River flows through this zone. Hence, the names of two provinces in 
this zone are north (Héběi Province) and south of the river (Hénán Province). Hénán 
Province has a population of almost 100 million people and was until recently the most 
populous province of China. As it is rich in natural resources it served as a granary for 
the Chinese empire. There is a lot of rain in June and July. This short rainy period is 
  China, the Village, the Projects 35 
followed by an almost rainless period of eight months. Both floods and droughts are 
frequent (Heberer 2009b:196). Hénán is part of an agricultural zone in central China 
that also includes most parts of Běijīng, Tiānjīn, Héběi, Shāndōng, Ānhuī and Jiāngsū. 
About one fifth of China’s agrarian land is situated in this area. About half of the agrari-
an land in this zone is irrigated. Due to the semi-humid or humid climate, up to two har-
vests per year are possible (Kolb 2006:111). Until recently most peasants in Hénán have 
not been specialized in commercial crops but in growing grain, mainly wheat and 
maize, as Hénán is part of the Chinese grain belt (Kolb 2006:111; Unger 2009:310). 
Other agricultural products grown in this agricultural area are sweet potatoes, cotton, 
tobacco, sesame, and fruits. There is not a lot of animal husbandry or forestry. The re-
gion is predominately free of woods (Kolb 2006:111). 
3.2 Peasants and agriculture in Shǔidàozhuāng Village 
3.2.1 The village 
Shǔidàozhuāng is located in Dàhé county of Píngyuán Municipality in Hénán Province. 
Whenever I told people on the train or on the bus that I was going to Dàhé County they 
told me that it was a very poor place (FN, 2011-04-18). Shǔidàozhuāng is about ten 
kilometers away from the county town and two kilometers south of a big national road. 
Hence, transportation is convenient. Not far away from the village there are also two 
expressways. About one kilometer to the south of the village, one of the expressways 
crosses a railway line and this artificial elevation is far and wide the only one as the land 
is completely flat. There is a big irrigation channel at the eastern edge of the village that 
provides the fields surrounding the village, especially those in the east, with water from 
the Yellow River. The linear distance from the village to the big river is only about ten 
kilometers. 
In 2011 the village Shǔidàozhuāng had a population of about 1.5 thousand inhab-
itants. 13  According to the village’s party secretary, the village had 359 households 
(WW, 2011-05-15a:292). Around 2006 the average annual per capita income in the vil-
lage was 
                                                          
13 This number comes from an online article written by the chairperson of the village committee, Wáng 
Wěi. Another written source mentions that the population of the village was less than three thousand. 
According to yet another one it was exactly 1,351. I cannot mention the sources used here in order to do 
not expose the identity of the village under study. 
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about two thousand CNY.14 The village had a land area of 2860 mǔ (亩),15 according to 
the party secretary (WW, 2011-05-15a:455). During the reform process post 1978, the 
land was contracted to the individual households. Every household was contracted 1.8 
mǔ per person.16 While Jonathan Unger maintains that in many Chinese villages land 
was redistributed every three to five years (Unger 2009:309), this was not the case in 
Shǔidàozhuāng, according to the accountant of the village committee (FN, 2011-04-20). 
On their land the villagers of Shǔidàozhuāng usually planted winter wheat and af-
ter the wheat harvest maize or rice. Some villagers cultivated more labor-intensive 
crops, such as cotton or lotus roots. The peasants of the different small groups, whose 
fields were adjacent, had to agree whether to plant crops such as maize or cotton in dry 
fields or rice and lotus roots in wet fields every season. In their own courtyards, villag-
ers usually planted vegetables for their own consumption. Some of the villagers raised 
chickens and pigs in their own courtyards. A few villagers herded a few goats between 
the fields. Very few of the villagers had cows. Many but not all households had motor-
ized three-wheelers or small tractors to transport grain, soil, or other things. Around five 
to ten years ago villagers have increasingly been using machines for planting and har-
vesting wheat, rice, and maize. The peasants did not own these machines themselves. 
Rather they paid other people to do the work with their machines. If one family member 
earned money as a migrant worker, or if the family ran a small business in the village, 
many households could afford this facilitation. However, poorer villagers still harvested 
by hand. If a combine harvester could not enter the dry field because wet fields sur-
rounded it, or because cotton was planted between strips of winter wheat, the villagers 
had no other option than to do the work by hand. The part of the harvest the villagers 
did not eat themselves, they usually sold to small private peddlers who came to the vil-
lage. Normally they did not sell staple food such as wheat and rice immediately after the 
harvest. They waited until prices rose or until they urgently needed the money. 
Some villagers were engaged in other nonagricultural activities within the village. 
Until a few years ago many villagers had produced leather shoes at home. When I came 
                                                          
14 Again in order to protect the anonymity of the village I cannot mention the source here. 
15 Fifteen mǔ are equal to one hectare. 
16 When I asked peasants how much land their family cultivated, they, especially the older ones, often 
told me that they had 1.7 or 1.8 mǔ per person, although old family members had died and new ones were 
born since the distribution of land. Only when I asked a second time they told me how much land they 
actually tilled. 
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to the village for the first time, everyone had already stopped due to falling prices. 
However, there were five to six small convenience stores in the village. Two households 
sold steamed buns and amother one cold vegetarian and meaty dishes. If guests from the 
outside came to the village, food was offered in the clean living room of another house-
hold. Villagers could have their wheat processed to flour and noodles in at least two 
different households. Other households had small rice processing machines. On the 
walls of some households it was written that they offered oil and water for motorized 
vehicles. Furthermore, there were three suppliers of agricultural inputs in the village. 
Every five days a temporary market came to the village. Villagers could buy 
shoes, clothing, vegetables, seeds, food, sweets, tools, dishes, and plates there (FN, 
2011-04-21). The temporary market was a recent development. A few years ago some 
houses had been torn down in order to widen the small road and to make room for the 
temporary market. During my time in the village I witnessed a violent fight between the 
party secretary and one angry villager, who complained about insufficient compensation 
(FN, 2011-06-04). As mentioned above in the first part of this chapter, land issues are 
now the most common cause for social unrest in the countryside. 
Concerning public welfare there was a small health station in the village, as well 
as a kindergarten and a primary school for the first six grades. After primary school 
children from the village could visit the junior middle school in the township and later 
on a senior middle school in the county town. 
After the beginning of the new millennium more and more villagers from 
Shǔidàozhuāng started to migrate to the cities to find work. At least one fifth of the vil-
lage’s population earned money as migrant workers in one of China’s big cities, a vil-
lager told me (FN, 2011-04-19). Some young people lived and worked in the nearby 
county town. When I walked through the village, I saw mainly women, old people, and 
many young children, but almost no young adults. 
Most villagers used electro bikes for mobility. Some of them were still using bi-
cycles. There were not many cars on the small roads of the village Shǔidàozhuāng. 
Wáng Wěi, the party secretary, owned a car. The other village cadres, most often Wáng 
Yàjūn, the accountant of the village, and sometimes Huáng Guóqiáng, used the little red 
minibus, which was supposed to be used for transporting things for the cooperative. In 
addition to these two cars, at least one villager was a taxi driver in Dàhé County. Some-
times cars were standing in front of the courtyards when relatives who lived in the cities 
visited the villagers. 
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In the village patrilocal residence was common, like in most parts of rural China 
(Fan 2008:9). During my time in the village several new houses were constructed. Usu-
ally new two-story buildings replaced older one-story buildings. 
Family clans played a not negligible role in the affairs of the village and the coop-
erative projects. In the village there were several clans, most importantly the Wángs, the 
Chéns, and the Huángs. 
The last village election took place in 2008. The next one was held shortly after 
my second time in the village at the end of November 2011. In 2008 Wáng Wěi, Wáng 
Yàjūn, Chén Yùjiàn, Huáng Guóqiáng and a woman called Lǐ Hóngyīng were elected to 
the village committee. Wáng Wěi, one of my main informants, was not only in the posi-
tion of party secretary but also in the position of chairperson of the village committee. 
Wáng Yàjūn was in the position of accountant. Lǐ Hóngyīng, whom I never saw at the 
building of the village committee during my stay in the village, was responsible for the 
implementation of birth control in the village. The former village accountant Gāo 
Shùnkāi, who was the chairperson of the Association for Environmentally Harmless 
Rice (or Rice Association), 17 was not reelected to the village committee. However, Hú 
Qǐhuá, my second main informant, complained to me about irregularities in the election 
process (HQH, 2011-05-06b:318–362, 2011-06-05:575–576, 2011-06-07:118–123). If 
we use He Baogang’s classification, which I shortly presented above in the section on 
the administrative structure, village democracy in Shǔidàozhuāng can roughly be classi-
fied as formalistic democracy, probably on the way to semi-democracy. In comparison 
with other Chinese villages, this is rather unexceptional. 
The village cadres did not benefit in a direct material way. Wages for the village 
cadres were low. Around 2005 the wage of the village cadres was a bit more than 100 
CNY per month; in 2011 it was 150 per month. Wáng Wěi, the party secretary, earned a 
bit more, namely 180 CNY per month. Starting in July 2011 he would earn more, name-
ly 1,430 CNY per month, because in 2008 he had passed an exam to become a govern-
ment employee (公务员 gōngwùyuán), Wáng Wěi told me. He claimed that he was the 
first pure peasant (纯粹的农民 chúncuì de nóngmín) in Hénán Province to pass this 
exam (WW, 2011-05-29:144–146, 2011-06-08c:327–335). 
                                                          
17 In the next chapter I offer a short summary of the conflict-laden history of the Association for Envi-
ronmentally Harmless Rice. 
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3.2.2 My two main informants 
Here I introduce my two main informants mentioned above. Wáng Wěi and Hú Qǐhuá 
told me many different stories about the village’s NRR projects. 
In their childhood Wáng Wěi and Hú Qǐhuá were not only schoolmates but also 
best friends (FN, 2011-04-20). Since the beginning both of them were also involved in 
the NRR projects in the village. In the process of the development of the cooperative 
projects, a split between them occurred. 
Wáng Wěi held many offices in the village but also at higher administrative lev-
els. In 2011 he was village party branch secretary, chairperson of the village committee, 
chairperson of the Peasant Cooperative Association, chairperson of the Professional 
Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Products, member of the Standing Committees 
of the People’s Congresses of Dàhé County, as well as of Píngyuán Municipality. 
Concerning cadres in the People’s Republic of China, Thomas Heberer differenti-
ates between (1) the political leading core, (2) the political elite, that is in leading posi-
tions at the central and provincial level, (3) the political sub-elite, that is leading distinct 
sub-areas, and (4) the local sub-elite, that is made up of leading officials of prefectures, 
municipalities, districts, counties, and townships. In the whole of China there are about 
nine million people that can be considered part of the local sub-elite. This is less than 
one percent of the population. Additionally there are about 45 million cadres at the local 
level, who have limited decision-making power and are closer to the people than to the 
elite (Heberer 2009a:161). 
According to this classification the other village cadres like Wáng Yàjūn, Chén 
Yùjiàn and Huáng Guóqiáng belong to the last huge group of local level cadres. Wáng 
Wěi, however, had managed to rise in political office in the past years. He can be con-
sidered to belong to the local sub-elite. 
Wáng Wěi was in his early forties by the time of my research in 2011. His family 
has always been selling veterinary medicine. In the early 1990s he followed his father 
and studied to become veterinarian. Until 1998 he served as veterinarian together with 
his father. Although competition was getting tougher in the 1990s, his family did very 
well in this field. In 1998 he registered a business with 300 thousand CNY together with 
a friend. The business went well. However, in 2000 Wáng Wěi left the business to his 
friend because he was chosen as party secretary of the village party branch and was 
elected as chairperson of the village committee. In that time the relationship between 
40 Imagined Cooperatives 
 
village cadres and the villagers was very tense because the cadres had to collect the tax-
es for the upper levels of administration. Conflicts often arose because villagers sus-
pected village cadres of putting the collected taxes into their own pockets. Hence, vil-
lagers were often unwilling to pay. Wáng Wěi explained that many people voted for 
him because he had a lot of money and they thought that he would not collect as much 
money from them as the others did. Furthermore, Wáng Wěi was young and his father 
had a lot of prestige in the village. He was not only the veterinarian. Many families also 
invited him to speak at weddings and other feasts. Nevertheless, Wáng Wěi did not like 
his post as village head and wanted to resign up until 2003 because, before the introduc-
tion of the taxation reform (税费改革 shùifèi gǎigé) in 2004, his job was nothing more 
than displeasing the villagers by collecting taxes. After the elimination of rural taxes the 
relationship between villagers and cadres improved, he told me. After a call from the 
agricultural bureau in 2004, Wáng Wěi got involved with Zhū Xiǎojuān and her NRR 
experiments (WW, 2011-05-15b:52–57,348–428). Since that time Wáng Wěi managed 
to rise in political office. Above I mentioned all of his positions. 
Hú Qǐhuá, my second main informant, counted his family among the poorest in 
the village and emphasized that his one-story house was old and worn out (HQH, 2011-
06-05:1023–1024). Indeed there were many families with new houses in the village. 
Since his marriage almost 20 years ago, Hú Qǐhuá has been raising pigs. He start-
ed with only two to five pigs. In 2011 he had forty pigs and his economic income 
stemmed mainly from pig farming (HQH, 2011-05-06a:33–46). According to Hú Qǐhuá, 
his family was not wealthy, because he and his wife had their own household since their 
marriage with only three mǔ of land. When his second child, a son, was born in 2000, 
almost no one from the village was working as a migrant worker in the cities. Around 
that time he was team leader of a small group, a subgroup of the village, and was busy 
with collecting the agricultural tax paid in grain and with organizing the digging of a 
channel together with other village folk. Taking care of these affairs until 2004, he had 
no time to migrate to the cities to work (HQH, 2011-06-05:1024–1051). In 2004 Wáng 
Wěi sent Hú Qǐhuá to participate in a training session about cooperatives. Hú Qǐhuá was 
fascinated by the idea of peasant cooperatives as a way of improving everyone’s situa-
tion in the village (HQH, 2011-05-07:151–157,388–393). Between 2004 and 2008 he 
was busy with the cooperative’s affairs as he was a council member of two NRR pro-
jects, namely the Rice Association and the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid (or 
Financial Cooperative). Therefore, in this period he still had no time and energy to im-
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prove his household income, he explained to me. Only in 2007 and 2008 was he disap-
pointed with developments within the cooperative and began to focus on expanding his 
family’s piggery. In 2007 he raised more than one hundred pigs and in 2010 he started 
raising chickens, too. However, he complained about losses due to a lack of experience. 
In 2011 he allegedly also made losses with his pigs and with vegetables due to bad 
weather. Hence, in 2011 he was raising fewer pigs as he was under economic pressure 
(HQH, 2011-06-05:1024–1051). 
According to a neighbor, Hú Qǐhuá managed to start new agricultural projects be-
cause he was specialized in agriculture, and was not a migrant worker. Furthermore, he 
had the ability to raise so many pigs and start other new projects because his family, 
namely his wealthy, elder brother, who had studied abroad, supported him financially 
(PYH, 2011-05-15:86–101). 
Hú Qǐhuá’s elder brother studied at the Railway Institute in Shànghǎi and worked 
in Zhèngzhōu in the communication department of the railway administration before 
going abroad for two years. When he returned to China he worked for a few years as 
technical manager in big telecommunication companies in Zhèngzhōu. After a few 
years he moved to Canada with his whole family (HQH, 2011-06-05:1056–1063). 
When I asked Hú Qǐhuá about his elder brother, he told me that although he could 
ask his elder brother for help in key moments, he did not want to do so. He did not want 
to depend on the help of others. He wanted to rely on himself. Hú Qǐhuá claimed that he 
did not use his brother’s money but borrowed several tens of thousands from the bank 
for buying the one hundred pigs in 2007 (HQH, 2011-06-05:1053–1063). 
Working as team leader and for the cooperative had a negative influence on his 
family’s economic development, but now Hú Qǐhuá felt that his family’s financial situa-
tion was slowly improving (HQH, 2011-06-05:1056–1063). His annual income was 
about 20 thousand CNY. Now he and his wife are cultivating ten mǔ of land. (HQH, 
2011-05-06a:39–60). Hú Qǐhuá started to concentrate on producing healthy, ecological 
and organic food because he—as an ordinary peasant, as one of the common people, he 
emphasized—realized the serious problem of food safety. However, in comparison to 
the thinking of other people, he viewed himself one step ahead (HQH, 2011-05-06a:77–
108). He claimed that many ideas that were realized in the cooperative projects were 
originally his ideas and only stolen and used by Wáng Wěi (HQH, 2011-05-06a:108–
109, 2011-05-06b:26, 2011-05-07:438–459,761). 
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Hú Qǐhuá had contact to urban consumers, who bought his ecological and organic 
agricultural products, like pigs, eggs, and chicken. They wanted his products because 
they trusted their quality. They were willing to pay a better price than on market. Even 
if Hú Qǐhuá did not want the financial help of his elder brother, he nevertheless made 
use of his elder brother’s connections to wealthy urban consumers. His brother intro-
duced Hú Qǐhuá to them (HQH, 2011-05-06a:113–158). With his elder brother’s friends 
Hú Qǐhuá discussed issues of food safety issues as well as market issues and they told 
him what they did not dare to eat (HQH, 2011-05-06b:40–51). However, according to 
Wáng Wěi, Hú Qǐhuá used the contacts he established when Wáng Wěi let him partici-
pate in meetings in his place concerning the cooperative in the city (WW, 2011-05-
06:175–176). 
Hú Qǐhuá stressed that there were not many people like him who consciously did 
not use agricultural chemicals and chemical fertilizers in agricultural production. He 
emphasized that no one required him to do so but that he himself wanted to do so 
(HQH, 2011-05-06a:312–320). 
During the interview it became clear that education was very important for him, 
especially when talking to students and intellectuals. He told me that he liked reading 
books and studying (HQH, 2011-05-06b:37–39). He proudly told me about his daughter 
who studied at the best school in the county town (HQH, 2011-05-06a:22). He also 
proudly recounted that NRR intellectuals applauded him for his proper standard Chinese 
(HQH, 2011-06-07:178–181). He further mentioned that once a NRR intellectual called 
him teacher Hú Qǐhuá after reading his report about the financial cooperation in the 
village (HQH, 2011-06-05:1198–1202). 
Hú Qǐhuá said about himself that he sometimes upset people because he spoke 
openly and directly on certain issues (HQH, 2011-06-07:196–197). Furthermore, Hú 
Qǐhuá told me that he never viewed himself as inferior to other people. As an example 
he told me about his meeting with Vice President Xí Jìnpíng, who visited the village in 
2009. When Hú Qǐhuá shook Xí Jìnpíng’s hand, Hú Qǐhuá thought that they were both 
Chinese and that they were both citizens and that they only had different duties. He 
himself was responsible for producing healthy foods, while Xí Jìnpíng was responsible 
for a better development of China (HQH, 2011-06-07:198–205). 
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3.2.3 The Peasant Cooperative Association 
In 2011 the Peasant Cooperative Association of Shǔidàozhuāng was officially an um-
brella organization of the NRR projects in the village. Wáng Wěi, the village party 
branch secretary and village committee chairperson of Shǔidàozhuāng, was also the 
chairperson of the cooperative association. In my first interview with him he gave me an 
overview of the village’s cooperatives (WW, 2011-05-03). There were five organiza-
tions under the umbrella of the cooperative association, namely the Professional Coop-
erative for Ecological Agricultural Products, the Professional Cooperative for Edible 
Mushrooms, the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid as well as the cultural troupe and 
the seniors’ Association (see figure below). The Professional Cooperative for Ecologi-
cal Agricultural Products included several sub-groups, which were literally called small 
groups (小组 xiǎozǔ). Wáng Wěi explained to me that these small groups could be 
called “cooperatives” (合作社 hézuòshè) as well. Only legally were they not separate 
cooperatives (WW, 2011-05-03:50–62). There are six sub-groups: the Small Group for 
Ecological Rice, the Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops, the Small Group 
for Raising Happy Pigs, the Small Groups for Organic Rice and Wheat, and the Small 
Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs (or Lotus and Crabs 
Small Group). 
Wáng Wěi claimed that he had been elected to chairman of the cooperative asso-
ciation in 2008. Hú Qǐhuá, former founding member of the Rice Association, doubted 
that there had been such an election. If there had been an election, then he had not been 
invited to participate, even though he was not only council member of the Rice Associa-
tion, but also vice-chairperson and accountant of the Financial Cooperative. He was not 
the only one who did not participate in the election. None of the council members of the 
former Rice Association knew about the election. In Hú Qǐhuá’s story Wáng Wěi only 
proclaimed himself to be the chairperson of the cooperative association (HQH, 2011-
05-27a:225–251). 
What astonished me was the fact that the peasant cooperative association held its 
first meeting at the end of May 2011, although it had already been established three 
years earlier in 2008 (FN, 2011-05-28). Hú Qǐhuá complained to me in an interview 
that, although he was a council member of the Financial Cooperative, he was not invited 
to the meeting (HQH, 2011-05-27a:233–245). For Gāo Shùnkāi, who was village ac-
countant until 2008 and the chairperson of the former Rice Association, and Hú Qǐhuá 
44 Imagined Cooperatives 
 
there was an obvious reason why there had been no meetings of the association until 
that point. Both suggested that the cooperative association was only a construct for pub-
licity reasons and that it did not de facto exist (HQH, 2011-05-27a:248; GSK, 2011-06-
03:480,500). Hú Qǐhuá claimed that the cooperative association was a construct that 
was only serving Wáng Wěi as a tool to control all the other projects (HQH, 2011-05-
27a:251–254). 
When I returned to the village in November 2011 Wáng Wěi was in Běijīng at 
that time. The village cadre Huáng Guóqiáng replaced Wáng Wěi temporarily. He told 
me that there have been no formal meetings of the cooperative association in summer or 
in autumn. In the village it was possible to handle such things informally, as people met 
each other quite often, he explained (FN, 2011-11-14). 
In chapters 4 to 9 I deal with several sub-organizations of the peasant cooperative 
association in more detail, but not with the cultural troupe, the seniors’ association, and 
the Professional Cooperative for Edible Mushrooms. Therefore I write little about them 
here. 
When I was in the village from April to June and in November the seniors’ asso-
ciation was inactive. The chairperson of the association, Chén Mùgēn, told me in an 
interview that the seniors’ association opened its doors only in winter. There were many 
activities for old people, even people from neighboring villages knew about these. The 
main advantage of this organization was said to be that the in-law relationships in the 
homes of the villagers improve (CMG, 2011-04-29:191–214).18 
Similar to the seniors’ association, the cultural troupe was not very active during 
my stays in the village. I only saw them performing once on April 30, when the cooper-
ative organized the second happy pig pre-order activities in the village. When asked 
about the relationship between cultural and economic cooperation, Wáng Wěi, the 
chairman of the cooperative association, answered that the relationship was one of mu-
tual aid (互相帮忙 hùxiāng bāngmáng). The cultural troupe was, for example, perform-
ing at marketing events of the cooperative, for example at the happy pig activities just 
mentioned. On the other hand the cooperative supported the cultural troupe financially 
if they needed to buy new instruments (WW, 2011-05-03:445–452). 
When I was in the village I only saw some material leftovers of the Professional 
Cooperative for Edible Mushrooms. In the buildings with the many small windows 
                                                          
18 There is more general information about seniors’ associations as NRR projects in rural China in Wang 
2009. 
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members of the cooperative had earlier been growing edible mushrooms. The Mush-
room Cooperative was established as a professional cooperative in 2007 (WW, 2001-
05-03:25), but it had existed since 2004. Because of falling prices, this business was, by 
2008 and 2009, not lucrative. According to Wáng Wěi, “the common people are very 
realistic, if they loose money, then they don’t grow it”.19 The Mushroom Cooperative 
did not operate in 2010 and in 2011, but officially it still existed, as it was still regis-
tered. The chairperson of this cooperative was Huáng Jiànguó, a member of the village 
party branch, a former member of the village committee and an active member of the 
Lotus and Crabs Small Group. At the beginning the Mushroom Cooperative was one of 
the best in the village, Wáng Wěi told me. Perhaps the Mushroom Cooperative will start 
operation again one day in the future (WW, 2011-05-03:11–33,71–75). 
In this chapter we had an ever closer look at rural China, at the village, and finally 
at the NRR project and at two main actors and informants. In the next chapter I summa-
rize the history of the village’s Rice Association and its transformation into the Small 
Group for Ecological Rice as part of the Professional Cooperative for Ecological Agri-
cultural Products. 
Figure: Organigram of the Peasant Cooperative Association 
 
Source: Own graphic, based on interview with Wáng Wěi (WW, 2011-05-03). 
                                                          
19 老百姓很现实嘛，赔了就不种。 Lǎobǎixìng hěn xiànshí, péile jiù bú zhòng (WW, 2011-05-03:19). 
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4 The History of the Rice Association 
In this chapter I summarize the history of Shǔidàozhuāng’s Association for Environ-
mentally Harmless Rice (hereafter RA) by putting together different narratives that ex-
isted in the village. It is a history of peasant cooperation, especially at the beginning, 
facing outside competition on the market and increasing conflict as well as alleged cor-
ruption within the organization and the village. 
4.1 Cooperation 
In 2004 cooperative projects were started in Shǔidàozhuāng with the help of the NRR 
intellectual Zhū Xiǎojuān. First the Cooperative for Economic Development was estab-
lished. Zhào Yùgāng, who was one of the three suppliers of agricultural inputs in the 
village, was elected in the position of the chairperson of the cooperative. With only one 
vote less, Hú Qǐhuá was elected to be one of the four other council members. Wáng 
Wěi, who saw himself as the initiator of the cooperative efforts in Shǔidàozhuāng (WW, 
2011-05-06:9–11, 2011-05-15b:18), was not in the council of the cooperative because 
of a rule made up by Zhū Xiǎojuān and Wēn Tiějūn. Village cadres were not allowed to 
participate in the leadership of the cooperative. Despite this rule Wáng Wěi, Zhào 
Yùgāng and Zhū Xiǎojuān allowed Gāo Shùnkāi, who at that time was the village’s 
accountant, to become an additional council member through a by-election (WW, 2011-
05-15b:11–29,106–122; GSK, 2011-06-03:49–58). 
As everyone was growing paddy in this locality, the council of the comprehensive 
cooperative proposed to establish the Association for Environmentally Harmless Rice. 
Everyone at the cooperative’s general assembly thought that it was a good idea. How-
ever, in order to get the RA started money was needed to pay for the environmental cer-
tification process and most peasants were not willing to take this risk. Finally six villag-
ers, mainly council members of the comprehensive cooperative, namely Gāo Shùnkāi, 
Hú Qǐhuá, Wáng Wěi, Zhào Yùgāng, and two other relatively wealthy villagers, invest-
ed a few thousand CNY in the RA. In addition, in 2005 the RA received money from 
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the Ministry of Agriculture with the help of Zhū Xiǎojuān and Wēn Tiějūn. The envi-
ronmental examination of the production area was passed and the rest of the invested 
money was used to organize technological training sessions on environmentally harm-
less production for the peasants. Furthermore, the RA rented a piece of land to build a 
warehouse and bought equipment for packaging. They also registered their own trade-
mark. 
The first council of the RA was not elected. It was simply comprised of those ini-
tial investors. Wáng Wěi and Zhào Yùgāng appointed Gāo Shùnkāi as the council 
chairperson of the RA. Wáng Wěi himself became the vice-chairperson of the RA. 
Peasants from Shǔidàozhuāng and the neighboring villages joined the RA by buy-
ing small shares. Organized in small production groups (生产小组 shēngchǎn xiǎozǔ), 
the members of the RA individually produced environmentally harmless rice on their 
own fields. At the beginning the RA supplied the participating peasants with agricultur-
al inputs. Not all members followed the strict criteria for environmentally harmless rice 
and some were excluded. 
After the paddy harvest, individual member households of the RA usually first 
stored their harvest at home. When they sold paddy to the RA, the RA promised to pay 
them the local market price of paddy per jīn (斤) plus an initial dividend (一次分红 yí 
cì fēnhóng) of 0,05 RMB per jīn.20 Then the RA sold the rice to urban consumers. How-
ever, the RA never distributed a second dividend (二次分红 èr cì fēnhóng) due to a lack 
of profits. 
The input costs for growing environmentally harmless rice were comparatively 
high and the output was comparatively low. However, the RA paid the peasants the ini-
tial dividend for their environmentally harmless rice. Nevertheless, considering the 
small seize of the peasant’s individual plots the overall benefit was limited. Hence, from 
the perspective of the chairperson of the RA, Gāo Shùnkāi, the RA’s success was lim-
ited (GSK, 2011-06-03:277–300). 
4.2 Competition 
The RA was organized like a marketing cooperative. Wáng Wěi summarized the 
idea behind marketing cooperatives as follows: Individual peasant households cannot 
enter the market on their own. If peasants get organized in a cooperative they can fulfill 
                                                          
20 One Chinese jīn is equivalent to half a kilogram. 
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all requirements and sell their own products on the market. In this manner they can earn 
money, which would otherwise be the profit of peddlers, wholesale dealers and super-
markets (WW, 2011-05-29:29–38). 
In practice this was, however, not so easy. Over the years the RA tried different 
methods of selling their environmentally harmless rice. Competition on the market was 
tough and sometimes other companies cheated them. 
Wáng Wěi and Hú Qǐhuá tried to sell rice themselves, first in Zhèngzhōu, the cap-
ital of Hénán Province, and later on in Běijīng. However, the urban consumers did not 
approve their products and preferred to buy rice in the supermarket. Only when Zhū 
Xiǎojuān helped them to arouse media attention did they manage to sell a lot of rice. 
However, even with the support of NRR activists, the costs of selling rice in the city 
were high and as soon as there was less and less media coverage the sales decreased as 
well. 
One of the customers in Běijīng put forward the idea of gòu mǐ bāo dì (购米包 
地). Gòu mǐ bāo dì literally means “purchase rice contract land”. It can be seen as one 
version of community supported agriculture. In 2006 Zhū Xiǎojuān organized a meet-
ing. Individual consumer households contracted half a mǔ of land and paid a deposit for 
it. Later on the urban consumers bought the rice harvested from their contracted land for 
a price they had agreed upon in advance. 
In March 2006 the RA entered for the first time the stores of a big supermarket 
chain with the help of friends from NRR intellectuals. However, the price the supermar-
ket paid the RA for the environmentally harmless rice was lower than when it sold the 
rice directly to urban consumers. Moreover, the supermarket did not pay immediately in 
cash. 
From 2008 to 2009 the successor organization of the RA, the Professional Coop-
erative for Ecological Agricultural Products, cooperated with a big glutamate company. 
The company paid the peasants a contracting fee and supplied them with fertilizer and 
agricultural chemicals. In turn the peasants produced rice for the company on the con-
tracted land. 
The RA, and later on the Professional Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural 
Products (or Professional Cooperative), also tried the method of sale on consignment. 
However, once a company in Shēnzhèn tricked them. Another attempt closer to the vil-
lage, namely in Zhèngzhōu, did not succeed because the consumers did not approve of 
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the high prices. The Professional Cooperative’s own shop in the county town (FN, 
2011-04-26), and a shop in the suburbs of Zhèngzhōu, which tried to sell products from 
several cooperatives from Dàhé County, faced the same problem (FN, 2011-11-08). 
From time to time the Professional Cooperative, the successor organization of the 
RA, also managed to sign contracts with big companies, which wanted to use the eco-
logical rice of the Professional Cooperative as a promotional gift. Possibilities for such 
contracts did not appear on a regular basis and competition for such contracts was tough 
(WW, 2011-05-29:268–280). 
The problem of selling the rice was one central aspect—if not the most important 
one—of the story Wáng Wěi told me about the history of the RA in the interviews. The 
key issue was the competition with other companies on the rice market. 
4.3 Conflict and Corruption 
In Hú Qǐhuá’s story the sales problem was not a big deal. Instead of this external prob-
lem he focused on internal disagreements and conflicts. Therefore, there exist different 
narratives within the village about how the transformation from the RA to the Profes-
sional Cooperative came about. 
In the interviews Wáng Wěi mentioned that some of the earlier council members 
left the RA because they were exhausted from supporting its development. However, 
additional contributions were necessary in order to develop Shǔidàozhuāng and the co-
operative. Hence, he and the other village cadres continued (WW, 2011-05-06:223–
227). However, not all of the council members dropped out of the RA voluntarily. 
Hú Qǐhuá told me that the first disagreement between him and Wáng Wěi ap-
peared in Běijīng around New Year 2005. Hú Qǐhuá felt that Wáng Wěi wasted the 
RA’s money by inviting journalists and higher-level leaders for meals, by giving rice as 
presents, by organizing expensive publicity activities, and by making private phone 
calls at the expense of the cooperative. Earlier on they had managed to sell the same 
amount of rice without spending so much money (HQH, 2011-05-07:320–481). 
Another conflict of interest between the village cadres and the RA arose because 
Wáng Wěi decided that the village committee was to deal with the gòu mǐ bāo dì con-
tracts in 2006. Wáng Wěi distributed the contracts to household who were not members 
of the RA. Ordinary members and council members of the RA were opposed to Wáng 
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Wěi’s decision because they felt that they did not receive the benefits they were entitled 
to (HQH, 2011-05-27a:583). 
In 2007 the village committee did not give the gòu mǐ bāo dì contracts to individ-
ual peasant households any more. Instead the village cadres used them for themselves. 
They rented more than fifty mǔ of land, according to Wáng Wěi, for the sake of better 
management (WW, 2011-06-08a:262–275). 
Both Zhào Yùgāng and Gāo Shùnkāi were removed from their offices as chairper-
son of the Cooperative for Economic Development and village accountant respectively 
through elections that were not in accordance with the statutes of the cooperative in the 
first case and manipulated in the second one (HQH, 2011-05-07:549–608, 2011-05-
27b:287–362,446–457, 2011-06-05:851–869; GSK, 2011-06-03:411–423; ZYG, 2011-
05-28:389–398). 
In 2008 Wáng Wěi registered the Professional Cooperative for Ecological Agri-
cultural Products with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Wáng Wěi was elected 
as chairperson of this new Professional Cooperative. At the end of 2009 Wáng Wěi 
brought about the cancellation of the RA. In Wáng Wěi’s own narrative he did so be-
cause the RA was not in accordance with 2007’s new law on professional cooperatives 
(WW, 2011-05-06:213–218, 2011-05-15b:146–239, 2011-06-08b:210–218). 
In Hú Qǐhuá’s narrative the village cadres had realized that the RA was success-
ful. After initial problems consumers finally accepted its products on the market and it 
was possible to make money. Hence, the village cadres created the Professional Coop-
erative and made use of the RA’s preparatory work (HQH, 2011-05-06b:206–212). 
In 2009 the village cadres started to use the material and immaterial property of 
the RA, namely the things bought with the initially invested money, the RA’s ware-
house and packaging machines, the packaging materials, the trademark and, hence, also 
the RA’s reputation, as well as the awards the cooperative projects received from the 
state (HQH, 2011-05-06b:175–178,381–394, 2011-05-27a:110–118,553–556; GSK, 
2011-06-03:433–437; ZYG, 2011-05-28:401–406). 
Furthermore, three former council members of the RA and other villagers told me 
that the village cadres who operated the Professional Cooperative bought conventional 
paddy or rice from outside the village. After packaging it they sold it as allegedly eco-
logical (or organic) rice, supposedly produced by the member households of the vil-
lage’s Professional Cooperative. The rumor went that, in this manner, the village cadres 
cheated the consumers and earned a lot of money (HQH, 2011-05-06b:214–220, 2011-
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05-07:707–730, 2011-05-27a:427–430, 2011-05-27b:439–442; ZYG, 2011-05-28:500–
522; FN, 2011-11-12). 
Of course, Wáng Wěi claimed that these rumors were not true (WW, 2011-05-
29:340–345). Be that as it may, what is a fact is that these rumors existed. James Scott 
(1985) pointed out that covert tactics of resistance, he called them everyday forms of 
peasant resistance, are more common among peasants than overt tactics. Gossip is one 
of these covert tactics. 
The village officials and the council members of the former RA shared the view 
that the village and party cadres controlled the cooperative projects in Shǔidàozhuāng. 
However, they disagreed on whether this was good or bad. 
From Wáng Wěi’s point of view it was a good thing. Otherwise there would be 
contradictions and the development of the cooperative would have been obstructed 
(WW, 2011-05-29:244–251, 2011-06-08a:174–181). 
From the perspective of the council members of the former RA, it was a problem 
that Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres de facto controlled the cooperative projects 
in the village. Although they had opposed Wáng Wěi’s plans in their position as council 
members of the RA, they did not manage to prevent him from holding irregular elec-
tions, from appropriating the gòu mǐ bāo dì contracts, from canceling the RA, and from 
using its property. According to Hú Qǐhuá, the main reason for this was that officials 
had many special rights in China. 
Hú Qǐhuá summarized the history of the early RA by describing what Wáng Wěi 
did as a “triple jump” (三级跳 sānjítiào): “In the first year it was a cooperative, in the 
second year it was the village [committee]’s, ... in the third year it became their own 
[thing].”21 
Ordinary members of the RA did not seem very concerned about the turbulent his-
tory of the RA. The influence on the other villagers was not as big as on the council 
members of the former RA who had invested quite a lot of money, time and energy into 
this cooperative venture. With this conflict-laden history in mind we can now have a 
look at the processes within the cooperative projects in the village in 2011. 
 
 
                                                          
21 第一年是合作社，第二年是村里的，⋯ ⋯ 第三年就成了他们自己的。 Dìyì nián shì hézuòshè, 
dì’èr nián shì cūnlǐ de, ... dìsān nián jiù chéngle tāmen zǐjǐ de le (HQH, 2011-05-07:672–674). 
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5 Ecological Rice and Minor Food Crops 
The Professional Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Products (or Professional Co-
operative) included several small groups which were not separately registered as coop-
eratives with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. In this chapter I deal with the 
Small Group for Ecological Rice (大米生态小组 dàmǐ shēngtài xiǎozǔ) and the Small 
Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops (小杂粮生态小组  xiǎozáliáng shēngtài 
xiǎozǔ). 
I write about the other small groups of the Professional Cooperative in separate 
chapters, namely the Small Group for Organic Rice and Wheat in the next chapter, the 
Lotus and Crabs Small Group in chapter 7 and the Small Group for Raising Happy Pigs 
in chapter 8. 
In the description of the Small Group for Ecological Rice (hereafter ER group) I 
use my empirical material to discuss the meaning of membership in the Professional 
Cooperative. I compare the former Association for Environmentally Harmless Rice (or 
Rice Association) with the later ER group of the Professional Cooperative and point out 
differences and similarities. Based on my empirical data on the small group I also write 
about the practices of leadership and gift giving through the village head and the other 
village cadres in the Professional Cooperative. 
When describing the Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops (hereafter 
MFC group) in the next section I compare it to the ER group, because of the many simi-
larities, and point out some differences. 
Whereas men managed the affairs of these small groups, their wives were also in-
volved in the operation of the cooperative as they were packaging the rice as well as the 
minor food crops. The next section focuses on this gendered division of labor within the 
cooperative. 
When Wáng Wěi, the chairperson of the Professional Cooperative, first presented 
the Professional Cooperative to me in an interview, he focused on the advantages. How-
ever, later he conceded that due to risks, limited benefits and the limited capacity of the 
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cooperative, participation of peasants was limited too. Before dealing with all the issues 
just mentioned, I start with a short introduction to the village’s Professional Coopera-
tive. 
5.1 The Professional Cooperative 
The Professional Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Products was officially 
founded on April 18, 2008. One month earlier, on March 18, Wáng Wěi had been elect-
ed by about eighty households to become chairperson of the council of the new Profes-
sional Cooperative (WW, 2011-05-15b:204–206, 2011-06-08b:210,218).22 According to 
Wáng Wěi, one of the common people proposed to use the method of raising hands for 
the election (WW, 2011-06-08b:220). 
Every year one general assembly was held, with about twenty to thirty of the 
eighty member households attending. Wáng Wěi thought that many households did not 
come to the meetings because many people were working somewhere outside of the 
village, and women were often busy with housework (WW, 2011-06-08b:233–248). In 
Wáng Wěi’s eyes many of the common people simply did not care about the collective. 
They did not care about the profits or about the losses of the collective, as long as they 
did not suffer any loss themselves (WW, 2011-06-08b:257–268). Wáng Wěi identified 
this as “small-peasant consciousness” (小农意识 xiǎonóng yìshi). He emphasized that 
he did not view this consciousness as an inevitable trait of these people. In a materialist 
way he explained that this small-peasant consciousness was created by the social sys-
tem, namely when China divided up the land and gave it to the small peasants (WW, 
2011-06-08c:111–114).   
Through the new law on cooperatives the state protected the professional coopera-
tives and gave them status as legal entities. The state also provided economic support, 
for example the Professional Cooperative was exempted from taxes (WW, 2011-05-
15b:239–240,253–254). 
                                                          
22 Whether this election was regular, as Wáng Wěi maintained (WW, 2011-05-15b:206), or not, was dis-
puted within the village, as I mentioned in the short summary of the history of the Association for Envi-
ronmentally Harmless Rice in the preceding chapter. 
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5.2 The Small Group for Ecological Rice 
In the first interview Wáng Wěi nearly forgot to tell me about the Small Group for Eco-
logical Rice (生态大米 shēngtài dàmǐ), although it was the biggest one, he told me, 
when it came to his mind (WW, 2011-05-03:331). 
In 2011 the surface area for ecological rice was increased from five to seven hun-
dred mǔ. This was all run by the cooperative according to Wáng Wěi (WW, 2011-05-
03:331–333; 2011-05-06:238). More than ninty households planted the rice on these 
seven hundred mǔ, according to Wáng Wěi (WW, 2011-05-03:359–360). 
The cooperative had the ability to sell the harvest of about four to five hundred 
mǔ, Wáng Wěi told me, which was only about seventy to eighty percent of all the rice 
produced in the village (WW, 2011-05-06:257–258). 
The cooperative organized a unified supply of agricultural inputs, for example of 
seeds (WW, 2011-05-03:332–333; 2011-05-06:233). However, Wáng Wěi told me that 
in fact the cooperative specified some varieties of rice, which were neither hybrid nor 
genetically modified. The peasants had to use these varieties if they wanted to sell the 
rice to the cooperative later on. Only earlier on did the Rice Association alone supply 
the peasants with the seeds. Now the peasants could also buy the suitable seeds at those 
three peasant households in the village who were selling agricultural inputs, such as 
seeds, fertilizer and agricultural chemicals (WW, 2011-05-03:362–364, 2011-05-
06:244–245). 
5.2.1 The meaning of being a member: selling rice to the cooperative 
As the village got the certification for environmentally harmless rice earlier on 
and as the cooperative organized countless training sessions from its foundation in 2004 
until 2007, the common people from the village and even from the neighboring villages 
all planted the rice according to the environmentally harmless standards, Wáng Wěi told 
me (WW, 2011-05-03:341–346,367–368). 
When asked if everyone who planted environmentally harmless rice was also a 
member of the cooperative, Wáng Wěi said that they all were. He explained this answer 
as follows. As everyone had participated in the training sessions on environmentally 
harmless production, the villagers could all produce according to these standards on 
their own initiative (WW, 2011-05-03:347–351,368–369). 
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However, the Professional Cooperative did not—in contrast to the earlier Rice 
Association—organize the production of environmentally harmless rice, former council 
members of the Rice Association told me. The former Rice Association even excluded 
some of its members because they did not produce in accordance with the standards 
(HQH, 2011-05-06b:218–220, 2011-06-05:269–384; GSK, 2011-06-03:458–459). 
When the Professional Cooperative collected the ecological rice,23 the peasants re-
ceived the market price plus an additional 0,08 CNY per jīn for processed rice or an 
additional 0,05 CNY per jīn for paddy (WW, 2011-05-03:351–357).24 Wáng Wěi un-
derstood this additional money as a kind of “protection” (保护 bǎohù) offered by the 
cooperative to everyone (WW, 2011-05-03:388–389). For one special kind of rice 
called Huángjīnqíng (黄金晴) the cooperative even paid the peasants an additional 0,37 
CNY per jīn (WW, 2011-05-06:235–236,38–40). 
In cases when the market price for rice was low, when the cooperative had an or-
der for rice coming in and when the peasants were not willing to sell their paddy, the 
cooperative tried to explain to everyone that it was very important for the reputation of 
the cooperative to fulfill the order. If still nobody wanted to sell the paddy to the coop-
erative, the village cadres and council members of the cooperative were mobilized to 
sell their rice, Wáng Wěi told me. In normal times the peasants only sold rice to the 
cooperative when they were in need for money and when they felt that the market price 
was high (WW, 2011-05-06:250–255).25 
Usually it was the village cadres and their family clans who sold their rice to the 
cooperative, for example Wáng Wěi’s older brother and his relatives, as well as Chén 
Yùjiàn’s and Huáng Guóqiáng’s relatives. Furthermore there were some reliable mem-
bers of the cooperative, Wáng Wěi stressed. They gave their rice to the cooperative, 
even if outside enterprises paid a better price. They did that, according to Wáng Wěi, 
because they knew that in times of falling prices these companies would put high pres-
sure on the prices and the cooperative did not do that (WW, 2011-06-08a:94–100). 
                                                          
23 Here Wáng Wěi first said “I” before he corrected himself and said “the cooperative” (WW, 2011-05-
03:353). 
24 One jīn is equal to half a kilogram. By “market price” Wáng Wěi meant the price the traders who came 
to the village to buy the paddy of the peasants were willing to pay (WW, 2011-06-08a:33). The former 
Rice Association also paid this additional money per jīn to its members (WW, 2011-05-03:351–357; 
GSK, 2011-06-03:327–328). 
25 This was very similar to what the council members told me about the practice of the former Rice Asso-
ciation (HQH, 2011-06-05:20–69; GSK, 2011-06-03:350–358). 
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Only once during my time in the village was I able to witness the cooperative’s 
practice of paddy collection. In early June I observed how peasants transported big bags 
of paddy to the building of the rice mill with their three wheeled vehicles. They parked 
their three-wheelers on the weighbridge in front of the rice mill. Zhèng Guìhuā, the wife 
of Wáng Wěi, took samples to find out about how much rice would be left after pro-
cessing. The peasant watched her husking the sample with a small machine. Then the 
load of paddy was weighed and multiplied with the calculated rate of rice. Zhèng 
Guìhuā wrote these numbers down into a notebook before the eyes of the villagers. The 
peasants did not immediately receive any money. Together with one of the women, who 
were hired by the cooperative for packaging the rice, the peasant unloaded her paddy, 
while Zhèng Guìhuā was already repeating the sampling and weighing procedure to-
gether with the next peasants (FN, 2011-06-05). 
The peasants could also sell their rice on their own, but they were not allowed to 
use the packaging of the cooperative and they would therefore not be able to get a high-
er price on the market, Wáng Wěi explained. The peasants could also sell their rice via 
personal relationships to consumers, who had heard about the good rice from 
Shǔidàozhuāng (WW, 2011-05-06:262–267). 
Some peasants in the village,26 especially council members of the former Associa-
tion for Environmentally Harmless Rice, which was the forerunner organization of the 
ER group of the Professional Cooperative, claimed that the new Professional Coopera-
tive had no members at all (HQH, 2011-05-06b:168–169, 2011-05-07:438–439), and 
that the money the cooperative earned belonged to those few village cadres (HQH, 
2011-05-06b:429). For example Hú Qǐhuá said: “They do not have a cooperative, but 
they say that there is one.”27 
With these other voices from the village in mind, I persistently asked Wáng Wěi 
whether or not the peasants who sold their paddy to the cooperative were members. He 
finally said that the permissiveness (随意性 suíyìxìng) of the members was high at the 
                                                          
26 Here I only mention some remarks of two villagers, who worked for the cooperative. Huáng Yùtíng, 
who cultivated organic rice and wheat for Wáng Wěi and the village cadres, said that there was no coop-
erative, no organization and no individuals. When I asked her, if there were no meetings, she said: “Look, 
did you see any meetings?” (你看你见过开会吗？  Nǐ kàn nǐ jiànguò kāihuì ma? HYT, 2011-06-
04a:443–445). Although I observed some meetings of the HP small group, I did not see any meetings of 
the ER group of the Professional Cooperative. Fāng Fēipéng, who cultivated lotus roots and crabs for the 
cooperative, said that this cooperative was only made up of four people, namely the village cadres and no 
one else (FFP, 2011-05-29:147–159). 
27 他们没有合作社，但他们就说有一个合作社。 Tāmen méiyǒu hézuòshè, dàn tāmen jiù shuō yǒu yí 
gè hézuòshè (HQH, 2011-05-06b:434). 
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moment. In one year they planted rice and participated, in the next they did not and 
withdrew voluntarily from the cooperative. Management was very permissive, very 
relaxed concerning membership, Wáng Wěi stated, pointing out that this was not only 
the case in this village. At the moment the operations of the cooperative could not strict-
ly conform to the requirements of the cooperative law, Wáng Wěi conceded. The reason 
for this was that the land was in the hands of the common people, he argued. Therefore 
the cooperative was unable to control what the peasants cultivated (WW, 2011-05-
03:371–381). 
The members of the cooperative did not have to pay a membership fee. Only once 
at the beginning of the Rice Association in 2005 had some of the current members paid 
20 CNY per mǔ (WW, 2011-05-03:382–383). 
Later Wáng Wěi specified that only those peasants who bought the seeds supplied 
by the cooperative received the additional 0,05 CNY per jīn. The cooperative also 
bought the rice of the others, but they usually did not receive the additional money. On-
ly before New Year 2011, Wáng Wěi told me, did the cooperative change this rule. 
Around that time the cooperatives had many orders and needed a lot of rice. Therefore 
the cooperative also paid the additional 0,05 CNY to peasants who did not get their 
seeds from the cooperative. Wáng Wěi saw a risk in this practice. He thought that this 
could make the peasants speculate that they did not need to buy the seeds from the co-
operative, but that they could still manage to sell the rice to the cooperative and receive 
the additional money (WW, 2011-06-08a:42–52). 
At the beginning the Rice Association signed contracts with its members about 
collecting their harvest. However, when the peasants did not want to give their paddy to 
the Rice Association, the contracts were useless. Later on the Professional Cooperative 
did not sign any contracts with the peasants, they only had oral agreements (WW, 2011-
06-08a:53–56). 
Thus, in Wáng Wěi’s version, the reason for not having contracts was that they 
would be useless for the cooperative in the case that peasants broke the contracts. How-
ever, he did not mention that it could also happen the other way around. 
Hú Qǐhuá told me one story about a broken promise Wáng Wěi made to peasants. 
Allegedly Wáng Wěi once told the villagers from a neighboring village that only if they 
bought the seeds the cooperative supplied the cooperative would collect their paddy and 
pay them a high price. After the harvest, Wáng Wěi never came to collect their paddy. 
Hence one peasant from that village became active and transported his paddy to the 
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cooperative, but later on Wáng Wěi did not give him any money. Wáng Wěi only told 
him that he should come again in two days time, but whenever the peasant came to 
Wáng Wěi to fetch his money, Wáng Wěi said that he had no money to pay him. After 
this event, the other peasants from that village also did not dare to give their paddy to 
the Professional Cooperative (HQH, 2011-06-05:694–703). 
The cooperative only bought the products from the peasants. This was the only re-
lationship the peasants had with the cooperative, Hú Qǐhuá claimed. When the village 
cadres then sold the agricultural products to urban consumers, the money they earned 
was their money. The peasants were not involved in the process of packaging, market-
ing and selling (HQH, 2011-05-27a:22–26). 
Indeed, when I talked with peasants in the village, many told me that they sold 
their rice to those who paid most for it (FN, 2011-06-03, 2011-06-05). Once a group of 
more than fifteen Chinese students from a vocational college of agriculture came to the 
village for one week to do some research. The peasants also told them that sometimes 
the market price was higher than the price the cooperative offered. They therefore did 
not always sell their paddy to the cooperative (FN, 2011-06-03). The peasants did not 
mention the cooperative as something special. Apparently, for them the Professional 
Cooperative was just another trader on the market. And obviously, the cooperative did 
not always offer the best price, although it announced that it always paid the market 
price plus the additional initial dividend. 
Peasants, who handed over their rice to the cooperative one day in June, told me 
that they did not always sell their paddy to the cooperative because of the price. How-
ever, they said that one advantage of the cooperative was that they did not have to 
transport their paddy so far. This statement was however relativized by my next obser-
vation. In the next alleyway some peasants sold their paddy to a trader who came from 
another province to the village. He collected the paddy right in front of the gate of the 
home of the peasants (FN, 2011-06-05). 
A few days later I told Wáng Wěi what I had observed. First he explained that 
some traders from South China were probably willing to pay a higher price, because the 
yields of the harvest of paddy was low in Hubei and Hunan Province due to a big 
drought and a flooding later on (WW, 2011-06-08a:20–22). 
Later he gave me two further reasons, which where independent of such weather 
influences on the market price. First Wáng Wěi told me about traders who could afford 
to pay a slightly higher price because they mixed fresh paddy with cheap aged paddy 
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from state warehouses. They would wash the old rice with special machines and add 
some flavor to it (WW, 2011-06-08a:58–67). 
The second reason Wáng Wěi mentioned was that there were about four to six 
very big rice companies in Hénán Province, whose rice had a very good reputation. 
Therefore they managed to sell ordinary rice for an extraordinary high price, which was 
much higher even than that of the Professional Cooperative’s ecological rice. The coop-
erative was not able to compete with these companies because of these two reasons 
(WW, 2011-06-08a:74–90). 
Wáng Wěi summarized this issue by stating that “the common people are like 
that, they sell the rice to those who are giving more.”28 
Indeed most peasants, whom Wáng Wěi called “members” of the cooperative, did 
not seem to view their relationship to the cooperative as something different from the 
market relationship they had to the small peddlers who come to the village to buy pad-
dy. Although the cooperative was supposed to bring an advantage in the form of the 
initial dividend, which was added to the market price, the cooperative did not even al-
ways offer the best price for the peasant. Most peasants in the village did not seem to 
view the cooperative as “their cooperative” and they were not involved in its operation. 
The relationship between buyer and seller on an ideal market ends as soon as the ex-
change is over. Market exchange is a kind of transaction that is mainly about the denial 
of obligation and the maximization of individual autonomy: 
What marks commercial exchange is that it’s “impersonal”: who it is that is selling something to 
us, or buying something from us, should in principle be entirely irrelevant. We are simply compar-
ing the value of two objects. (Graeber 2011:103) 
That is exactly what many villagers did when they decided whether to sell to the 
cooperative or to other traders. However, once the peasants gave their paddy to the co-
operative, a temporary bond between member/seller and cooperative/buyer was created, 
as the cooperative did not pay the peasants immediately. However, as soon as the coop-
erative gave the outstanding money to the peasant, the relationship with the cooperative 
was more or less over. 
Many peasants were reluctant to participate in the cooperative through selling be-
cause of the limited benefits the cooperative offered and the risk of not receiving any 
money at all for their produce. Most of those who sold their paddy to the cooperative 
                                                          
28 老百姓就是这样，谁给的高就卖给谁。 Lǎobǎixìng jiùshì zhèyàng ma, shuí gěi de gāo jiù màigěi 
shuí (WW, 2011-06-08a:87). 
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were, if it was not the village cadres themselves, the members of their family clans. 
Thus their relationship with the cooperative—a market relationship of buying and sell-
ing—was based on a preexisting social relationship of kinship—a social relationship 
that existed before the market exchange and persisted afterwards. 
Concerning the question of membership, the former Rice Association was in some 
respects similar and in some different to the ER group. The main difference was the 
stronger involvement of the members in the Rice Association. In the first year of the 
Rice Association, its members participated in many training sessions and they had to 
buy shares, albeit small ones, in the cooperative. Furthermore the members were orga-
nized into production teams with production team leaders being the link between the 
members and the council of the cooperative. There was mutual supervision and those 
who did not accord with the standards of the cooperative were excluded from it. At the 
beginning only the Rice Association supplied the members of the cooperative with agri-
cultural inputs. 
However, changes in organization and member involvement already started before 
the more radical break with the foundation of the Professional Cooperative in 2008 and 
the cancellation of the Rice Association in 2009. Even before that, the Rice Association 
did allow its members to buy agricultural inputs from other traders. Already in the se-
cond year members did not have to buy any shares or pay any membership fees. And at 
that time the council members directly informed the members if the Rice Association 
wanted to buy their paddy. Although the production teams still existed, the production 
team leaders no longer served as a link between members and council. 
One constant feature was that both the Rice Association and the ER group paid 
the peasants a initial dividend of an additional 0,05 CNY per jīn of paddy. The only 
change in this regard was that the ER group introduced a special kind of rice and that 
they paid a higher initial dividend for this kind of rice, namely 0,37 CNY per jīn. 
What remained the same was that the peasants only sold their paddy to the coop-
erative if they were in need of money or if the marked price for paddy was high. If the 
ordinary members were not willing to sell, it was the council members who gave their 
paddy to the Rice Association or the Professional Cooperative later on. However, a cru-
cial change occurred concerning who the council members were. With the change from 
the Rice Association to the Professional Cooperative not one council member stayed the 
same. Now it was exclusively village cadres who ran the ER group. 
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5.2.2 Village cadres in control 
The ER group had four shareholders, namely Wáng Wěi, Wáng Yàjūn, Chén Yùjiàn 
and Huáng Jiànguó, Wáng Wěi told me in one early interview (WW, 2011-05-06:269–
275).29 Wáng Wěi stressed, that there had been more shareholders earlier on. However, 
no one wanted to continue because there was not a lot of money to be earned when the 
production of rice decreased (WW, 2011-05-06:269–275).30 Only those four kept the 
cooperative up and running and now managed the cooperative (WW, 2011-05-06:269–
275). 
Hú Qǐhuá pointed out that this did not meet the standards of the new cooperative 
law, according to which a cooperative needed to be made up of at least five member 
households (HQH, 2011-05-27a:123–129). In Wáng Wěi’s representation of the Profes-
sional Cooperative, it was made up of several small groups. Even if Hú Qǐhuá was right, 
and there were no other members involved in the operation of the so called cooperative 
(HQH, 2011-05-06b:168–169, 2011-05-07:438–439),31 there were at least five village 
cadres involved, namely Wáng Wěi, Wáng Yàjūn, Chén Yùjiàn, Huáng Jiànguó,32 and 
Huáng Guóqiáng if the small groups for rice, minor food crops, and lotus roots and 
crabs were taken together. I witnessed that even more households were involved in the 
Happy Pig Small Group. However, if the small groups for rice, minor food crops and 
                                                          
29 In fact in that interview Wáng Wěi said Huáng Guóqiáng (WW, 2011-05-06:269–275), but he must 
have meant Huáng Jiànguó. Huáng Guóqiáng himself said that he was not involved in selling rice and 
minor food crops (HGQ, 2011-05-27b:398–403), and Huáng Jiànguó said that he had a share in the eco-
logical rice and minor food crops small groups and Huáng Guóqiáng did not (HJG, 2011-06-04:335–346). 
Hú Qǐhuá said that the four village cadres originally involved in the operation of the Professional Cooper-
ative were Wáng Wěi, Wáng Yàjūn, Chén Yùjiàn and Huáng Jiànguó. Although Huáng Jiànguó had no 
longer been part of the village committee since 2008, he was still involved in the operation of the Profes-
sional Cooperative because he also held a share in the cooperative. Huáng Guóqiáng, who replaced 
Huáng Jiànguó in the village committee, was involved in the Happy Pig Small Group of the Professional 
Cooperative. However, it was not clear to Hú Qǐhuá if Huáng Guóqiáng was also involved in the other 
parts of the cooperative (HQH, 2011-05-27a:82–93). 
30 The stories former council members and shareholders of the Rice Association told me were quite dif-
ferent. They wanted to continue, but they could not. According to their accounts, the village cadres occu-
pied the warehouse of the Rice Association and stole its material (such as the packaging machines) and 
immaterial (such as the certification for environmentally harmless production and the trademark) property 
(HQH, 2011-05-06b:175–178, 2011-05-27a:110–118, 2011-06-05:483–495; GSK, 2011-06-03:459–
463,515–516; ZYG, 2011-05-28:401–406). They claimed that from those managing the ER group today 
only Wáng Wěi had been among those six people who had made a bigger initial investment to get the 
Rice Association started. Wáng Yàjūn and Chén Yùjiàn had only made the small investment of 20 RMB 
per mǔ of environmentally harmless rice and Huáng Jiànguó had not even bought these small shares in 
the Rice Association (ZYG, 2011-05-28:309–310). 
31 Wáng Wěi claimed that there was a general assembly of the Professional Cooperative every year with 
about thirty of the eighty member households attending (WW, 2011-06-08b:233–248). I was unable to 
witness with my own eyes whether this was true or not as I did not stay in the village for a whole year. 
32 Since 2008 Huáng Jiànguó has no longer been on the village committee, but he has still been in the 
village party branch (WW, 2011-05-29:241–242), and thus villagers still referred to him as village cadre. 
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lotus and crabs were treated as separate cooperatives, Hú Qǐhuá was right that each 
group did not have more than four member households who were involved more deeply 
in the operation of these small “cooperatives”. 
In spring 2011 Wáng Yàjūn was responsible for the management of the ER group. 
He managed the warehouse, the transport and the financial affairs, as well as the small 
store of the cooperative in the county town (WW, 2011-05-06:269–275). During my 
time in the village I saw Wáng Yàjūn selling ecological rice to visitors who came to the 
village. I also saw him transporting packaging materials from the county town to the 
warehouse in the small red minibus (FN, 2011-06-02). 
Hú Qǐhuá claimed that in fact Wáng Wěi controlled everything in the Professional 
Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Products and that there were contradictions 
between the village cadres. Wáng Wěi was the only one who had an overview of all the 
operations of the cooperative. According to Hú Qǐhuá, Wáng Wěi used the method of 
rotation of work orders to prevent the other village cadres knowing about all the income 
and expenses of the cooperative. Wáng Wěi would for example give the key of the 
warehouse to one person for two months, and then to someone else for the next period 
of time. That person knew how much paddy came in and how much rice went out dur-
ing that period of time. That person also knew how much money the cooperative should 
pay or earn but that person would never get the money as Wáng Wěi controlled this 
aspect of the cooperative’s operation. In the case of the MFC group, Wáng Wěi would 
first let Huáng Jiànguó buy or sell the beans outside of the village, then he would 
change the responsibility to Wáng Yàjūn, then to his own wife, then to Chén Yùjiàn and 
so on. In this manner the other village cadres all knew a little bit, but they did not know 
how much was bought and sold in total and how big the whole profit was. That way 
they were not able to know for sure if Wáng Wěi put some of the money into his own 
pocket and how much it was. Only Wáng Wěi knew about all the expenses and all the 
income, Hú Qǐhuá asserted. Therefore, Wáng Wěi could always tell the other village 
cadres that the cooperative did not earn a lot of money. Hú Qǐhuá was certain that the 
cake was not equally divided among the village cadres. All the people visiting the vil-
lage would first come to Wáng Wěi. His name appeared in all the news about the coop-
erative, in the media, and was written on all the packaging materials. People from the 
outside only knew Wáng Wěi. My evidence from participant observation of visits of 
students, intellectuals, leaders and urban consumers in the village coincide with Hú 
Qǐhuá’s observation of the distribution of social capital, to use Pierre Bourdieu’s term 
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(Bourdieu 1986), generated through the cooperative. Hú Qǐhuá could not say anything 
about the concrete circumstances concerning the internal distribution of economic capi-
tal generated by the cooperative. However, Hú Qǐhuá estimated that Wáng Wěi took 
about fifty to eighty percent of the cooperative’s income for himself. The other village 
cadres also received a part, but much less than Wáng Wěi. Wáng Wěi would only give 
them some small benefits, to make them go along with him (HQH, 2011-06-07:794–
839).33 
These little benefits were not even direct monetary benefits all the time. Hú Qǐhuá 
heard that the wife of Huáng Jiànguó, a former member of the village committee, com-
plained that Wáng Wěi asked them to invest money in the cooperative again and again, 
but that they did not get any money back. Therefore Hú Qǐhuá was convinced that there 
were internal contradictions within the cooperative (HQH, 2011-06-07:839–853). 
Instead of monetary benefits, Wáng Wěi could provide his accomplices with other 
benefits, Hú Qǐhuá pointed out. Apart from corruption, the other village cadres profited 
from Wáng Wěi allowing them to be village cadres. In the case that there arose a con-
flict between their family and other families, their position as village cadres and their 
connection to Wáng Wěi would be of advantage to them (HQH, 2011-06-07:906–912). 
During my stay I was not able to find enough evidence to prove that Hú Qǐhuá’s 
description of the rotation in the management of the cooperative was indeed close to 
reality. For one my stay was not long enough to find out through participant observa-
tion, and secondly Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres were not very talkative when 
I asked them about the internal affairs of the cooperative. Some interviews with the vil-
lage cadres, especially the one with Wáng Yàjūn, developed from an interview into 
something more like an interrogation (IR WYJ, 2011-05-25). During one of my earlier 
interviews with Wáng Wěi, the other village cadres were even in the same room and 
could hear everything that Wáng Wěi told me. It is possible that this was just a coinci-
dence. On that evening they awaited the arrival of Zhū Xiǎojuān and a manager from 
Běijīng (IR WW, 2011-05-06). The fact is that the other village cadres already knew 
what Wáng Wěi told me about the cooperative before I interviewed them. If what Hú 
Qǐhuá told me was true and Wáng Wěi really took the lion’s share of the cooperative’s 
profit, the others would very probably not talk about it with me because of the possible 
                                                          
33 Indeed one village cadre at first repeated all the reasons Wáng Wěi had already given me as explana-
tion for the constant losses of the Professional Cooperative. However, when I said that I could not imag-
ine that all these things cost so much, he said that he also could not explain very clearly where all the 
income of the cooperative went (CYJ, 2011-05-29:235–275). 
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consequences. The short history of the Rice Association showed that Wáng Wěi was 
able to get rid of those people who did not go along with him, as the cases of Gāo 
Shùnkāi, Zhào Yùgāng and Hú Qǐhuá demonstrated. 
However, back to the limited evidence I collected through participant observation 
concerning the management tasks. As mentioned above, I saw Wáng Yàjūn organizing 
the operation of the ER group. Only once did I see someone else involved in the opera-
tion of the small group. The wife of Wáng Wěi was collecting and weighing the paddy 
some peasants sold to the cooperative (FN, 2011-06-05). Mǎ Zhìyǒng assisted Wáng 
Yàjūn in the management and was responsible for issuing invoices (WW, 2011-05-
06:269–275). 
The point I want to make to summarize this section about the leadership of the ER 
group is that cooperation is not automatically egalitarian. The Professional Cooperative 
not only created economic but also social capital (Bourdieu 1986). The Professional 
Cooperative aroused the attention of many intellectuals and government officials be-
cause the projects in Shǔidàozhuāng were part of the NRR movement. The social capi-
tal was not equally distributed within the ER group. Involvement of ordinary members 
in cooperative affairs was low. Therefore they could barely establish any new connec-
tions with outside visitors. Even the village cadres, who managed the cooperative, did 
not benefit to the same extent. Wáng Wěi, who was both the chairperson of the village 
committee and the village party branch secretary, profited the most from the social capi-
tal produced by the model cooperative. Whereas this was easily visible during my stay 
in the village, it was harder to find out what happened to the economic profits of the 
cooperative. According to the village cadres, especially Wáng Wěi, the ER group made 
no profit at all. However, other villagers doubted whether or not this was true. They 
suspected that the village cadres made profits and that the profit was shared unequally. 
It was impossible for me to find enough evidence to support or refute this hypothesis 
with high certainty. I did not manage to have a look at the account books of the coop-
erative. Even this would not prove anything. During my stay in the village, several vil-
lagers made their own estimations and calculations about the alleged profits or losses of 
the cooperative. They had to do so, because, as Hú Qǐhuá told me once, Wáng Wěi and 
the village cadres did not publish all the information about the money the village and 
the cooperative received from the state, although they were supposed to do so in order 
to enable mass supervision (HQH, 2011-05-27b:431–437). However, apparently the 
villagers did not manage to force the village committee and the cooperative to operate 
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with more transparency. Since the beginning of the cooperative project it had been dif-
ficult to keep clear accounts. Hú Qǐhuá, who was the first accountant of the Rice Asso-
ciation, complained to me in an interview that it was hard for him to keep the accounts 
because he did not receive the invoices of those who were selling the rice in the differ-
ent places in time (HQH, 2011-06-05:333–341). With the change from the Rice Associ-
ation to the Professional Cooperative, inconsistencies persisted. According to Wáng 
Wěi, the chairperson of the Professional Cooperative, some accounts were still not set-
tled because of the bad relationship between the former council members, who had 
managed the Rice Association, and the village cadres, who now managed the Profes-
sional Cooperative (WW, 2011-05-15b:443–449). 
Although the central role Wáng Wěi played in decision making and in the contact 
with the outside world suggested that what was true for the distribution of social capital 
might as well be true for the distribution of economic capital, it did not need to be so. 
Even if it was true that the cooperative made no profits, the alleged losses of the coop-
erative were in part caused by gift-giving, a social practice crucial in building social 
relationships—as the anthropologist Marcel Mauss pointed out in his famous essay 
“The Gift” (Mauss 1968)—or, to return to Bourdieu’s terminology, in building social 
capital. 
5.2.3 The costs and benefits of gift giving 
Shǔidàozhuāng became famous and it was mainly officials who bought rice from the 
Professional Cooperative because it was a trademark with a good reputation, Wáng Wěi 
told me. As a local speciality, the rice was often given as a present. Especially at Chi-
nese New Year, many work units gave the cooperative’s rice as welfare presents to their 
employees. At that time the cooperative received many orders and processing took quite 
a while. Therefore, before New Year everyone tried to be first. The work units even 
made orders and paid in advance. Normally the rich bought the cooperative’s rice, and 
only very few common people (WW, 2011-05-29:204–210). 
Although the customers were mainly officials, they still bought the products of the 
Professional Cooperative on credit. Therefore, the profit of the Rice Association was 
basically made up of outstanding invoices (WW, 2011-05-29:215–216). 
What further prevented the Professional Cooperative from making profit was that 
Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres often gave presents to leaders visiting the vil-
lage. Sometimes they did not really want to do it, but they did it in order not to lose 
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face. In an interview Wáng Wěi told me a story about what had just happened that 
morning. Leaders from the Zhèngzhōu Bureau of Animal Husbandry came to visit the 
village. Local leaders from the Dàhé County Bureau of Animal Husbandry as well as 
leaders from the township government accompanied them. They urged Wáng Wěi to 
give the higher-level leaders some packages of their tasty rice and minor food crops as a 
present. They told him that it did not need to be a lot, just five or ten bags. In order not 
to lose face Wáng Wěi got ten bags from the cooperative’s warehouse and gave it to 
leaders without charging them for it. In this manner the cooperative lost money (WW, 
2011-06-08b:70–83). Once, when business people from Zhèngzhōu visited the village, 
leaders from the Discipline Inspection Bureau of Dàhé county, who had good relations 
with them, proposed that the cooperative handed out some rice as presents to them. 
These presents were worth more than four thousand CNY, Wáng Wěi told me (WW, 
2011-05-29:217–220). 
Sometimes the village cadres also decided on their own to present the cooperative 
products as a gift to visitors. A professor from the rural development sociology group 
from Wageningen University in the Netherlands, who visited the village together with 
her Ph.D. student, wanted to buy some rice for her. As Wáng Wěi was not present, 
Wáng Yàjūn gave the rice to her. However, he did not charge her (FN, 2011-05-13). 
Whereas Wáng Wěi only mentioned the negative influence of giving presents to 
leaders, Hú Qǐhuá asserted that Wáng Wěi also used presents (and money) in order to 
gain protection from leaders from above (HQH, 2011-05-27b:243–246). 
To summarize this section I want to turn to Marcel Mauss’ (1968) theoretical 
thought on the ambiguity of these gifts, and on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) general science 
of the economy of practices. Marcel Mauss stressed that there is an inherent tension in 
gift giving: On the one hand it appears as a voluntary and selfless act, but on the other 
hand it seems obligatory and selfish (Mauss 1968). Wáng Wěi stressed that he felt that 
there was an obligation to give gifts to visiting, higher-ranking officials. Apparently he 
(and the lower-ranking officials who asked him to do so) felt that they were indebted to 
the higher-ranking officials, maybe because they took the time to come down to the 
village. By giving them a lot of the cooperative’s expensive and tasty rice, he quite 
probably not only paid this “debt”, but also created new “debt” on the side of the high-
er-ranking officials.34 In this way Wáng Wěi established a relationship with the higher-
                                                          
34 As mentioned above, Wáng Wěi claimed that the rice was worth more than four thousand CNY (WW, 
2011-05-29:217–220). 
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ranking officials, who were now indebted to him. While Wáng Wěi denied this side of 
the gift and not only presented it as selfless but also disadvantageous for him, his adver-
sary Hú Qǐhuá only stressed the selfish character of such gifts because the high-ranking 
officials might now help and protect Wáng Wěi in times of need. Of course there is no 
guarantee of that. The obligation is as voluntary for them as the act of giving rice was 
for Wáng Wěi. 
With Bourdieu (1986:253), who offers a theoretical perspective on such transfor-
mations of economic capital into social capital, we might look at the above mentioned 
situation of gift giving like this: “From a narrowly economic standpoint, this effort is 
bound to be seen as pure wastage, but in the terms of the logic of social exchanges, it is 
a solid investment.” One might argue that by talking about the gifts from this narrowly 
economic perspective, Wáng Wěi hid the fact that the apparent economic loss could 
also be viewed as a profit in terms of social capital. 
Before turning to another commodity sold by the cooperative, namely the minor 
food crops, I want to finish this summary by pointing out that Wáng Wěi (and some-
times the other village cadres) used the economic capital of the cooperative to create 
social capital for themselves. The high cost of gift giving prohibited the cooperative 
from giving bigger economic benefits to its members. On the other hand, the practice of 
gift giving indirectly also benefited the cooperative, as the village cadres, especially 
Wáng Wěi, could use the gift-created and gift-cultivated relationships to sell even more 
of the cooperative’s products. However, these benefits did not seem to trickle down to 
its members. 
5.3 The Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops 
The Chinese term “xiǎozáliáng” (小杂粮) can be translated as “minor food crops”. It is 
also often translated as “food grains other than wheat and rice”. In the case of the coop-
erative the term included not only millet (小米 xiǎomǐ), but also different kinds of 
beans, such as black mung beans (黑绿豆 hēilǜdòu) and red beans (红豆 hóngdòu). 
Maize was not included. 
Hú Qǐhuá, a council member of the former Rice Association and one of the adver-
saries of Wáng Wěi, claimed that originally it was his idea to grow minor food crops in 
the village, for example the black mung beans. He wanted to introduce such a fine va-
riety because on the market there was no such thing at that time. He knew that rarity 
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enhanced the value. Indeed, the black mung beans could be sold for ten CNY per jīn 
(HQH, 2011-05-06a:108–115). However, Hú Qǐhuá did not participate in the MFC 
group. He sold his minor food crops directly to urban consumers, whom he called his 
friends (HQH, 2011-05-06a:194–200). At the beginning Wáng Wěi said to him that the 
minor food crops would be part of the cooperative, Hú Qǐhuá recounted. However later 
on it was changed into “their own” project. By “them” Hú Qǐhuá meant Wáng Wěi and 
the other village cadres (HQH, 2011-05-07:767). Yet, to the outside they said that their 
“clique” (小团体 xiǎotuántǐ) or “small gang” (小团伙 xiǎotuánhuǒ)—that is how Hú 
Qǐhuá called it—was a cooperative because otherwise the consumers would not trust 
their products (HQH, 2011-05-27a:26–32). In my interviews Hú Qǐhuá complained sev-
eral times that Wáng Wěi stole his ideas and used them for the cooperative and then for 
himself (HQH, 2011-05-06a:108–109, 2011-05-06b:26, 2011-05-07:438–459). 
The MFC group was organized in a similar way to the ER group. It offered a uni-
fied supply of seeds to the peasants who produced minor food crops. According to 
Wáng Wěi, the peasants could not easily buy this kind of seeds from other traders be-
cause they were rather special (WW, 2011-05-03:393–394). 
After the harvest the cooperative bought the minor food crops from the peasants 
and gave them the market price plus an additional ten percent as an initial dividend 
(WW, 2011-05-03:395,407). Wáng Wěi gave me some examples. The price the cooper-
ative paid for one jīn of black mung beans was one CNY higher than the market price, 
namely 11 instead of 10 CNY. When the market price for red beans was 5,5 CNY per 
jīn, the cooperative paid 6,05 CNY (WW, 2011-06-08a:162–164).  
Wáng Wěi explained that when the council members of the Professional Coopera-
tive decided how much additional money the MFC group wanted to give to the peas-
ants, they considered all the costs of selling the minor food crops, such as the wages and 
the packaging material. They calculated how much money they could make and how 
much they could give to the peasants. They decided to give the peasants about ten per-
cent, because like this the cooperative could still make profits (WW, 2011-06-08a:166–
172). 
In the case of black mung beans, the market price was 10 CNY per jīn. After 
packaging the costs amounted to 14 CNY, according to Wáng Wěi. The cooperative 
sold the package, including eight kinds of minor food crops, for 60 CNY to consumers 
and for 55 CNY on the wholesale market. In this manner the cooperative made a profit 
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of about eight to nine CNY per item without paying the peasants the initial dividend 
(WW, 2011-06-08b:101–106). 
Some peasants, for example the former council member of the Rice Association 
Hú Qǐhuá, did not consider this practice of giving the peasants a dividend of an addi-
tional ten percent as appropriate for calling the organization of the village cadres a co-
operative. From his perspective the village cadres bought the minor food crops from the 
peasants, packaged it, and sold it for a high price. All the money the so-called coopera-
tive earned was in fact the profit of the village cadres. If it was a cooperative, the prac-
tice should be implemented in the following way: First the minor food crops should be 
collected, packaged and sold. Only afterwards would all members share the income. 
The cooperative would get a very small amount of money for operation, but the major 
part would be distributed as a dividend among the masses (HQH, 2011-05-07:761–767). 
The cooperative managed to give larger benefits to the peasants in the case of the 
minor food crops than in the case of the ecological rice because the cooperative sold the 
minor food crops for a very high price (WW, 2011-06-08b:112–114). 
Another difference to the ecological rice was that peasants in the Central Plains of 
China traditionally did not use any kind of fertilizer for growing beans and minor food 
crops (except maize and sesame), Wáng Wěi told me. The yields were nevertheless very 
high. That the peasants did not need to use fertilizer also meant that they could save 
some labor, and this made growing minor food crops even more attractive (WW, 2011-
06-08b:123–128). 
In my first interview with Wáng Wěi he estimated that about fifty households par-
ticipated in the production of minor food crops (WW, 2011-05-03:402–403). However, 
in our final interview he told me that it was only about thirty or thirty-five households 
(WW, 2011-06-08b:116–117). 
The real acreage of minor food crops (without maize) in the village is about one 
hundred to one hundred and fifty mǔ, although the cooperative claimed to have an acre-
age of three hundred mǔ, Wáng Wěi disclosed (WW, 2011-06-08b:133–134). 
Similar to the group for ecological rice, the cooperative informed its members 
when someone ordered minor food crops. The peasants then had the possibility to deliv-
er their minor food crops to the cooperative. Sometimes the peasants themselves told 
the cooperative when they wanted to sell their minor food crops. It would be unreasona-
ble not to buy the peasant’s products in such a situation because the peasants were “your 
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members” (你的成员 nǐ de chéngyuán), Wáng Wěi told me (WW, 2011-06-08a:204–
209). 
The MFC group had been cooperating very well in the last few years, according to 
Wáng Wěi (WW, 2011-05-03:393). In accordance with the principles of cooperatives, a 
second dividend would be distributed to the members if the cooperative made profits. 
Yet the MFC group never distributed a second dividend, Wáng Wěi explained. There 
were several reasons for this, according to Wáng Wěi. Firstly, the costs of management 
were high. There were many outstanding accounts, some of which were uncollectible. 
Secondly, every year the MFC group paid four thousand CNY for public welfare be-
cause it made profits. This was Wáng Wěi’s decision: “I told it [the small group] to do 
it.”35 This public welfare financed by the MFC group included the electricity bill for the 
road lamps, the wage for the women who were responsible for cleaning and garbage 
collection.36 Furthermore the profit of this group was used for financing eggs in gift 
boxes (WW, 2011-05-03:408–414). In another interview Wáng Wěi gave me a further 
reason for the losses of the Professional Cooperative. The Professional Cooperative 
organized activities for urban consumers in the village every year, for example the hap-
py pig activities for signing the happy pig contracts in spring and the ecological culture 
tourism festival (生态文化旅游节 shēngtài wénhuà lǚyóu jié) in autumn. These activi-
ties were not only exhausting to organize, but also very expensive (WW, 2011-05-
29:217–224).37 
Some villagers—not only the council members of the Rice Association, who did 
not have a good relationship with Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres—thought that 
it was possible that the cooperative nevertheless made profits and that the village cadres 
stuffed money into their own pockets (FN, 2011-06-03).  
                                                          
35 我就让它去办。 Wǒ jiù ràng tā qù bàn (WW, 2011-05-03:412). 
36 Although this was for the good of everyone, Hú Qǐhuá said that this was not possible. In his eyes, the 
village committee was supposed to pay for the public services such as garbage collection and the elec-
tricity for the road lamps. What Wáng Wěi said was “sheer nonsense” (无稽之谈 wújīzhītán). Hú Qǐhuá 
explained that Wáng Wěi said that the expenses of the village committee were expenses of the Profes-
sional Cooperative, because the Professional Cooperative was fake and did in fact not exist (HQH, 2011-
05-27a:2–6). Fāng Fēipéng, who worked for the cooperative at the lotus field, also thought that the village 
committee should pay for these expenses. However, he noted in an informal conversation, if the village 
committee did not have enough money, it was okay if the village cadres also used the money from the 
cooperative (FN, 2011-06-03). 
37 Fāng Fēipéng confirmed that the cooperative lost money by organizing these promotion activities. He 
recounted that the cooperative had prepared food for the urban consumers last autumn. However, they did 
not know about it and brought their own drinks and food. Thus the cooperative lost about two thousand 
CNY, according to Fāng Fēipéng (FN, 2011-06-03). 
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Apparently to emphasize that he and the other village cadres did not benefit from 
the profits of this small group, Wáng Wěi told me that those involved in the manage-
ment worked for the small group for free. They did not get a wage. Wáng Wěi also told 
me that loans are taken out on their names. For Wáng Wěi the initial dividend was an 
advantage from the perspective of the peasants, but a risk from the perspective of the 
cooperative. Although the cooperative should technically carry this risk, he and the oth-
er village cadres accepted the risk the other members were not willing to take, Wáng 
Wěi pointed out (WW, 2011-05-03:414–420). 
In summary we can say that the MFC group was very similar to the one for eco-
logical rice concerning membership and leadership. The peasants who sold their minor 
food crops to the cooperative were called members. For selling their minor food crops 
to the cooperative they received the market price plus a dividend. The village cadres 
managed the packaging, marketing and sale of the minor food crops. Because the minor 
food crops, especially the black mung beans, were rare on the market, the cooperative 
managed to sell them for a higher price. Therefore, the benefits for the peasants as well 
as for the cooperative were higher than in the case of ecological rice. However, fewer 
peasants participated in this small group due to the limited sales capacity of the coop-
erative. Thus the main difference was of quantity rather than of quality. 
5.4 Managing men, packaging women 
Before the Professional Cooperative could sell ecological rice and minor food crops, 
processing and packaging was of course necessary. At the time I was in the village, the 
rice mill, which had been established in 2006, was already out of operation. 
Small amounts of rice were processed within the village at peasant households 
who owned small rice processing machines. Bigger amounts, for example one big truck 
with about twenty to thirty tons of rice, were processed in bigger rice mills in other 
places, some closer, for example in the neighboring village, some further than one hun-
dred kilometers away (WW, 2011-06-08a:232–237). 
Usually the packaging was done at the place where the Professional Cooperative 
had had the paddy processed to rice. Only the small boxes were packaged in 
Shǔidàozhuāng. The packaging of these small boxes required manual work. This work 
was very troublesome as the cardboard boxes had to be stuck together and tied up with a 
cotton thread (WW, 2011-05-29). Common people (老百姓 lǎobǎixìng), who earned a 
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wage of 5 CNY per hour, did the processing and packaging, Wáng Wěi told me (WW, 
2011-05-06:13, 2011-05-29:349). 
In normal times about seven to eight women packaged the rice for the Profession-
al Cooperative. Sometimes even ten women did the packaging, but in the busy periods 
of the year, for example during the wheat harvest, it was hard to find someone to do the 
work, so there were only four of them, Wáng Wěi explained (WW, 2011-06-08a:117–
123). 
One day I worked with these women for a few hours. In the early morning Wáng 
Wěi told me that the cooperative had just processed a small amount of rice with a small 
rice processing machine at a peasant household within the village. In the mid morning a 
man transported about twenty to thirty big bags of rice with a blue, three-wheeled, mo-
torized vehicle to the building of the old village committee. Zhèng Guìhuā, the wife of 
Wáng Wěi, had the key for the building but the lock was jammed. After cracking open 
the lock, the women first swept the floor. Then I helped the three women and the man to 
carry the heavy bags of rice from the three-wheeler into the building. A few of the bags 
were filled with the special kind of rice called Huangjinqing. After we had finished this 
task, the man left the scene with his blue vehicle (FN, 2011-06-02). 
The women now prepared the machines and devices for drying and sieving the 
rice before packaging. First they dried the rice with a hot-air machine. In a second step 
the women put the rice on the sieve with a small shovel or their hands to sift out small 
and broken grains. Then the women moved the rice onto a small table. Now the tedious 
part of the work started. We were sitting around the table on low stools with buckets 
between our legs and began to sort out the good grains from the bad ones. We picked 
out single black and yellow grains as well as little pieces of stones and dirt with our 
fingers and threw them to the ground. The good rice grains we wiped into the buckets 
with our hands. This laborious and time consuming job would be omitted if big pro-
cessing machines removed the husk of the paddy, the women told me. The bigger ma-
chines managed to sort out bad grains and little pieces of stones and dirt, whereas the 
peasants’ smaller processing machines did not manage to do this (FN, 2011-06-02). 
When I asked the women if they also did all of these jobs before cooking and eat-
ing the rice themselves, they answered that they did not. Hence, they only did this be-
cause the rice was supposed to be sold on the market for a high price as a quality prod-
uct of the Professional Cooperative’s trademark (FN, 2011-06-02). 
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When we were sitting around the table sorting out the bad rice grains, I also asked 
them why it was them who did this work. Zhèng Guìhuā, the wife of Wáng Wěi, told 
me that they did it because no one else did it. Men did not do this kind of work because 
they left the village to work in the cities, she explained (FN, 2011-06-02). 
At that moment Wáng Yàjūn, the one responsible for the management of the ER 
group, arrived at the old village committee with the little red minibus. His wife did not 
work with the other women because she was taking care of her grandchild at home. The 
minibus was full with packaging material, which Wáng Yàjūn had just picked up at a 
factory in the county town. I asked him why men did not do the packaging work. He 
explained that the wage was too low for men to do this work (FN, 2011-06-02). 
This was also the explanation Wáng Wěi gave me first. If men worked not to far 
away from the village they could earn about seventy to eighty CNY. Further away they 
could even earn about one to two hundred CNY. Moreover, it was “work done by wom-
en” (妇女做的活 fùnǔ zuò de huó), Wáng Wěi explained (WW, 2011-06-08a:145–154). 
When I asked how high a wage the cooperative needed to pay so that men would 
also do this work, Zhèng Guìhuā claimed that no matter how high the wage, men would 
never do such work. At home she had to do all the work, she continued. As Wáng Wěi 
was always busy, only her parents-in-law helped her with housework and fieldwork 
(FN, 2011-06-02). 
On the next morning I stopped by the old building of the village committee again. 
Three women were still preparing the rice for packaging. One was sieving the rice, and 
the other two were sitting around the table sorting out the rice. A fourth woman was 
packaging minor food crops, namely beans, with the vacuum packaging machine. Then 
she used the coding machine to put the date of production on the small bags (FN, 2011-
06-03). Only on the next day did three of them start preparing the packages for the rice, 
before finally packaging it. One woman was folding the cardboard boxes and the other 
two stuck the boxes together (FN, 2011-06-04). 
The next day they were still preparing and packaging the rice. When I passed by 
two women were sorting out the rice, while temporarily Zhèng Guìhuā, the wife of 
Wáng Wěi, and another woman were collecting paddy from peasants next-door at the 
building of the former rice mill (FN, 2011-06-05). 
These packaging women were all members of the cooperative, Wáng Wěi said, 
namely in the sense that they produced rice and minor food crops for the cooperative 
(WW, 2011-06-08a:158–159). They were about forty years old but not older than fifty 
  Ecological Rice and Minor Food Crops 75 
because it was important that they had good eyes in order to sort out little stones and 
bad grains (WW, 2011-06-08a:125–126). 
Among the four working women were the wives of Wáng Wěi and Chén Yùjiàn. 
According to Wáng Wěi, these two were responsible for packaging rice and minor food 
crops. The other two women were not members of their family clans but neighbors. 
Originally the wife of Wáng Yàjūn also took care of packaging. The wives of the four 
big shareholders of the small groups for ecological rice and minor food crops were re-
sponsible for packaging in place of their husbands. They took care of the key and rec-
orded all the accomplishments (WW, 2011-06-08a:130–143,211–213). The wives of the 
village cadres received the same wage as the other women, namely 5 CNY per hour 
(WW, 2011-06-08a:215). 
In Hú Qǐhuá’s narrative about the Professional Cooperative it was crucial that the 
wives and neighbors of the village cadres, and not someone else, did the packaging of 
the agricultural products. He made the allegation that the village cadres bought ordinary 
rice from other villages and sold it as ecological rice, which was supposedly produced 
by the members of the Professional Cooperative in Shǔidàozhuāng. Hú Qǐhuá claimed 
that the village cadres bought the rice from the outside and that their wives took care 
about the packaging. Hence, they were in fact like a “gang of criminals” (犯罪团伙 
fànzuì tuánhuǒ), he said (HQH, 2011-05-27a:179–186). 
To recapitulate this section I repeat how the social actors explained their own ac-
tions concerning the gender division of labor. First they argued that they were doing it 
because no one else was doing this work. Men were usually working outside of the vil-
lage, so they could not do this work. The second explanation was that men would not do 
the work for such a low pay. A more abstract statement about men and women backed 
up these two concrete explanations, namely that the packaging work was simply the 
work of women. Men did not do this kind of work. 
Tamara Jacka (1992) argues that there is evidence of a public–private dichotomy 
concerning the gender division of labor in rural China as there is in the West. She un-
derstands this dichotomy neither as universal nor as inevitable but “as a set of norms 
governing the work opportunities and choices of women and men and the ways in 
which work is to be recognized” (Jacka 1992:117). Men are responsible for the outside, 
women for everything inside the household. Jacka stresses that the meanings associated 
with it were changing within rural China over time. 
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Earlier on men were said to work in the fields (outside of the house), while wom-
en were said to work at home (inside of the house). Through this rhetoric the significant 
contribution of women to agriculture remained hidden. Increasing rural to urban migra-
tion furthered the feminization of agriculture as many husbands pursued migrant and 
non-agricultural work outside of the village. Men were now working outside of the vil-
lage while women were working inside of the village (Fan 2008:9–11,89–92). 
Although the village cadres did not leave the village in order to find wage labor, 
within the organization of the cooperative they and their wives (as well as the women 
packaging the rice) reproduced a gender division of labor that was based on a public–
private and outside–inside dichotomy, albeit in a slightly different form. Social imagin-
ings about what kind of work was appropriate for whom were reconstructed with refer-
ence to sexual differences within the cooperative. The managing men represented the 
cooperative to the outside. They were the “pioneers of cooperation,” whereas the pack-
aging women inside of the old building of the village committee were more or less in-
visible to the outside. 
I could not witness any attempts to transform this kind of gender division within 
the cooperative.38 There was, however, one difference to the prevailing gender division 
of labor in the Chinese countryside within the cooperative. Usually men were the 
breadwinners through their urban wage work, on which their wives relied on for im-
proving the live of the family. If it was true that the cooperative made no profits and the 
village cadres did not share them, then the packaging women—although their wage was 
very low—earned more than the managing man, who did not receive any wage from the 
cooperative at all. This situation would directly challenge the social actor’s second ex-
planation for the gender division of labor, namely that the pay for men was too low for 
doing the packaging work. Obviously, as “pioneers of cooperation” in the focus of intel-
lectuals and students, as well as of government officials, men were willing to do the 
managing work for free while they were not willing to do the invisible work of prepar-
ing the outside cover of the products the cooperative was selling. 
                                                          
38 This might be due to my position as male researcher. When I asked the women if I could help them 
with the packaging work, they did not hesitate although men did usually not do this work. Nevertheless, I 
think, it is quite possible that they would have told other stories to female researchers, if they had pack-
aged the rice together with them. 
  Ecological Rice and Minor Food Crops 77 
5.5 The risks and benefits of participation 
Although the MFC group provided bigger benefits for the peasants, the advantages of 
participating were still limited. The additional income per mǔ was only about three hun-
dred CNY, Wáng Wěi noted. For the ecological rice the benefits were even smaller. 
According to Wáng Wěi, this explained why not many peasants participated in the pro-
ject (WW, 2011-06-08c:27–29). 
Another reason was that to participate in the cooperative also meant trouble (麻烦 
máfan) for the members of the cooperative. The cooperative did not have capital. There-
fore, it could not pay the peasants immediately when they gave their paddy or minor 
food crops to the cooperative. If an enterprise cheated the cooperative, the cooperative 
would not be able to pay the peasants. Thus many peasants felt that giving their produce 
to the cooperative was a risk. Hence, although they wanted to participate in order to 
receive the initial dividend, they feared that they might not get any money at all (WW, 
2011-06-08c:31–44). 
Even if the cooperative was able to pay them later on, it could happen that at that 
time the market price was already higher than the market price plus the dividend when 
they gave their paddy to the cooperative. In such a situation the peasants felt that they 
suffered losses (WW, 2011-06-08c:44–50). 
Moreover, the cooperative could only provide the service (of selling their prod-
ucts) for a certain number of peasants and not for more (WW, 2011-06-08c:29–31), as 
its sales capacity was limited. According to Wáng Wěi, the common people wondered 
how Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres could be “so stupid” (这么笨蛋 zhème 
bèndàn) that they did not manage to successfully sell the products of the cooperative, 
even though there was lots of support from the media and the government leaders (WW, 
2011-06-08c:213–216). 
According to Wáng Wěi, one student identified the main problem of the coopera-
tive as a sales problem. The student argued that the cooperative lacked a competent per-
son who had the ability to successfully organize the sale of the peasants’ products. If the 
cooperative managed to sell more products, more peasants could participate in the co-
operative (WW, 2011-06-08c:125–128). 
Wáng Wěi himself doubted if even experienced managers of big companies 
would be able to sell the products of the cooperative because competition on the big 
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market was tough and there were not so many methods available to compete successful-
ly (WW, 2011-06-08c:209–213). 
Despite Wáng Wěi’s efforts, and despite the support from the outside world, the 
cooperative did not manage to develop. Wáng Wěi attributed this to the just mentioned 
market problem. Furthermore, he argued that a reform was necessary. A specialized 
state organization, organized from the center down to the local level, was needed for the 
support of agricultural cooperatives (WW, 2011-06-08c:396–399). 
Before moving on to another project of the Professional Cooperative, I want to 
note that all of the information in the last section of this chapter stems from my final 
interview with Wáng Wěi in June 2011. In the first interview he mainly talked about the 
advantages of the cooperative. At that time he did not yet mention that the peasants took 
a risk if they handed their paddy over to the cooperative. Earlier on Wáng Wěi also did 
not tell me that the benefits the cooperative offered the peasants were relatively small 
compared with the income the peasants could generate through wage labor as migrant 
workers in the cities. Not only were the benefits limited, the number of peasants who 
could benefit from the cooperative was also limited.39 
In several informal conversations villagers who had a small business told me that 
they did not participate in the cooperative (FN, 2011-04-24, 2011-04-25, 2011-04-27).40 
Owners of a small supermarket told me that they did cultivate rice but not in an envi-
ronmentally harmless way because this was too troublesome (FN, 2011-04-25). 
                                                          
39 Wáng Wěi first explicitly said to me that the cooperative in Shǔidàozhuāng was indeed not very suc-
cessful more than one month after my arrival in the village, when on one late evening we were sitting in 
his car in a neighboring village. It was the first day of a normal two-day funeral ceremony of the grand-
mother of one of his former schoolmates. He and his schoolmates waited for their last turn to mourn in 
front of the picture of the deceased on that evening. After the dinner, where the family of the deceased, as 
usual, offered the guests a lot of Chinese liquor, Wáng Wěi told me in the car that only very few peasants 
could participate in the cooperative and that the benefits for those who participated were not very high 
(FN, 2011-05-23). 
40 Many of them told me that they only cultivated wheat and maize (FN, 2011-04-24, 2011-04-25, 2011-
04-27). If a combine harvester was used, these were the least labor intensive crops grown in the village. 
The customary use of harvesters in the village started about five to ten years ago. If villagers could afford 
it, they would employ a combine harvester. However, it was not always possible for combine harvesters 
to enter the fields, for example if peasants had already planted lines of small cotton plants between strips 
of winter wheat, or if wet fields with lotus roots or rice seedlings surrounded the wheat field (FN, 2011-
06-06). Some of those villagers who had a small business cultivated paddy too. Rice seedlings were 
planted by hand in the village. For those who could afford it, it was possible to hire other people to do it. 
In autumn combine harvesters did most of the harvesting work. However, poor families still used hand 
and sickle to harvest. In contrast to other households in the village, most of those who had a small busi-
ness additional to agriculture did not plant lotus roots and cotton. 
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In contrast, the peasant who participated in the Small Group for Organic Rice and 
Wheat discussed in the next chapter emphasized the positive non-monetary effects of 




6 Organic Rice and Wheat 
In this chapter I present the Small Group for Organic Rice (有机大米种植小组 yǒujī 
dàmǐ zhòngzhí xiǎozǔ) and the Small Group for Organic Wheat (有机小麦种植小组 
yǒujī xiǎomài zhòngzhí xiǎozǔ). Since 2010 one peasant household has cultivated or-
ganic rice and wheat for the cooperative. As agricultural chemicals and chemical ferti-
lizers were not used at all in the production, these agricultural products were organic, in 
contrast to the ecological products from the small groups discussed in the preceding 
chapter. Here I describe the perspective of the peasant and the cooperative’s chairperson 
on their arrangement. While the peasant did not need to care about yields and sales, as 
this was the affair of the cooperative, the peasant was dissatisfied with inadequate and 
outstanding remuneration and felt powerless about it. Furthermore I present what I 
found out about forms of cooperation in the organic rice fields, which had nothing to do 
with the cooperative, as well as the challenges the peasant faced, but which the coopera-
tive did not help to address. 
In 2010 the Professional Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Products started 
this new project. It was the idea of a student from the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences (WW, 2011-06-08b:17–18). Organic meant that the peasant did not use any 
chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals (WW, 2011-06-08b:45–46). Instead of 
chemical fertilizer, chicken manure was used for fertilization (HYT, 2011-06-04a:149–
150). Instead of agricultural chemicals, they experimented with alternative methods to 
deal with pests, for example by using chili powder against plant lice (HYT, 2011-06-
04a:212–216).41 
One peasant household started to grow eight mǔ of organic rice on its own land 
for the cooperative. The cooperative signed a contract with the peasant. According to 
Wáng Wěi’s first description, this contract was a kind of guarantee for the peasant as it 
                                                          
41 The peasants learned about this special method not through oral traditions, but through the volunteer’s 
research on the internet (HYT, 2011-06-04a:209–216). 
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assured that the peasant’s income per mǔ would be the highest one in the village. The 
rice was sold via the platform of the cooperative, Wáng Wěi explained (WW, 2011-05-
03:316–321). 
6.1 The advantages of growing organic rice 
From the perspective of the peasant, the project started in the following way: Huáng 
Yùtíng recounted that Wáng Wěi came to her around May Day 2010 when she was 
washing rice seedlings in her field, which was adjacent to the small road in the south of 
the village. Huáng Yùtíng thought that Wáng Wěi asked her because she was compara-
tively good at cultivating rice and year after year she had no problems with plant diseas-
es or pests. Wáng Wěi trusted her. He knew that she would not use any agricultural 
chemicals if he told her not to use them. In contrast to other people she went to the 
fields with the rice seedlings every day in order to weed (HYT, 2011-06-04a:3–12). 
According to Huáng Yùtíng, Wáng Wěi prepared the contract. When I asked her 
if she was a member of the cooperative, she said that she was not. In her eyes she did 
not sign a contract with the cooperative but with the village committee, which she re-
ferred to as the “production brigade” (大队 dàduì).42 In fact Huáng Yùtíng did not sign 
the contract herself. Her son did because he was the head of the household (HYT, 2011-
06-04a:133–139), although he was not present in the village most of the time as he was 
working as migrant worker outside of the village (HYT, 2011-06-04a:56–58). 
According to the contracts, Huáng Yùtíng was required to grow eight mǔ of or-
ganic rice and wheat. Besides these eight mǔ, the household of Huáng Yùtíng only had 
one other piece of land, namely half a mǔ of lotus roots (HYT, 2011-06-04a:98–102). 
When Wáng Wěi proposed that she grew organic rice and said that she would re-
ceive a fixed income, she did not think twice, Huáng Yùtíng told me. Spraying agricul-
tural fertilizer was very painful, she explained. Afterwards she had to wash her whole 
body, but still during the night the face and the hands would itch. Hence, she appreciat-
ed the idea of not using agricultural fertilizers (HYT, 2011-06-04a:15–21). Furthermore 
she thought that it was a good thing because she could also eat the organic food herself 
(HYT, 2011-06-04a:170–171). 
                                                          
42 However, on the contract she showed me, it was written that it was a contract between the household 
and the Peasant Cooperative Association signed by Wáng Wěi. 
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Planting organic rice required a lot of labor (HYT, 2011-06-04a:26), but Huáng 
Yùtíng did not complain about it and did not explicitly refer to this as a disadvantage. 
Instead Huáng Yùtíng stressed that not everyone could do what she did because not 
everyone had the same way of thinking she had. For her it was no problem to go to the 
field everyday, to go there several times a day to weed, to look after the water and to 
wash the rice seedlings (HYT, 2011-06-04a:46–50). 
6.2 Mutual aid and paid work in the rice fields 
While Huáng Yùtíng usually did these everyday tasks alone, she did work together with 
others when planting rice seedlings (HYT, 2011-06-04a:104). 
At the time of the wheat harvest I met Huáng Yùtíng and three other women in the 
fields in the east of the village. They just had a short rest in the shadow of the trees next 
to the road. When they returned to work, Huáng Yùtíng showed me how to plant rice 
seedlings. I only managed to plant them in a crooked line, some seedlings I pushed to 
deep into the mud, some not deep enough so that they floated to the surface. Huáng 
Yùtíng and the two other women in the field were much quicker than I was, and the 
lines they planted were straight. One woman stayed out of the field and just watched us 
doing the work. When I asked her to take a photo of us planting the seedlings, I won-
dered, why she was just sitting there. She was wearing rubber boots, which indicated 
that maybe she had worked before I came there. However, as long as I stayed there, she 
did not work. I was especially astonished since she had just told me that the women 
were not paid for this work because it was mutual help. It seemed strange to me that the 
woman did not participate in the work herself if it was true that the three women 
worked voluntarily and for free (FN, 2011-06-03). 
Later I learned that only Huáng Yùtíng did not get any money for planting rice 
seedlings there. The other two women were in fact paid for their work. In the interview 
Huáng Yùtíng explained that the one woman stayed out of the field because she did not 
want to do the work. Her husband worked in Zhèngzhōu and had money. Therefore, she 
could afford to pay the two younger women to do the work for her. Usually it was 
younger women in thirties who were hired to do this kind of work, Huáng Yùtíng told 
me. For one day they got about sixty CNY. Old people were not able to do this kind of 
work for one day without suffering pain in their lower back, Huáng Yùtíng remarked 
(HYT, 2011-06-04a:76–86). 
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Huáng Yùtíng herself worked at the other women’s field for two days for free be-
cause she did not have anything to do at home. Moreover, it was also a kind of method 
to get the work on the own field done. Later the woman would help Huáng Yùtíng 
planting rice seedlings in her field too. They did this, she explained, simply because it 
was pretty good if the neighbors were together. Huáng Yùtíng did not give her any 
money and she also did not get any money. In addition to this method of mutual help, 
Huáng Yùtíng would also hire young women to help her planting rice seedlings in the 
field where she was growing organic rice for the cooperative (HYT, 2011-06-04a:63–
86). 
Here I found a setting that was interesting in at least two respects. Firstly, mutual 
aid and paid labor coexisted side by side. Secondly, the cooperation within the project 
of the cooperative seemed to be independent of the cooperative. The mutual aid be-
tween the two women was based on friendship and had existed even before the founda-
tion of the first NRR project in 2004. 
Let us now have a closer look at the relationship between the peasant and the co-
operative. Huáng Yùtíng only did the work (劳动 láodòng) of cultivating the organic 
rice. For all the inputs, for example seeds and chicken manure, Huáng Yùtíng only told 
Wáng Wěi what she needed. Wáng Wěi then bought these agricultural inputs and also 
organized the transportation to the field (HYT, 2011-06-04a:140–152). 
In the first years the village cadres bought the seeds for the organic wheat and rice 
Huáng Yùtíng cultivated for them. However, in autumn 2011 the situation changed. 
Wáng Wěi claimed that he had no money. Hence, Huáng Yùtíng had to buy the seeds 
for the organic wheat for the next season herself (FN, 2011-11-12). 
6.3 Dealing with challenges with(out) the cooperative 
The cooperative asked Huáng Yùtíng to take notes about how she cultivated the organic 
rice in a diary. She had to write down when she washed the rice seedlings and when it 
was raining. She also noted if big or important changes occurred. She recounted that the 
NRR intellectual Zhū Xiǎojuān and other people from the outside, for example a TV 
station from Běijīng, had had a look in her diary (HYT, 2011-06-04a:204–207).43 
                                                          
43 Villagers involved in the Happy Pig Small Group and the lotus and crabs projects of the cooperative 
also had to write such diaries about their agricultural activities. 
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If something happened, Huáng Yùtíng reported this to the village committee. 
Huáng Yùtíng gave me one example. Once the ordinary rice plants of other people got 
diseases. After two weeks, when the plant disease was at its highest point, it also oc-
curred in Huáng Yùtíng’s field. She reported it to Mǎ Zhìyǒng. He then did some re-
search on the internet in order to find out what they could do instead of using agricul-
tural chemicals (HYT, 2011-06-04a:209–212). 
In 2011 other peasants used agricultural chemicals for three to four days in order 
to deal with plant lice. Again, when the problem was at its peak, the same problem also 
occurred in Huáng Yùtíng’ organic wheat field. Huáng Yùtíng informed Mǎ Zhìyǒng, 
who then did some online research. He told Huáng Yùtíng to use chili powder to deal 
with the pests. However, this method did not show any effects, so Huáng Yùtíng 
stopped it (HYT, 2011-06-04a:212–216). 
For Huáng Yùtíng the big challenge concerning plant disease was not so much the 
question of not using agricultural chemicals but more a question of irrigation. If there 
was not enough water, the plants easily got diseases. However, irrigation was something 
she could not control alone. Her field was in a bad location, as it was quite far away 
from the big irrigation channel in the east of the village. The small channel next to her 
field was dried and grass was growing at the bottom of the channel. Only one week be-
fore the interview, water finally filled up the small channel. The big channel had already 
been opened soon after the wheat harvest, when the peasants started to plant their rice in 
the fields where they had previously cultivated wheat. When the water from the Yellow 
River came to the village through that big channel, the villagers whose fields were lo-
cated in the east of the village could use it first because they were closer to the source of 
water. According to Huáng Yùtíng, they used a lot of it. Only at night could Huáng 
Yùtíng add water to her field together with the family of Wáng Yàjūn, the village ac-
countant, whose field was next to the one of Huáng Yùtíng. Around midnight the water 
finally found its way to their fields, because all the others had already stopped using it 
(HYT, 2011-06-04a:222–231,249–256). 
Huáng Yùtíng complained that nobody was taking care of the irrigation works. 
She said that irrigation was very good to the east of the channel. The irrigation channel 
was in a better condition there because this was the place people and leaders from the 
outside inspected, as it was next to the road and was easily accessible. “Here, where no 
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one visited, who would repair [the irrigation system] for you?”44 Huáng Yùtíng asked 
rhetorically (HYT, 2011-06-04a:232–246). 
As mentioned in chapter 1, many on the left in China argued that the deterioration 
of rural social welfare and local public infrastructure, for example irrigation, was one of 
the new problems after decollectivization in the countryside (Day 2007:326, 2008b:57; 
Wang 2009:139). Intellectuals involved in the NRR movement therefore suggested fo-
cusing on public welfare. Hè Xuěfēng, for example, proposed that the state’s rural in-
vestment should focus not on individual households but on the public projects (Day 
2007:334). Lǐ Chāngpíng saw the labor power of the Chinese people as a possible solu-
tion for such problems by mobilizing collective labor (Day 2007:330). Similarly Wáng 
Xímíng (王习明) argued that cooperatives, which operated in a market context, could 
only minimally increase the peasants’ income. Therefore, he hoped that “cooperatives 
may be able to take advantage of the countryside’s surplus labor-power to carry out 
public works such as building or repairing roads and irrigation systems” (Wang 
2009:146). In the case of the village Shǔidàozhuāng, the cooperative did not address the 
crucial issue of irrigation in this way. The NRR projects involving economic coopera-
tion were all market and money oriented projects. 
Concerning the challenges of planting organic rice and wheat, we can summarize 
that the cooperative tried to help the peasant to address problems such as plant disease 
and pests when they became acute. However, the cooperative did not tackle the more 
fundamental question of repairing the irrigation channel. 
In spite of these difficult prerequisites the rice always had enough water in 2011, 
Huáng Yùtíng told me when I came to the village again in autumn. Therefore she did 
not have to spray any agricultural chemicals (FN, 2011-11-12). 
6.4 Yields and sales: concerns of the cooperative 
Without using chemical fertilizer and agricultural chemicals, the yields of rice and 
wheat decreased (HYT, 2011-06-04a:32). The yields of ordinary rice on the eight-mǔ 
large field were more than 8,3 thousand jīn. With the change to organic cultivation the 
yields dropped to only 4,2 thousand jīn, Huáng Yùtíng told me (HYT, 2011-06-
04a:159–160,173–175). However, Huáng Yùtíng’s income was fixed and guaranteed. 
She appreciated that she did not have to care about losses caused by wind and rain 
                                                          
44 这边每人参观谁给你修？ Zhèbiān méi rén cānguān shuí gěi nǐ xiū? (HYT, 2011-06-04a:239). 
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(HYT, 2011-06-04a:42–44). Nevertheless, in the second year of cultivating organic rice 
the yields were already higher, Huáng Yùtíng told me in November 2011. She explained 
that this time instead of four to five rice seedlings she had put seven to eight into the 
earth (FN, 2011-11-12). 
When I asked Huáng Yùtíng what she knew about the sale of the organic rice and 
wheat, she said that she did not care about this as it was the affair of the village commit-
tee, especially of Wáng Wěi, who often went to other places outside of the village, for 
example to Běijīng for meetings. If they sold out, it was good, if they did not sell out, it 
was good as well as she was supposed to receive the money according to the contract 
(HYT, 2011-06-04a:38–40,128–131). 
Under the condition that Huáng Yùtíng planted the organic rice in accordance 
with the rules of the cooperative, she received the equivalent of the income of the high-
est yields of paddy per mǔ in the village, regardless of the actual yields of the organic 
paddy per mǔ (WW, 2011-06-08b:40–41; HQH, 2011-06-05:518). 
In turn the entire harvest belonged to the cooperative. The cooperative then sold 
the organic rice for 8 and 9,8 CNY per jīn (WW, 2011-06-08b:43). This price sounded 
quite high to me. The Association for Environmentally Harmless Rice had sold the rice 
for 2,5 CNY per jīn. However, Wáng Wěi said that this was not a high price compared 
with other organic products of this kind (WW, 2011-06-08b:56). 
The cooperative sold organic rice and wheat using the method of gòu mǐ bāo dì 
(WW, 2011-06-08a:255), which is similar to community supported agriculture. One 
morning at the beginning of June, I observed that a Chinese volunteer translator signed 
a gòu mǐ bāo dì contract. She came to the village together with an US American teacher, 
who visited the village about once a month to help the teachers and pupils of the vil-
lage’s elementary school awaken their potential as transformational global citizens, part 
of a project for building a sustainable society.45 The translator contracted half a mǔ of 
organic rice. She signed the contract with Mǎ Zhìyǒng and gave him 1,000 CNY. Usu-
ally it was Wáng Wěi who signed such contracts with the consumers, Mǎ Zhìyǒng told 
me later on. After the harvest the translator would receive all the rice from the piece of 
land she contracted, for a price four times as high as the price for ordinary rice in the 
supermarket (FN, 2011-06-02). 
                                                          
45 This US American teacher told me that Zhū Xiǎojuān attended one of her courses in Běijīng and then 
asked her to go to Shǔidàozhuāng because she felt that the cooperative projects in the village did not 
really work (FN, 2011-06-12). 
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Mǎ Zhìyǒng first claimed that “the peasants” (农民 nóngmín) would receive that 
money. He did not answer when I asked him whom he meant by “the peasants.” When I 
asked him if the cooperative, namely “the few of them”, got the income from the sales, 
he confirmed it without enthusiasm (FN, 2011-06-02). 
When I talked with the Chinese volunteer translator, it turned out that she did not 
know who would receive the money she paid for the contracted land and would pay for 
the produce later on (FN, 2011-06-02). 
If she, who had even visited the village herself, did not know, I guessed that the 
consumers in Běijīng also did not know what it meant in fact that “the peasants” would 
receive their money. 
In May 2011 nearly all the organic rice from the last rice harvest was sold out, 
Wáng Wěi told me (WW, 2011-05-03:323). Nevertheless, in the first year the coopera-
tive lost money with the organic rice project, Wáng Wěi complained. The yields were 
very low with only three hundred jīn of rice (or five hundred jīn of paddy) per mǔ, in-
stead of up to one thousand one hundred jīn of rice per mǔ (WW, 2011-06-08b:50–54). 
To sum this section up, I want to point out that the remuneration scheme of the 
organic rice project differed significantly from the Small Group for Ecological Rice. 
The yields of paddy had a direct influence on the income of the peasants who cultivated 
ecological rice in order to sell it to the cooperative (or to another trader). In the case of 
the organic rice the yields did not influence the income of the peasant at all. It was the 
cooperative’s income which depended on the yields of the organic rice. Yet, although 
the peasant did not share this direct interest in yields with the cooperative, the peasant 
managed to increase the yields in the second year, based on her experiences from the 
first year. 
6.5 Feeling powerless: the peasant’s dissatisfaction with remu-
neration 
According to the contract, Huáng Yùtíng should be paid an income equal to the highest 
yields of ordinary paddy per mǔ in the village. Based on the assumption that the yields 
of ordinary rice were about one thousand jīn per mǔ and that the price for one jīn was 
about 1,5 CNY, Huáng Yùtíng estimated that she could have generated an income of 
about 1,5 thousand CNY per mǔ by growing ordinary rice. However, she said that she 
only received 1,200 CNY per mǔ from Wáng Wěi. Thus her income was three hundred 
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CNY lower, she complained. Later she relativized her statement. If she had cultivated 
ordinary rice, she would have needed to buy agricultural inputs herself. For one mǔ the 
costs of agricultural chemicals were usually at least fifty CNY and the costs for chemi-
cal fertilizers were about one hundred and twenty CNY. Hence, these costs needed to be 
subtracted. Therefore, she finally concluded that her income for organic rice was almost 
equal to the ordinary income she could have generated otherwise (HYT, 2011-06-
04a:154–170). 
Huáng Yùtíng did not know any details of the sale of the organic rice that she had 
produced. She only knew that the price was as high as 10 CNY and thus four times as 
expensive as rice in the supermarket. She recounted that Mǎ Zhìyǒng nevertheless 
claimed that Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres made losses with the organic rice 
project. However, Huáng Yùtíng did not believe that they really lost money. She made 
some calculations and came to the conclusion that the village cadres should have been 
able to make profits (HYT, 2011-06-04a:181–200).46 
She added that Mǎ Zhìyǒng told her that it was not easy to sell a new product in 
the first year (HYT, 2011-06-04a:197–202). At first this sounded quite reasonable to 
me, however, if one urban consumer contracted half a mǔ of rice, then the village cadres 
only needed to find sixteen consumer households to buy their organic rice. 
According to Huáng Yùtíng, Mǎ Zhìyǒng also stressed expenses such as pro-
cessing and packaging rice, as well as printing the trademark. Then Huáng Yùtíng said 
again that she did not care about this and that she also did not ask for any details be-
cause asking such question made people unhappy, she explained. After that she imme-
diately repeated the advantages the project provided for her, namely that it was better 
for her body as she did not have to spray agricultural chemicals (HYT, 2011-06-
04a:197–202). She had already told me about this advantage before. I had the impres-
sion that by repeating it in this context she stressed that she did not interfere in the af-
fairs of the village committee and focused on herself. On the other hand—and probably 
even more importantly—she explained to herself why she accepted an unequal deal, in 
                                                          
46 Based on the knowledge that the yields were about 4,2 thousand jīn, and on the assumption that one 
hundred jīn of paddy were at least seventy jīn of rice after processing, the village cadres should have been 
able to sell about three thousand jīn of rice. As they sold the rice for 10 CNY per jīn the total income 
should have been more than 30 thousand CNY. The village cadres paid Huáng Yùtíng 9,600 CNY. She 
estimated that the costs for transportation and so on did not use up the remaining more than 20 thousand 
CNY. There should have been some profits for the village cadres, Huáng Yùtíng felt certain (HYT, 2011-
06-04a:189–194). 
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which the other party, namely the village cadres, not only benefited a lot but also denied 
that they benefited from it. 
When I returned to the village in November 2011 I met Huáng Yùtíng again. One 
of the first things she told me was that Wáng Wěi had not yet given her the money for 
the organic wheat and rice harvest. She complained that she had already asked him for 
the money several times. He always maintained that he did not have any money. How-
ever, she knew that they had already sold all of the wheat she had cultivated. She men-
tioned that the village cadres were selling her organic rice for a very high price in 
Běijīng, and that they even bought ordinary rice from outside of the village and sold it 
as organic rice, claiming that she had produced this rice. She had not observed this her-
self but nevertheless she seemed certain of it.47 When I talked with her in June 2011, she 
did not raise this accusation and maintained that she did not care about how the village 
cadres sold the rice. In autumn I had the impression that she was more upset about the 
village cadres than in spring. She claimed that Wáng Wěi let money disappear into his 
own pockets. However, she noted that she could not do anything by herself if Wáng 
Wěi told her that he had no money to pay her. Huáng Yùtíng also said that she herself 
was not able to sell organic rice for such a high price in Běijīng. Therefore, she had no 
other option than letting the village cadres, and especially Wáng Wěi, sell her organic 
rice (FN, 2011-11-12). 
Wáng Wěi on the other hand emphasized that, whereas the peasant had a fixed in-
come, the cooperative had to bear the risks. He claimed that the cooperative made losses 
in the first year of the organic rice project (WW, 2011-06-08b:50–54). Wáng Wěi liter-
ally said about the contract: “For the common people that contract is an overlord provi-
sion, for us it is a grandson provision.”48 By this he meant that the contract was advan-
tageous for the peasant, who was in the high position of the overlord, but disadvanta-
geous for the cooperative, which was in the low position of a grandson (WW, 2011-06-
08b:36–38). 
                                                          
47 In an interview, a council member of the former Rice Association accused the village cadres of having 
tricked many consumers by selling them ordinary rice as organic rice for a very expensive price. Hú 
Qǐhuá claimed that the cooperative sold about 18 to 28 mǔ of rice as organic rice (HQH, 2011-06-05:523–
525). The Professional Cooperative planned to expand the organic rice project from eight to 20 mǔ as the 
neighbors, namely the family of the village accountant Wáng Yàjūn, also wanted to participate, Wáng 
Wěi communicated to me in May 2011 (WW, 2011-05-03:337–340). If it is true what Hú Qǐhuá and 
Huáng Yùtíng said, then the cooperative had already de facto expanded its sale of organic rice without, 
however, increasing the acreage. 
48  那个合同对老百姓来说是一个霸王条款，对我们来说是一个孙子条款。  Nàge hétong dùi 
lǎobǎixìng láishuō shì yí gè bàwáng tiáokuǎn, dùi wǒmen láishuō shì yí gè sūnzi tiáokuǎn (WW, 2011-06-
08b:30–31). 
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Interestingly both sides felt that the other side benefited more from the organic 
rice and wheat project. Moreover, while Wáng Wěi stressed the monetary benefit for the 
peasant, Huáng Yùtíng felt that the non-monetary aspects were beneficial for her. Con-
cerning remuneration, she was not satisfied. However, she felt powerless and alone. She 
thought that there was nothing she could do to change the situation. 
In fact she was not alone and some people had a different understanding of coop-
eration and tried to change the existing cooperative. I deal with this resistance in chapter 
9. Before that let us turn to the small groups for lotus roots and crabs (chapter 7) and for 




7  Lotus Roots and Crabs 
In this chapter I describe the Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots 
and Crabs (藕蟹混养小组 ǒuxiè hùnyǎng xiǎozǔ). Whereas the small groups for eco-
logical rice and for ecological minor food crops were examples of supply and marketing 
“cooperatives”, the Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and 
Crabs (hereafter LC group) was roughly organized in a similar way to the Small Group 
for Organic Rice and Wheat, and thus it resembled more a production “cooperative”, 
if—considering its internal organization—it should be called a cooperative at all.49 The 
cooperative directly organized and managed the production of lotus roots and crabs, as 
well as of organic rice and wheat. In the case of ecological rice and ecological minor 
food grains, the peasants produced ecological rice and ecological minor food crops 
more or less individually, whereas the cooperative only sold inputs such as seeds to the 
peasants and bought their outputs for further marketing and sale. The internal organiza-
tion of the LC group is at the center of my attention here. In the first part of this chapter 
I give an overview of the project, focusing on its relations with the outside world, name-
ly on lotus roots and crabs as commodities and gifts, as well as on state support. In the 
following parts I focus on the division of labor and on remuneration within the small 
group. Based on my empirical findings, I discuss in the third part the relations between 
the cooperative and the workers. As different people who worked at the LC group relat-
ed differently to the shareholding village cadres, I use both the notions of class and pa-
tron-client to further our understanding of these relationships. 
                                                          
49 I put the term “cooperative” in quotation marks here because there existed different opinions in the 
village on whether these small groups should be called cooperatives or not. In the way they were repre-
sented by the managing village cadres, these small groups were cooperatives. However, as we saw in the 
previous chapters, some villagers did not view these small groups as cooperatives according to their un-
derstanding of this term. 
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7.1 Outlining the Lotus and Crabs Small Group 
Like the small groups for ecological rice, for ecological minor food crops, and for or-
ganic rice and wheat, discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the LC group was not officially 
registered as a separate cooperative but as part of the Professional Cooperative for Eco-
logical Agricultural Products (or Professional Cooperative; WW, 2011-05-03:41–42). 
7.1.1 A new idea 
In Wáng Wěi’s narrative, he originally invested his own money to study the integrated 
cultivation of lotus roots and crabs, and took assistant professor Zhū Xiǎojuān with him. 
When he returned from the study, he gave a report on it to the leaders of the agricultural 
bureau and county government. These leaders thought that this kind of integrated culti-
vation might improve the lot of many peasants because many peasants cultivated lotus 
roots in the township. They proposed that there should be an experiment with the inte-
grated cultivation of lotus roots and crabs in Shǔidàozhuāng, because it was Wáng Wěi 
who first learned about it and who found the venture appealing. Hence, Wáng Wěi ex-
plained, he and the other village cadres pioneered and launched the lotus and crabs pro-
ject in Shǔidàozhuāng (WW, 2011-05-03:109–114). 
As with the other projects in the village, Hú Qǐhuá, council member of the former 
Association for Environmentally Harmless Rice, contested Wáng Wěi’s claim and stat-
ed that the integrated cultivation of lotus roots and crabs was instead his idea (HQH, 
2011-05-07:773). 
The lotus roots of the cooperative’s small group were ecological. That meant that 
they did not use any agricultural chemicals and instead of chemical fertilizer they used 
organic fertilizer, namely manure from a farm outside of the village. Some peasants in 
the village told me that they grew lotus roots in a more or less ecological way. However, 
other villagers did use chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals for growing their 
lotus roots (FFP, 2011-05-29:1036). 
7.1.2 Lotus roots and crabs as commodities and gifts 
The LC group sold most of their lotus roots through the same channel the other peasants 
used for selling their lotus roots in the village. The peasants sold their lotus roots as 
commodities to the small peddlers, who came to the village with their three-wheelers 
(FN, 2011-04-23, 2011-04-25, 2011-04-27; FFP, 2011-05-29:793–810). Concerning the 
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price, the peddlers did not differentiate between ecological lotus roots and conventional 
lotus roots grown by other villagers (FN, 2011-11-11).50 In April the peasants sold their 
last lotus roots of the season for 1,4 CNY per jīn to the peddlers (FN, 2011-04-23). In 
November the price was 1,6 to 1,7 CNY per jīn (FN, 2011-11-12). 
A much smaller part of the lotus roots were sold to visiting urban dwellers during 
the ecological culture tourism festival (生态文化旅游节 shēngtài wénhuà lǚyóu jié) in 
autumn for a price much higher than the usual market price within the village, namely 
for 5 CNY per jīn (FFP, 2011-05-29:803). 
The first ecological culture tourism festival took place in Shǔidàozhuāng in 2009, 
the second in 2010. During the second festival the Professional Cooperative managed to 
sell its first crabs to urban dwellers. However, most of the crabs were given away as 
presents during publicity activities (WW, 2011-05-03:126–127). Through this the coop-
erative lost 1,000 CNY at the festival according to Wáng Wěi (WW, 2011-05-29:225). 
In 2011 crabs were sold mainly to businessmen who came to the village to pick 
them up. They were sold for a price higher than the usual market price for ordinary 
crabs. One crab was sold for 10 CNY by the cooperative. On the market peddlers 
bought crabs for 40 CNY per jīn and it needed more than four crabs were needed to 
make up one jīn, Fāng Fēipéng told me. The businessmen usually bought between 30 
and 80 baskets of crabs, thus spending between 300 and 800 CNY, as there were about 
ten crabs in one basket (FN, 2011-11-11). 
7.1.3 The meaning of loss 
In 2009, the first year of the project, the village cadres made no profit with raising crabs 
because they were not experienced in it. Birds, snakes and frogs ate the crabs when they 
changed their hard shell during their growth process. In 2010, the small group did better 
in raising the crabs than the year before (WW, 2011-05-03:114–126). 
Although usually it was possible to make a lot of money only cultivating lotus 
roots, in 2010 the village cadres did not make profits with the LC group, due to several 
reasons, Wáng Wěi claimed. Firstly, it was necessary to dig ditches to provide an ade-
quate water supply for raising crabs. These water ditches occupied at least ten mǔ of 
land and therefore influenced the yields of lotus roots. Secondly, they lost a lot of mon-
ey with the crabs. Thirdly, the marketing channels had not yet been opened.  
                                                          
50 Once I observed that the peasants’ lotus roots were put on the same vehicle together with the ecological 
lotus roots from the cooperative (FN, 2011-11-14). 
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Fourthly, many lotus roots, worth more than forty five thousand CNY, were damaged 
by frost in winter (WW, 2011-05-03:132–143). 
Fāng Fēipéng also mentioned that the village cadres lost parts of their harvest due 
to bad weather, however, according to Fāng Fēipéng, the problem was too much rain, 
not frost. Two incidents of heavy rain resulted in plant disease and, hence, less yields. 
According to Fāng Fēipéng, the harvest was reduced by more than one thousand jīn per 
mǔ (FFP, 2011-05-29:812–818). 
Concerning the meaning of “loss of money” (赔钱 péi qián), I found it interesting 
that Fāng Fēipéng at once told me that, on one hand, despite the bad weather, the small 
group still earned money, and, on the other hand, that “last year everyone lost money.”51 
Here the meaning of “losing money” is not absolute but relative. It does not mean that 
last year all the peasants earned no money by planting lotus roots. What Fāng Fēipéng 
meant was that the peasants lost money in comparison to what they might have earned 
without negative influences reducing their harvest (FFP, 2011-05-29:817–818). 
Whereas Wáng Wěi generally claimed that none of the NRR projects of the vil-
lage were profitable, and no second dividend was distributed, Fāng Fēipéng generally 
claimed that they “have profits for sure”, because “if there was no profit, who would do 
it?”52 On one hand, Fāng Fēipéng’s argument sounds perfectly reasonable. The Profes-
sional Cooperative was founded in 2008. If the village cadres who ran the Professional 
Cooperative made a loss all the time, why would they continue? Maybe even more im-
portantly, how were they able to continue for already three years if their claim of per-
manent loss was true? On the other hand, Fāng Fēipéng’s statement perfectly fitted into 
the image Wáng Wěi had of the “common people” as being only motivated by financial 
gains. According to Wáng Wěi, the villagers did not follow the pioneering example of 
the village cadres: “The common people, they are realistic. They look; if no money is 
earned, they don’t follow at first. It is when you make money that everyone will auto-
matically follow you.”53 Wáng Wěi represented himself—in contrast to the common 
people—as being selflessly caring for the collective. However, if we move with Pierre  
                                                          
51 去年都赔钱的。 Qùnián dōu péi qián de (FFP, 2011-05-29:817). 
52 肯定有利润的。 ⋯⋯没利润谁赶呀？ Kěndìng yǒu lìrùn de ... Méi lìrùn shuí gān ya? (FFP, 2011-
05-29:165–167). 
53 老百姓呢，是很现实的。他看了没有赚钱，他们就先不跟嘛。就是什 么时候你赚了钱了大家就
会自然而然地跟你。 Lǎobǎixìng ne, shì hěn xiànshí de. Tā kàn le méiyǒu zhuànqián, tāmen jiù xiān bù 
gēn ma. Jiùshì shénme shíhou nǐ zhuànle qián le dàjiā jiù huì zìrán’érrán de gēn nǐ (WW, 2011-05-
03:128–130). 
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Bourdieu (1986) from a narrowly economic perspective to a broader view of different 
kinds of capital, we can view this apparently selfless pioneer behavior of the village 
cadres as not completely selfless, as we already did in chapter 5 in the subsection about 
the costs and benefits of gift giving. David Graeber rightly warns us against simply 
viewing every human action as being only about maximizing profit, as even Bourdieu, 
one of the most critical social scientists, does with his general science of the economy 
of practices. If critical theory is only looking for hidden structures of power, dominance, 
and exploitation everywhere, it becomes impossible to imagine a world without it, and 
hence criticism becomes pointless. However, Graeber’s argument is not about not look-
ing for power and exploitation at all (Graeber 2001:26–30). (In fact, not doing so would 
make imagining alternatives pointless.) Especially in cases of gift giving between une-
quals, where, furthermore, the gift-giver is not himself the producer of the gift, it seems 
perfectly reasonable to me to be skeptical about an alleged selfless act. Bourdieu’s ana-
lytical tools offer a way to approach such cases. Moreover, while Wáng Wěi claimed 
that the villagers were acting in self-interest, the villagers claimed that Wáng Wěi acted 
in self-interest. Maybe the village cadres’ stories about the constant losses of the coop-
erative were not true and self-interest in its relatively pure economic form did exist here 
too. 
Returning to the concrete case of the lotus and crabs project, Fāng Fēipéng indeed 
claimed that the village cadres made a profit (not revenue, as he stressed) of more than 
76 thousand CNY in 2010 (FFP, 2011-05-29:658–667). 
Fāng Fēipéng did not know any exact numbers for the year 2009, however, he was 
still convinced that they made no losses in this first year: “Of course [they] did not lose 
money.”54 He assumed that in 2009 they probably did not earn as much money as in 
2010, when they saved money by using their own left over lotus roots for planting (FFP, 
2011-05-29:783–791). 
In autumn Fāng Fēipéng estimated that in 2011 the cooperative had revenue of be-
tween three to four thousand CNY per mǔ from selling lotus roots. After deducting the 
costs of production, profits of one to two thousand CNY per mǔ should still be left, ac-
cording to his calculations. This amount should also be enough to make an overall profit 
with the lotus and crabs project, even if the cooperative again lost money with the rais-
ing of crabs because men armed with knives had stolen many of them (FN, 2011-11-14). 
                                                          
54 当然不赔钱。 Dāngrán bù péi qián (FFP, 2011-05-29:790). 
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Summarizing this subsection, there is one thing we can know for sure, namely that 
the village cadres claimed that the LC group was not profitable, but that villagers did 
not necessarily believe that this was true. Concerning the question of state support, the 
picture was similar. 
7.1.4 State support 
Fāng Fēipéng said he understood why Wáng Wěi and the village cadres claimed that 
they made no profits. Everyone would tell the outside that they made losses. No one 
would dare to announce with a loud voice that they had made money that year. From 
Fāng Fēipéng’s perspective, this claim of loss was connected with the aim of receiving 
money from state projects. If Wáng Wěi had not said that he had lost money, he would 
not have received any money from the state, Fāng Fēipéng suspected (FFP, 2011-05-
29:673–680): “If he says that he lost money, in the case of loss, there are definitely peo-
ple who will give him the money that he lost, those from the project will give him sub-
sidies for sure. Right?”55 
Not only Fāng Fēipéng but also Hú Qǐhuá claimed that the village cadres had re-
ceived state support for the cooperative’s LC group. According to Hú Qǐhuá, the state 
allocated funds to them because they claimed that all the villagers were involved in the 
lotus and crabs project. In fact the money the village cadres earned with the LC group 
was their profit, while the money they lost was the state’s money, Hú Qǐhuá emphasized 
(HQH, 2011-05-07:773–779, 2011-05-27b:428–429). 
Hú Qǐhuá made this claim about state support, although he did not know any de-
tails about it. However, he emphasized that all the people knew that the state gave mon-
ey to the project. Hú Qǐhuá complained about the lack of transparency in the operation 
of both the Professional Cooperative and the village committee. In order to enable mass 
supervision, all the information about state funding should be publicized, he said, but 
the village cadres did not do so. Despite this news blockade, Hú Qǐhuá expected that 
after a while everyone would know what was going on (HQH, 2011-05-27b:431–437). 
For example, Hú Qǐhuá heard other people saying—he acknowledged that he did 
not know for sure—that the state gave the village cadres money in a disguised form. By 
this he meant that they did not have to pay for certain services and inputs. For example, 
                                                          
55 他说我赔了，赔了肯定会有人给他赔那个钱，项目上肯定会给他补助的。对吧？ Tā shuō wǒ péi 
le, péi le kěndìng huì yǒu rén gěi tā péi nàge qián, xiàngmù shàng kěndìng huì gěi tā bǔzhù de. Duì ba 
(FFP, 2011-05-29:679–680)? 
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an excavator constructed the irrigation channel embankment, as well as dykes and 
ridges between the fields. Private customers would usually have to pay for that service 
by hour. The village cadres did not have to pay for using the excavator. For Hú Qǐhuá 
this was the same as the state giving money to the village cadres. Furthermore, Hú 
Qǐhuá heard that the state subsidized the cooperative’s lotus root seeds and that the ag-
ricultural bureau also contributed some money (HQH, 2011-06-07:761–769). 
According to Hú Qǐhuá, there were also rumors that the state gave the LC group 
money, calculated on the basis of the surface area planted with lotus roots. Hú Qǐhuá 
estimated that in fact the lotus field only had a surface of about 30 to 40 mǔ, but that the 
village cadres reported that the small group cultivated 100 to 200 mǔ of lotus (HQH, 
2011-06-07:779–789). I heard several different numbers concerning the acreage of lotus 
roots, ranging from Hú Qǐhuá’s information of 30 mǔ, to Fāng Fēipéng’s of 50 mǔ (FFP, 
2011-05-29:530), up to one peasant’s of 60 mǔ (FN, 2011-04-19). According to Fāng 
Fēipéng, the lotus and crabs group transfered 80 mǔ of land on the whole, but did not 
plant lotus roots everywhere (FFP, 2011-05-29:530). If the cooperative really reported 
more acreage of lotus roots, this was not an exception. For example, Wáng Wěi himself 
told me that the real acreage of minor food crops was lower than the number the coop-
erative announced to the public (WW, 2011-06-08b:133–134). 
In the interviews Wáng Wěi did not mention that they had received any state sup-
port for the project. The only thing Wáng Wěi told me was that they had applied for a 
project for 2011 in order to expand. However, when I interviewed him in May 2011, the 
project had not been yet approved (WW, 2011-05-03:127–128). In a later interview in 
June, Wáng Wěi asked me to switch of my recorder, and told me that the project for the 
LC group was already approved, but that the money the state distributed allegedly dis-
appeared in the pockets of the leaders before arriving at the cooperative (WW, 2011-06-
08c:294–295; IR WW, 2011-06-08).56 
To summarize this subsection, we can state that there were two claims that the 
state’s money which was supposed to support a collective, cooperative project was used 
by local officials for their private gain. Villagers leveled this charge against the village 
cadres, especially against the chairperson of the village committee. The chairperson of 
                                                          
56 While some villagers accused Wáng Wěi of being corrupt, he in turn accused leaders above the village 
level of being corrupt. In the accounts of involved people, it is usually the other that is corrupt but almost 
never the self. This is one of the challenges of empirical studies on corruption. 
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the village committee himself blamed the next, higher-level officials. In the next part we 
turn from the LC group’s relations with the outside world to its internal relations. 
7.2 Village cadres as shareholders 
On my first day in the village a peasant in military style clothing told me that four 
big peasants rented 60 mǔ of land from other people in order to grow lotus roots (FN, 
2011-04-19). Only later on did I realize that he had told me about a project of the coop-
erative (FN, 2011-05-06). 
Already in the first interview, Wáng Wěi told me that it was only the four village 
cadres who were involved in the lotus and crab project (WW, 2011-05-03:130). How-
ever, Hú Qǐhuá told me that earlier on Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres had made 
a different claim about the small group’s members. In order to make the state allocate 
funds to the project, Hú Qǐhuá maintained that the village cadres told the outside that 
the LC group belonged to all the peasants in the village. Hú Qǐhuá recounted that he and 
his wife were surprised when students came to his home and asked how high a dividend 
they got from the integrated cultivation of lotus roots and crabs. Hú Qǐhuá and his wife 
told the students that they did not receive any money and that the project only belonged 
to the four village cadres (HQH, 2011-05-07:773–779, 2011-05-25:612–617). Accord-
ing to Hú Qǐhuá, even the wife of Huáng Guóqiáng, the only village cadre who was not 
involved in the LC group, complained that Wáng Wěi wanted the villagers to tell the 
outside lies about something that did not exist and that she could not say what she was 
expected to say (HQH, 2011-05-25:619–630). Hú Qǐhuá asserted that Wáng Wěi did 
not tell the outside that only village cadres and not the common people participated in 
the project because if he told them, people would start to ask themselves if Wáng Wěi 
was using his power to seek personal gain (HQH, 2011-05-25:657–662). When I in-
formed Hú Qǐhuá that Wáng Wěi told me from the start that it was only the four village 
cadres’ project, Hú Qǐhuá explained that it was definitely clear to Wáng Wěi that it 
made no sense to continue to tell lies because I had already stayed in the village for so 
many days (HQH, 2011-05-25:693–694). 
In 2008 the four village cadres Huáng Jiànguó, Wáng Wěi, Wáng Yàjūn, and 
Chén Yùjiàn, invested money to pay 500 CNY per mǔ per year to transfer the land use 
rights to the LC group of the Professional Cooperative. According to Wáng Wěi, this 
land had the poorest quality of soil in the whole village (WW, 2011-05-03:89–109). 
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Nevertheless, not all of the peasants whose land was transfered immediately agreed to 
the village cadres’ offer, Hú Qǐhuá told me. The village cadres indeed invested a lot of 
time and energy to get the land use rights in the name of the village committee, Hú 
Qǐhuá acknowledged (HQH, 2011-06-07:756–760). Despite the poor quality, Wáng 
Wěi and the other village cadres transfered this land because they wanted to set a pio-
neering example, Wáng Wěi explained. Huáng Jiànguó, the vice village party branch 
secretary of Shǔidàozhuāng, was the person in charge of the management of the LC 
group (WW, 2011-05-03:89–109). 
In Wáng Wěi’s narrative the village cadres tried to enlarge the project and include 
more peasants in this cooperative project, but in the end they did not manage to do so 
(WW, 2011-05-03:130). In contrast, Hú Qǐhuá told me that Wáng Wěi and the village 
cadres did not even organize a meeting in order to inform all the villagers about their 
plans of cooperatively cultivating lotus roots and crabs or to ask them to participate in 
this new small group of the cooperative (HQH, 2011-06-07:754–756). He even raised 
an accusation against the village cadres, namely that they did not want other villagers to 
participate in order to take all the profits themselves after the state had helped starting 
the project because the village cadres had pretended that the whole village was involved 
(HQH, 2011-06-07:769–774). Be that as it may, only the village cadres were sharehold-
ers of the LC group and the only ones who managed it. 
7.3 One permanent worker... 
7.3.1 ... for guarding, feeding and secret accounting 
The LC group had one permanent worker, who lived and worked at the lotus and 
crabs field from April until December (FFP, 2011-05-29:494,615). The young man, 
who was called Fāng Fēipéng, had an oral agreement with the cooperative. In addition 
to the wage, they also specified the tasks Fāng Fēipéng had to fulfill. He told me that his 
main task was to prevent other people from stealing the crabs and the lotus roots.57 His 
second task was to feed the crabs once every afternoon. Moreoever, if people from the 
outside, such as leaders, journalists, intellectuals, students and urban dwellers, came to 
                                                          
57 In November 2011 Fāng Fēipéng told me that many crabs had been stolen. One night two men entered 
the container where he was living next to the lotus fields and threatened him with a knife. He did not dare 
to do anything because they seemed to be drunk. At the same time there were two or three men outside 
collecting the crabs in the fields. When the men left in their car, Fāng Fēipéng saw the number plate and 
informed the police who managed to catch the robbers. However, the crabs were gone (FN, 2011-11-11). 
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visit the lotus and crabs project, Fāng Fēipéng was supposed to introduce and explain 
the project to them.58 He was also asked to write a diary in order to document the ad-
vances and drawbacks in the cultivation process (FFP, 2011-05-29:480–484).59 
Besides these tasks, I also observed that he scared away birds with the sound of 
crackers, which he shot into the air with a slingshot in order to prevent them from eating 
the crabs. He also hindered other animals from eating the crabs. Once he caught a snake 
with his bare hands, I read in his diary. However, he did not kill it because this was not 
in accordance with the philosophy of the village, he believed (FN, 2011-05-25). 
The planting of the lotus roots in spring, the weeding during the season and the 
digging of lotus roots in autumn were not included in Fāng Fēipéng’s basic set of tasks. 
According to the oral agreement, Fāng Fēipéng was responsible for supervising the pro-
cess of planting lotus roots. However, he could additionally participate in planting lotus 
roots himself. For this additional work he was paid as much as the other day laborers.60 
Similarly, in autumn, Fāng Fēipéng not only kept books about the amount of lotus roots 
unearthed and sold, he also dug out lotus roots himself in the morning, when he was not 
as busy with taking notes as in the afternoon (FFP, 2011-05-29:497–517,647–654,977–
980). 
In 2011 three of the village cadres asked Fāng Fēipéng to undertake another task. 
They suspected that the fourth of them, namely Huáng Jiànguó, who was responsible for 
accounting, was corrupt and was putting some of the project’s money into his own 
pocket without writing it into his “bright”—as Fāng Fēipéng called it—account book 
(míngzhàngběn 明账本). Therefore, without Huáng Jiànguó knowing it, Fāng Fēipéng 
had a second, a “dark” or “secret” account book (ànzhàngběn 暗账本) and recorded all 
the revenues and expenditures. Whereas Huáng Jiànguó still collected all the money of 
the small group, all the money went through Fāng Fēipéng’s hands first. That way the 
other village cadres, namely Wáng Wěi, Wáng Yàjūn and Chén Yùjiàn, wanted to su-
                                                          
58 For example, during the ecological culture tourism festival Fāng Fēipéng had to prepare a banner, a 
very small ceremony and an angling competition in which urban dwellers tried to catch crabs. Then he 
introduced the lotus and crabs project, as well as the schedule of activities in the festival to the visitors, 
and answered their questions. Most of the questions of the urban dwellers concerned the raising of crabs, 
but not the cooperative. All in all this was not a lot of work for him, as the village cadres and Mǎ Zhìyǒng 
arranged everything else, and as the student volunteers from the agricultural universities helped with the 
rest of the tasks during the festival (FFP, 2011-05-29:690–705). 
59 Fāng Fēipéng also showed me his notes. Proudly he told me that many people, including intellectuals 
like Zhū Xiǎojuān and Wēn Tiějūn, lauded him for writing the diary. He showed me two empty note-
books, which someone had given to him as a present. Once he had received a dictionary too (FN, 2011-
05-25). 
60 I focus on the day laborers in a subsection below. 
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pervise the doings of Huáng Jiànguó and prevent corruption (FFP, 2011-05-29:721–
773). Fāng Fēipéng, on the other hand, seemed proud to be the second accountant of the 
project. 
In the course of the year Fāng Fēipéng’s work basically did not change. He only 
mentioned that there were more visitors in June and July than in the rest of the year 
(FFP, 2011-05-29:489–492). In autumn it was also Fāng Fēipéng’s task to catch the 
crabs when consumers ordered them in advance. He would then prepare the crabs to be 
picked up by the consumers on the next day (FN, 2011-05-25, 2011-11-11). 
Fāng Fēipéng was not involved in decision-making processes. Only once did he 
participate in a meeting in 2010. The village cadres managed the small group. His rela-
tionship to the village cadres was that he worked for them. He was the worker and the 
four cadres were his bosses, he told me. Huáng Jiànguó was the village cadre who 
stopped by the lotus field most often, sometimes even once a day and every day of the 
week. However, he had almost nothing to do there, Fāng Fēipéng noted. Huáng Jiànguó 
only checked the water level and asked Fāng Fēipéng if he needed money (FFP, 2011-
05-29:871–902). 
From April until December Fāng Fēipéng worked for the cooperative every day. 
During this time he had no holidays because he always needed to guard the crabs, he 
explained. From January to March he had no work and could do whatever he wished 
(FFP, 2011-05-29:860–867). 
During the work period Fāng Fēipéng lived in a building container next to the lo-
tus field. In one room there were two bunk beds and an electric fan. In the other half of 
the container materials for the cultivation of the crabs were stored. In this room he 
sprouted wheat used for feeding the crabs. With an electric hotplate Fāng Fēipéng could 
cook dishes for himself there. Outside of the container Fāng Fēipéng had planted some 
vegetables, such as eggplants and chillis. The container had electricity, but there was no 
toilet and no running water, so instead Fāng Fēipéng had to go into the fields if neces-
sary. In summer he washed himself in the irrigation channel. In the cold season he went 
to the public bathhouse (zǎotáng 澡堂) in the county town once a week.61 In summer it 
was very hot in his container. Mosquitos bit him to death in summer because wet fields 
surrounded his home, he complained to me (FN, 2011-05-09, 2011-05-25, 2011-11-11). 
                                                          
61 Many peasants from the village went to bathhouses in winter, some once, others twice or three times a 
week because in their own bathrooms there was usually no heating system, Fāng Fēipéng explained (FN, 
2011-11-11). 
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Fāng Fēipéng’s wage was “only 500 CNY per month,” according to Wáng Wěi 
(WW, 2011-05-03:147). In an informal conversation Fāng Fēipéng first told me that he 
felt that his wage was very low (FN, 2011-04-22). However, later on, contrary to Wáng 
Wěi’s information, Fāng Fēipéng claimed in an interview that he received a wage of 
1,200 CNY per month. He said that his wage was high considering that it was work in 
the village because even in the county town Dàhé the average wages were only about 
800 to 1,000 CNY (FFP, 2011-05-29:78–100,466–467).62 In this case Wáng Wěi’s in-
formation was closer to reality then Fāng Fēipéng’s.63 
In autumn 2011 Fāng Fēipéng told me that he had not yet received his wage for 
the year because the season was not yet over. He explained that he did not want to im-
mediately receive his wage every month like in 2010 when he had immediately spent 
most of this money. In order to be able to save some money this time, he asked the vil-
lage cadres to pay him at the end of the year. If he needed money during the year, he 
had to ask the accountant Wáng Yàjūn for it. The money Fāng Fēipéng got from the 
cooperative in order to pay for his living expenses (like food) and consumer goods (like 
his new mobile phone) was then subtracted from the wage he was supposed to receive 
in the end of the year (FN, 2011-11-11). 
Fāng Fēipéng was not the first permanent worker of the LC group. In 2009 the son 
of Wáng Wěi’s elder brother worked there. According to one peasant, he earned more 
than Fāng Fēipéng, namely 900 CNY per month (FN, 2011-11-13). Apparently Fāng 
Fēipéng knew this. He thought that Wáng Wěi’s nephew received a higher wage be-
cause of his close relationship to Wáng Wěi. Nevertheless, Fāng Fēipéng was willing to 
work for 500 CNY per month (FN, 2011-11-14). To better understand his decision, I 
summarize his life story at this point. 
7.3.2 From the village to the city and back to the village 
Fāng Fēipéng was about 20 years old when I met him in 2011 (FN, 2011-04-22). He did  
                                                          
62 Fāng Fēipéng told me that during the year the cooperative gave him money to cover his living expenses. 
For example, the village cadres gave him money for buying food in the village. According to Fāng 
Fēipéng, these living expenses amounted to 200 CNY per month. Additionally to that, he said, he re-
ceived a wage of 1,000 CNY per month from the cooperative (FFP, 2011-05-29:78–100,466–467). 
63 I could not think of any reason why Wáng Wěi would not tell the truth concerning this issue. In all the 
other issues he emphasized the high costs of the cooperative in order to proove that the cooperative made 
no profit. Furthermore, Wáng Wěi—especially in the earlier interviews—stressed the advantages the 
cooperative offered to the peasants. Fāng Fēipéng, on the other hand, maybe exaggerated in this case in 
order to create a good impression on me, the interviewee. When I returned to the village in autumn 2011, 
Fāng Fēipéng told me that his wage was in fact 500 CNY per month (FN, 2011-11-11). 
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not spend his early childhood in Shǔidàozhuāng but in another village. His father died 
when Fāng Fēipéng was still very young. His mother then married another man and 
moved with Fāng Fēipéng to Shǔidàozhuāng, where Fāng Fēipéng went to school (FN, 
2011-05-25). Fāng Fēipéng’s family was among the poorest in the village. They only 
had the land use rights for about two mǔ. Additionally, his mother and his stepfather 
cultivated four mǔ of land from relatives who lived and worked outside of the village in 
a city. On their fields they planted wheat, rice and maize (FFP, 2011-05-29:3–32,459–
460). 
Fāng Fēipéng only attended school until the age of 15. He said that he was not 
very good in school. Together with some schoolmates he looked for wage labor in the 
cities because they could earn more money there, Fāng Fēipéng recounted. Through a 
local intermediary, they found work in a toy factory in Guangzhou in the Guangdong 
Province, where other villagers already worked as migrant workers. Fāng Fēipéng and 
his schoolmates were still considered children, as they had not yet reached the age of 16. 
Thus companies with better working conditions and better pay did not hire them be-
cause these companies refused to use child labor. Sometimes Fāng Fēipéng worked only 
eight hours, but most of the time he worked twelve hours a day every day of the week 
because work was organized in only two and not in three shifts. In the dormitory of the 
factory he shared a room with four bunk beds with seven other workers. At the end of 
each month they received their wage on time. Fāng Fēipéng was paid a basic wage of 
1,000 CNY plus an additional piece wage. If he and his three colleagues, who worked 
together at one machine, managed to exceed the set production target, they received an 
additional bonus. In this way he could earn up to 4,000 CNY per month. In the factory 
he did not witness any cases of worker resistance. Open resistance was forbidden ac-
cording to the contract. Those who were dissatisfied simply quitted their job and left the 
company. Fāng Fēipéng worked at the factory for three years and only visited his par-
ents in the village once a year at the Chinese New Year. He thought that this was a 
waste of money, as the trip was very expensive and he could not earn money during 
those days. However, with the age of 18 he returned to Shǔidàozhuāng in 2007 because 
of health problems due to standing at the machine all day long. He also complained 
about the bad air in the city. His leg was swollen, probably thrombosis. Immediately 
after his return his condition worsened. He was lucky that he returned because in the 
city there was no one who would have looked after him, he said. He had to stay in the 
hospital for about one month. The doctor instructed him not to do any hard work for a 
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long time. Fāng Fēipéng stayed at home lying in bed for more than one year and for 
three years he did not do any heavy work (FFP, 2011-05-29:249–455). 
In 2010 the village cadres asked Fāng Fēipéng if he wanted to work for the coop-
erative because they knew about his illness and that his family was the poorest in the 
whole village, Fāng Fēipéng explained. He decided to do this work because at that time 
he was not yet able to do any other kind of work due to the problem with his leg. 
Through his work for the cooperative at the lotus and crabs project he could earn a little 
money while continuing recreation at the same time (FFP, 2011-05-29:459–478). 
Fāng Fēipéng enjoyed working for the cooperative in the village. He liked it more 
than working as a migrant worker in the city because he was not monitored as closely as 
in the factory. He could do the things he liked to do, and he did not have to do the things 
he did not want to do (FN, 2011-04-22; FFP, 2011-05-29:828–830). 
Furthermore, his current work for the cooperative was not as exhausting as the 
work in the toy factory. The wage he earned in the city was higher, however, higher 
living expenses, Fāng Fēipéng noted, diminished this advantage (FFP, 2011-05-29:833–
834). 
In the interview in the end of May 2011, Fāng Fēipéng told me that he would pre-
fer to plant lotus roots himself and earn as much money as the village cadres do now. 
He was self-confident and said that he would even be able to take better care of the 
fields than them because he thought that it was easier for one person to manage than for 
more. He knew exactly when to weed and when to use organic fertilizer so that his lotus 
roots would grow even better. Fāng Fēipéng viewed his time as the worker of the LC 
group as a learning opportunity.64 Later on he himself would be able to buy organic fer-
tilizer, pesticides and herbicides for his own ecological lotus roots. However, the only 
problem was that he did not have enough capital to do so, Fāng Fēipéng explained. He 
had already thought about how he could manage to borrow capital from his father’s 
elder brother for next year. To participate in the mutual financial aid cooperative was 
not an option for him, because he did not want to pay interest and therefore preferred to 
borrow from relatives. If he had enough capital, he would also cultivate crabs, if not, he 
would only plant lotus roots (FFP, 2011-05-29:992–1047). 
                                                          
64 He did not only learn by doing. During his time at the cooperative Fāng Fēipéng also started to like 
reading. In school he did not read a lot, but now he liked reading newspapers and books. He started read-
ing because he considered himself too backward. Now he could use the internet and communicate with 
girls on QQ, a very popular free instant messaging service in mainland China (FFP, 2011-05-29:1065–
1083). 
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In November 2011 Fāng Fēipéng’s plans for the future had already changed. He 
did not want to continue to work for the cooperative if the wage continued to be as low 
as 500 CNY. Only if they offered him 1,000 CNY would he think about staying, he told 
me. He wanted to go to the cities again to find work, although the work there would be 
more exhausting and dangerous than in the countryside at the lotus field. This time he 
wanted to go to Inner Mongolia and not to Guangdong. Other villagers who worked in 
Inner Mongolia had told him that there he could earn at least 1,000 CNY per month if 
he worked at a construction side. Concerning working hours, he did not care about a 12-
hour day because working for the LC group meant that he sometimes had to stay at his 
container for the whole day—in summer in order to guard the crabs when they were big 
enough to be worth stealing, and later on in autumn in order to guard the dug out lotus 
roots when they were easily accessible to thieves because they were piled up in front of 
his container before they were sold (FN, 2011-11-14). While writing this in spring 2012, 
I have wondered whether Fāng Fēipéng was still working for the Professional Coopera-
tive in the village, as a migrant worker in Inner Mongolia or cultivating his own lotus 
roots in the village, or maybe doing something else. 
7.4 Day laborers... 
The LC group hired day laborers mainly for planting lotus roots in spring and for dig-
ging them up in autumn. 
7.4.1 ... for planting lotus roots 
In April 2011 it took ten day laborers, including Fāng Fēipéng, about two weeks to plant 
all the lotus roots on about 50 mǔ of the transfered land belonging to the lotus and crabs 
group. 65  The cooperative paid the day laborers a wage of 70 CNY per day, Fāng 
Fēipéng said. The day laborers came from Shǔidàozhuāng, as well as from neighboring 
villages. The four members of the cooperative, that is the four village cadres, did not 
participate in this work (FN, 2011-05-27; FFP, 2011-05-29:510–551). 
Later I found out that it was mainly women who planted the lotus roots, and that 
men and women were not equally paid for doing the same work. Fāng Fēipéng told me 
that he was paid 70 CNY per day, while women were only paid 50 CNY. Fāng Fēipéng 
                                                          
65 In 2010, his first year of work at the cooperative, Fāng Fēipéng did not participate in planting the lotus 
roots but only started work later on (FFP, 2011-05-29:610–611). Therefore, he was not able to give me 
any information on the planting process the previous year. 
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explained this by stating that everywhere in China it was like that. He continued that 
men would not do this work if they were paid less. However, in the concrete process of 
hiring it was not the peasants who asked the cooperative for paid work. The cooperative 
asked the peasants if they wanted to work for them. It was thus the village cadres’ deci-
sion to hire mainly women and not men for planting the lotus roots. Furthermore, the 
women were not randomly chosen. It was predominantly those women who also helped 
packaging the rice for the cooperative (FN, 2011-05-31). 
7.4.2 ... for digging up lotus roots 
The lotus roots were unearthed again in October and November (FFP, 2011-05-29:623). 
Huáng Jiànguó first checked with Fāng Fēipéng and then decided if and when to sell the 
lotus roots, Fāng Fēipéng told me. Huáng Jiànguó then informed an intermediary from 
Shǔidàozhuāng. This villager knew the market and where to sell the lotus roots. He or-
ganized a vehicle and a driver. The next step was that either this intermediary or Huáng 
Jiànguó organized the day laborers for digging (FN, 2011-11-14).66 According to the 
oral agreement, Fāng Fēipéng was responsible for recording the amount of lotus roots 
unearthed and sold. However, in the morning he had time to dig out lotus roots himself. 
In this way he managed to earn an additional forty to fifty CNY per day (FFP, 2011-05-
29:647–654). In contrast to the planting of lotus roots in spring, the day laborers were 
not paid per day but instead per jīn of dug up lotus roots. The piece wage per jīn was 0,3 
CNY.67 On one day one person dug up between 400 to 600 jīn. Thus it was possible to 
earn up to 200 CNY (for 666 jīn of lotus roots) per day, Fāng Fēipéng told me (FN, 
2011-05-27). According to Fāng Fēipéng and my own observations in November 2011, 
it was mainly but not exclusively men who dug up lotus roots for the cooperative.68 In 
this case, men and women were paid the same piece wage. The day laborers were not 
working together in the lotus field. Every one was working for himself and had his own 
pile of dug up lotus roots. At the end of the day Fāng Fēipéng weighed the piles. Those 
who unearthed more lotus roots earned more money. In the evening Huáng Jiànguó paid 
                                                          
66 The day laborers told me that “those from the production brigade” (大队他们 dàdùi tāmen)—thus 
referring to the village committee, and hence viewing the shareholders of the project not in their position 
as members of the Professional Cooperative but in their position as village cadres—asked them to work in 
the lotus field (FN, 2011-11-13). 
67 In autumn the wage per jīn was 0,4 CNY, according to the men who worked for the cooperative (FN, 
2011-11-13). 
68 For example, on November 14 nine men and three women were working at the lotus field (FN, 2011-
11-14). 
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the day laborers and Fāng Fēipéng did the secret bookkeeping (FN, 2011-05-31; 2011-
11-13; 2011-11-14). 
Most peasants in the village dug up their lotus roots themselves. However, there 
were some villagers who paid other people for doing this work. Interestingly, Fāng 
Fēipéng did not mention the availability of money (for example, from wage labor in the 
cities) as a reason, but of skills instead. He explained that these villagers let other people 
do it because—from his perspective—these peasants did not know how to carefully dig 
up the lotus roots without damaging them (FN, 2011-05-27). In 2010 Fāng Fēipéng also 
dug up lotus roots for other peasants to earn some additional money (FFP, 2011-05-
29:905–907). 
From this section we can summarize the following points. Firstly, there was a ten-
dency to divide labor according to gender. It was mainly women planting and men dig-
ging up lotus roots. Secondly, day laborers were paid immediately after a day’s work. 
This stood in contrast to the permanent worker who was paid at the end of the month in 
the first year and at the end of the year in his second year working for the small group. 
This was not an exception in the practice of the Professional Cooperative. As we have 
seen in the preceding chapter, the woman who cultivated organic rice and wheat for the 
Professional Cooperative was also not paid immediately but only later on. Furthermore, 
peasants who sold their paddy or minor food crops to the cooperative, who were hence 
considered as members by Wáng Wěi, the chairperson of the Professional Cooperative, 
were also not paid as soon as they delivered their paddy to the cooperative. Thirdly, 
these day laborers were not necessarily villagers of Shǔidàozhuāng but also came from 
other places of Dàhé County. Hence, not all of the day laborers had a relationship with 
the shareholders and managers of the small group that exceeded their rather impersonal 
relationship of buyers and sellers of labor power. However, there were also some day 
laborers who not only related with the shareholders and managers in their position as 
employers but also in their position as village cadres. Fourthly, Fāng Fēipéng was both 
permanent worker and day laborer. 
7.5 Volunteer duty at the lotus field 
So far I have dealt with paid work in the lotus and crabs project of the Professional Co-
operative. However, there was also unpaid work in this small group. Fāng Fēipéng re-
ferred to this work as “volunteer duty” (义务 yìwù; FFP, 2011-05-29:559). 
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In the morning of the day when the crabs were put into the lotus field, Mǎ 
Zhìyǒng and I were invited to have breakfast at Wáng Wěi’s family home. Afterwards 
we went to the fields of the LC group. Mǎ Zhìyǒng, Fāng Fēipéng and Zhèng Guìhuā, 
the wife of Wáng Wěi, and I prepared a fence that surrounded three of the six lotus 
fields of the cooperative. The fence was made out of thin bamboo canes and plastic, was 
about half a meter high and prevented the crabs from running away, and the snakes and 
frogs from entering the crabs’ habitat. We also repaired the small earth dykes between 
the wet fields. After a while the village cadre Chén Yùjiàn also arrived at the lotus fields. 
He first showed Fāng Fēipéng where to repair a hole in the irrigation channel. Then 
Chén Yùjiàn also joined us preparing the fence. Next to Fāng Fēipéng’s container, two 
men used a motorized water pump to add water to the lotus fields. Later the village ca-
dres, Wáng Wěi and Wáng Yàjūn, arrived with the small red minibus. They had bought 
crabs in Píngyuán city. Now everyone stopped work and helped to put the crabs into the 
water. Afterwards we continued building the fence around the wet fields. Wáng Wěi 
and a man in a black suit also helped us. For lunch Wáng Wěi, Wáng Yàjūn, the man 
with the black suit, Mǎ Zhìyǒng and I went to a cheap restaurant in the neighboring vil-
lage next to the big street. Zhèng Guìhuā, Wáng Wěi’s wife, and Fāng Fēipéng did not 
join us. Zhèng Guìhuā left the fields with her electro bike (FN, 2011-05-09). Later she 
told me in an informal conversation that she ate at home on that day (FN, 2011-05-14). I 
knew from other meals with the village cadres that their wives usually did not eat to-
gether with them if they invited their friends for the meal. Only sometimes did they join 
us towards the end of the meal (FN, 2011-06-10). Fāng Fēipéng also did not eat with us. 
In an interview he explained that he could not come along because otherwise no one 
would have stayed at the lotus field to watch the crabs (FFP, 2011-05-29:579). 
When we finished our meal at the restaurant, the village cadres bought Chinese 
dumplings for Fāng Fēipéng. When we returned to the fields, Fāng Fēipéng, Zhèng 
Guìhuā and two other women were still preparing the fence. Fāng Fēipéng quickly ate 
the dumplings and continued his work. Wáng Wěi took a shovel and showed his wife, 
the two women and Fāng Fēipéng how they should straighten the embarkment of the 
irrigation channel next to the lotus fields. Mǎ Zhìyǒng, who received a call from Zhū 
Xiǎojuān, and later on Wáng Wěi, left the scene, while the women and Fāng Fēipéng 
continued to work at the irrigation channel (FN, 2011-05-09). 
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On that day (nearly) all of the labor was unpaid labor, or “voluntary duty” (yìwù 
义务), as Fāng Fēipéng put it. Only those who worked in the afternoon were hired by 
the cooperative for 25 CNY each (FFP, 2011-05-29:554–577). 
When we talked about voluntary duty, Fāng Fēipéng told me that his favorite ac-
tivity was physical labor. Sometimes it made him feel uncomfortable if he was not 
working on a job. In this respect he was different from his schoolmates, Fāng Fēipéng 
emphasized. According to him, both his male and female schoolmates were all very lazy. 
Already in primary school he was hardworking and very often it was him who cleaned 
the classroom. Even now did he sometimes voluntarily clean the new building of the 
village committee (FFP, 2011-05-29:911–923). 
Fāng Fēipéng explained that the village cadres themselves only worked at the lo-
tus fields if there was a lot of work to do, for example when the lotus roots were planted 
or dug up. However, after a few requests it turned out that most often it was not the vil-
lage cadres themselves who came to work voluntarily and without payment at the lotus 
field. Rather the village cadres Wáng Wěi and Chén Yùjiàn sent their wives to the 
field.69 Those two women helped the day laborers and Fāng Fēipéng planting lotus roots 
on one or two days (FFP, 2011-05-29:593–606). In comparison with the duration of the 
whole planting process, which lasted about two weeks, this contribution by family 
members of the village cadres was rather small. Paid workers, either permanent or tem-
porary laborers, did most of the work. 
7.6 Relations of class or patron-client relations? 
To summarize this chapter I discuss the relations between the cooperative and the dif-
ferent workers with the concepts of class and patron-client relations. Is the relationship 
between the shareholders of the cooperative/buyer of labor power/village cadres and the 
workers/sellers of labor power/villagers best understood as a class relation between cap-
italists and workers or as a patron-client relation? 
7.6.1 Class relations 
In Nicos Poulantzas’ (1975) Marxist understanding, classes are groups of people that 
are defined through their place in the production process. He differentiates between 
                                                          
69 I got very similar information about the participation of village cadres and their wives in the lotus and 
crabs project from Wáng Wěi’s wife, Zhèng Guìhuā, in an informal conversation about two weeks before 
the interview with Fāng Fēipéng (FN, 2011-05-14). 
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class places and class positions. This differentiation is not to be confused with the often-
mentioned distinction between economic class situation (“class in itself”) and political-
ideological class position (“class for itself”). Individuals can occupy objective class 
places that are determined by economic as well as (and this is the difference to the con-
cept of “class in itself” as pre-political) by political and ideological factors. These plac-
es are already political and ideological as they already involve class struggle. They are 
objective in the sense that they exist independently of the will of the individual that oc-
cupies the place. In contrast, class positions refer to concrete situations of class struggle 
in which a social class might take a class position that is not in accordance with the ob-
jective interests determined by its class place. The Marxian concept of class is a rela-
tional concept, in contrast to models of social stratification and status groups. Inequality, 
or different levels of income, does not make people into members of different social 
classes. Rather inequality is the effect of social class on individuals, the effect of class 
places that are occupied by these individuals. Hence, social inequalities can only disap-
pear with the disappearance of social classes (Poulantzas 1975: 14–17). 
Within the production process of the LC group, the members of the cooperative, 
that is the four shareholders in the small group, were in the place of cooperating capital-
ists controlling the means of production and buying the labor power of one permanent 
worker and of several day laborers. Individual villagers, for example Fāng Fēipéng, and 
people from other nearby villages occupied the places of workers within the production 
process. However, while the relationship between the day laborers from other villagers 
with the village cadres ended as soon as they had finished a day’s work, this was not the 
case with the permanent worker Fāng Fēipéng and the day laborers from the village.    
7.6.2 Patron-client relations 
Many anthropologists have found that in the countryside “vertical” links across class 
boundaries often prevent the formation of horizontal linkages between those sharing the 
same place in the production process. In these cases, links of kinship, religion, ethnicity 
or nation tended to be more powerful than links of class. Hence, ethnographers rarely 
used the concept of class to analyze such relationships. Rather they developed other 
notions such as networks, cross-cutting ties, and patron-client relationships (Hann 
2009:99). 
Patrons are politically superior and clients inferior. Patrons control “access to po-
litical, economic or cultural resources that the clients want or need. The means by which 
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the client gains access to them is not through appeals to formal bureaucracy, but by the 
manipulation of personal relationships of reciprocity” (Mitchell 2009:416) Clients hon-
or their patrons by way of gift giving or political support. In return, patrons give their 
clients access to certain resources: “It is therefore a personal relationship of exchange 
that although asymmetrical, is assumed to be mutually beneficial.” (Mitchell 2009:416) 
As the worker Fāng Fēipéng and the village cadres were living in the same village, 
they also had a personal relationship. Their relationship can be considered as a relation-
ship between patron and client as well. Wáng Wěi offered Fāng Fēipéng his job at the 
LC group in a situation when Fāng Fēipéng was not able to find another job due to his 
health problems. Furthermore, when Fāng Fēipéng talked with me about his wage, he 
also told me that his family had received 800 CNY from Wáng Wěi. It was the rural 
minimum living guarantee (nóngmín dībǎo 农民地堡) granted to his family by the pro-
vincial government after applying for it with the help of the village committee (FN, 
2011-11-11). Giving their clients access to rare resources is typical for patrons. In turn 
Fāng Fēipéng was a loyal client. He offered what he called “voluntary duty” to his pa-
trons. Not only did he sometimes work for free at the lotus field, he sometimes also 
cleaned up the building of the village committee. Probably he also offered political sup-
port to Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres in the village elections. A few weeks 
before the elections he told me that he was allowed to vote this time (FN, 2011-11-11). 
However, he did not tell me for whom he wanted to vote. 
7.6.3 Capitalists/patrons and workers/clients 
Many studies of clientelism treated class and patron-client relations as mutually exclu-
sive (Rothstein 1979:32). In the 1970s Marxists argued that patron-client relationships 
are not purely personal relations. From their perspective they were structural, as well as 
related to class. Some even argued that patronage was a class relationship backed up 
with an ideology of mutual benefit (Mitchell 2009:417). Frances Rothstein (1979) em-
phasized that in the dependent capitalist development in Mexico, clientelism was based 
on class. Michal Bodemann (1982:147) pointed out that in rural Sardinia clientelism 
was not only based on the economic position of the patrons, “but also to a specific form 
of political power which is defined by the patron’s relationship to the state.” 
Indeed, the relations between the cooperative and those of its workers that came 
from the same village were neither purely unstructured and impersonal market mediated 
relationships nor purely personal patron-client relationships. Wáng Wěi’s and the other 
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village cadres potential for being patrons was partly based on their class place as coop-
erative capitalists in the LC group and partly based on their political position as village 
cadres and, hence, on them being the connection to the state apparatus at the local level. 
For the next chapter about the Happy Pig Small Group, one part of which, namely 
the Happy Pig Farm, is also a production cooperative-like project, we can keep this dis-
cussion about class/patron-client relations in mind. 
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8 Happy Pigs 
Another sub-project of the Professional Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Prod-
ucts (or Professional Cooperative) was the so-called Small Group for Raising Happy 
Pigs (快乐猪养殖小组 kuàilèzhū yǎngzhí xiǎozǔ). I explain the meaning of “happy 
pigs” below. This project, and especially the different stories that exist about it, could 
easily fill up a whole chapter. However, due to restrictions of time and space, I only 
summarize the main characteristics of this project here. Considering it from the point of 
view of grounded theory methodology, it can also be argued that it should be omitted 
here because of theoretical saturation. The main codes and concepts I identified in the 
material about the Happy Pig Small Group (hereafter HP group) had already been de-
veloped in the coding process from the material about the other projects of the Profes-
sional Cooperative. I will first introduce the project and then summarize the similarities 
and differences to the other NRR projects in the village. 
8.1 The meaning of “happy” in happy pigs 
First of all, what made “happy pigs” happy—or what made them different from conven-
tionally raised pigs? The idea for raising happy pigs developed as an answer to the 
growing problem of food safety (食品安全 shípǐn ānquán) in China. There have been 
many food scandals in China recently and consumers have started to worry about eating 
unhealthy food. One of the villagers, who was raising pigs, namely Hú Qǐhuá, a council 
member of the former Association for Environmentally Harmless Rice, expected con-
sumers to be eager to buy food that did not cause any health problems and to even be 
willing to pay a better price if they knew for sure that the food was safe. Hence, he de-
veloped the idea of raising healthy, happy pigs, without using any dangerous chemicals. 
Therefore, he did not use industrially produced pig feed (饲料 sìliào) that often con-
tained additives (添加剂 tiānjiājì) and that made pigs grow faster. Of course he also did 
not use lean meat powder (瘦肉精 shòuròujīng), a substance that lowers the fat content 
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in order to make it look more attractive for the consumer. The use of lean meat powder 
is illegal in China but, nevertheless, widespread, even though it is poisonous to humans 
(HQH, 2011-05-06b:33–59). Instead, Shǔidàozhuāng’s peasants only used maize, wheat 
bran, wild edible herbs, leftover food or the like for feeding the happy pigs three times a 
day (WW, 2011-05-03:312–316). The peasants wrote a diary about their happy pigs in 
order to raise their sense of responsibility and to show the consumers how they raised 
their happy pigs (WW, 2011-05-03:257–261). A pig raised in the conventional way is 
fed industrial pig feed once a day and could be sold and slaughtered after about three to 
four months. Raising a happy pig took much longer, namely almost one year. Hence the 
production costs as well as the risk of disease among the pigs, and hence the risk of fi-
nancial loss, were higher for the peasants (HQH, 2011-05-27b:153–160). 
8.2 Inclusion and exclusion (1): Hú Qǐhuá and the happy pigs 
In 2009 Hú Qǐhuá started to grow happy pigs in the pigsties in his courtyard. Before 
Chinese New Year 2010, assistant professor Zhū Xiǎojuān helped him selling his happy 
pigs in Zhèngzhōu to urban consumers for a higher price than the usual market price for 
conventional pig meat (HQH, 2011-05-06b:26–31). 
Wáng Wěi liked the idea of growing happy pigs and set up a small group for 
growing happy pigs as part of the Professional Cooperative. He designated Hú Qǐhuá as 
the person in charge (负责人 fùzérén) of the small group (HQH, 2011-05-06b:77, 2011-
05-25:81–85,445–456, 2011-06-05:243–250; WW, 2011-05-06:174; FN, 2011-11-14). 
In 2010 Hú Qǐhuá and seven other households participated in the HP group and raised 
about fifty happy pigs. These seven households included three village cadres, namely 
Wáng Yàjūn, Chén Yùjiàn and Huáng Guóqiáng, as well as Huáng Guóqiáng’s younger 
brother and three other families from the Huáng clan. The small group was organized as 
a marketing cooperative. The peasants raised the happy pigs individually. The coopera-
tive sold the happy pigs to urban consumers (HQH, 2011-05-06b:438–441, 2011-05-
25:318–384; WW, 2011-05-03:182–183). 
In 2011 a second part, namely a new Happy Pig Farm (hereafter HP farm), was 
added to the HP group with about seventy happy pigs. It was organized in a similar way 
to the other production cooperative-like small groups in the village. Six households rais-
ing about fifty pigs still participated in the marketing cooperative-like part of the HP 
group (WW, 2011-05-03:204–214,247–248). Two households no longer raised happy 
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pigs as part of the small group. Huáng Guóqiáng’s family participated in the new HP 
farm and stopped raising pigs in their own courtyard (HGQ, 2011-05-27a:281–285). 
Wáng Wěi excluded Hú Qǐhuá, the initiator of the project, from the small group (HQH, 
2011-05-06b:71–96, 2011-05-25:48–102,550–550, 2011-05-27b:182–189). 
The members of the HP group did not give me one single reason for Hú Qǐhuá’s 
exclusion. Instead everyone, except those who told me that they did not know about it, 
gave me a different reason (CYJ, 2011-05-29:350–361; HQH, 2011-05-27b:2–53; 
HGQ, 2011-05-27b:281–337: WYJ, 2011-05-25:732–745). One of the reasons seemed 
more plausible than the other ones to me. According to Wáng Wěi, Hú Qǐhuá could no 
longer participate in the small group because he did not share his resources with the 
cooperative. By resources Wáng Wěi meant Hú Qǐhuá’s personal contacts with urban 
consumers, which Hú Qǐhuá was able to establish when Wáng Wěi let him go in his 
place to meetings concerning the cooperative in the city. According to Wáng Wěi, Hú 
Qǐhuá used these contacts in order to sell his ecological products and also some of his 
happy pigs for a higher price than he could have fetched selling them to the peddlers on 
the market (WW, 2011-05-06:174–192). When I told Hú Qǐhuá about this charge, he 
asked in reply, what else other than trying to sell them by himself he should do with 
those happy pigs the cooperative did not manage to sell (HQH, 2011-05-25:595–599)? 
Some members of the HP group did not know—or at least claimed that they did not 
know—why Hú Qǐhuá was excluded (HQH, 2011-06-05:1163–1167). Even one of the 
two persons who supposedly succeeded Hú Qǐhuá in this position in charge of the HP 
group, said that it was a decision made by the leaders, namely by Wáng Wěi and the 
other village cadres (HYM, 2011-05-16:140–148). The other members of the small 
group were apparently not involved in this decision. Hú Qǐhuá himself claimed that 
Wáng Wěi kept him from participating in the small group by not informing him about 
the meetings. Hú Qǐhuá further maintained that Wáng Wěi excluded him because Hú 
Qǐhuá told people from the outside, for example students like me, the truth about the so-
called cooperative. This displeased Wáng Wěi, Hú Qǐhuá explained, and thus Wáng 
Wěi excluded him in retaliation (HQH, 2011-05-06b:71–96). Furthermore, Hú Qǐhuá 
claimed that Wáng Wěi excluded him because otherwise Hú Qǐhuá would have led eve-
ryone from the small group to use the 200 thousand CNY from the state together. In this 
manner he would have hindered the village cadres from appropriating the money for 
themselves (HQH, 2011-06-05:252–255,560–564). Be that as it may, Hú Qǐhuá was no 
longer involved in the HP group when I was in the village. 
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8.3 Inclusion and exclusion (2): 
marketing or production cooperative? 
As mentioned above, we can differentiate between the marketing cooperative-like part 
of the small group and its production cooperative-like part. In the marketing coopera-
tive, production was carried out by the individual peasants in their courtyards in the 
pigsties that had previously been used for raising pigs in the conventional way. The only 
difference was the method used for feeding the pigs (HQH, 2011-06-05:1083–1088). In 
the agricultural slack seasons the members of the small group met every week in order 
to exchange their experiences on raising their happy pigs (WW, 2011-05-03:254–255, 
2011-06-08b:362–364). The peasants did not share the risk of raising the happy pigs 
(HGQ, 2011-05-27b:267–268; HYM, 2011-05-16:167–180). In 2010 all the happy pigs 
of one of the village cadres suddenly died. He had to bear the financial loss alone. He 
even returned the booking fees to the consumers (CYJ, 2011-05-29:85–99). 
In the marketing cooperative-like part of the HP group there was a clear division 
of labor. The peasants raised the happy pigs. The Professional Cooperative—that is the 
village cadres and most prominently Wáng Wěi—were responsible for marketing and 
selling them (WW, 2011-05-03:236–237). 
In the production cooperative-like part of the small group the pigs were raised by 
one worker in a newly constructed stable at the eastern edge of the village. When I first 
visited there were only pigsties similar to those in the courtyards of the peasants. Only 
in autumn was there a new type of building at the HP farm, namely a stable based on the 
ferment bed (发酵床 fājiàochuáng) 70 model of a pig stable at the Little Donkey Farm in 
the suburbs of Běijīng (FN, 2011-11-12, 2011-11-14). 
Only five people invested in the new HP farm. The other peasants did not want to 
invest in a new building because they thought that they had enough space to raise pigs 
in their own courtyards. Three of the shareholders were village cadres, namely Wáng 
Wěi, Wáng Yàjūn and Huáng Guóqiáng. Furthermore, one old school friend of Wáng 
Wěi from a neighboring village and one friend of Huáng Guóqiáng, a villager from 
Shǔidàozhuāng who worked and lived at the HP farm, bought a share in the HP farm. 
They expected to receive 200,000 CNY from the state because they had applied for a 
project. They were supposed to receive the money after they had invested 200,000 CNY 
                                                          
70 Instead of concrete the ground of the new pigsty was made out of dry maize stalks, sawdust, rice chaff, 
and a special kind of ecological fungus that prevented bad smell. 
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themselves, and if the stable they built met certain requirements and if they bought at 
least 150 pigs (WW, 2011-05-06:66–96,136–140).71 However, in November 2011 the 
money had still not appeared (FN, 2011-11-13, 2011-11-14). According to Hú Qǐhuá, 
the officials at county and township level did not dare to give money to Wáng Wěi any 
longer because they thought that such an act would be under close supervision due to 
the ongoing anti-corruption investigations against Wáng Wěi at that time (FN, 2011-11-
14). 
Initially the five shareholders planed, in accordance with the requirements of the 
state project, to raise more than one hundred and fifty pigs at the new farm, however, as 
there were not as many orders as they expected, they only bought between sixty and 
seventy little pigs (SYL, 2011-05-13:151–153; WW, 2011-05-03:182–183,204–214). 
Villagers who were already growing pigs in their courtyards in a conventional way told 
me that they were not asked if they wanted to participate in the HP group of the cooper-
ative but that they were interested in doing so (PYH, 2011-05-10:353–384, 2011-05-
15:46–77,161–165). 
Wáng Wěi explained to me that the cooperative was a stage that everyone in the 
village could use for selling their pigs. It would be unfair if he and the other pioneers 
used the resources of the cooperative themselves and only sold their own pigs, increased 
the size and raised even more pigs on their own. He stressed that they let those house-
holds participate which could not sell the happy pigs themselves (WW, 2011-05-06:15–
20). Wáng Wěi also told me that villagers wanted to participate in the small group to 
raise happy pigs in their courtyards and sell them through the channel of the coopera-
tive, but the cooperative did not have the capacity to sell so many pigs, so these villag-
ers could not participate. He emphasized that it was not the case that they did not let 
them participate. The cooperative simply did not have the capacity to do so at the mo-
ment. In the future, when the trademark was established, more peasants would have the 
possibility to raise happy pigs (WW, 2011-05-06:117–129,156–157). However, appar-
ently the Professional Cooperative had the capacity—or at least Wáng Wěi and the oth-
er village cadres participating in this sub-project had thought so at the beginning—to 
sell the large number of additional pigs bred in the new pig farm. Why was this possi-
ble, while it was allegedly impossible to sell those pigs that could have been raised by 
                                                          
71 Wáng Wěi tried to persuade the responsible officials to lower the requirements. He told me that 150 
pigs was already a very low number. Usually the state only supported projects with at least 500 pigs. 
Moreover, the five shareholders only invested 100 thousand CNY instead of the 200 thousand CNY re-
quired (WW, 2011-05-06:88–94,136–140). 
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peasants who were already raising pigs in the conventional way? Wáng Wěi told me 
that he had explained to a villager that the village cadres had to build the HP farm be-
cause they could not say no if some leaders wanted to invest money on behalf of the 
peasants (WW, 2011-05-06:120–123). Hú Qǐhuá suspected that the real reason for this 
choice—pro new pig farm and against letting other villagers participating—was that 
Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres themselves wanted to receive the money from 
the state project and, therefore, constructed the new pig farm (HQH, 2011-05-06b:441–
458, 2011-05-25:232–303,550–555). While Wáng Wěi and the other shareholders 
claimed that the other peasants were informed about the project but not willing to take 
the risk to invest in this pioneering project (CYJ, 2011-05-29:368–370; WW, 2011-05-
06:70–73,142), other villagers claimed that they were never asked to do so and never 
informed about the project (PYH, 2011-05-15:161–165). While it may be true that 
peasants were reluctant to invest a lot of money in this project out of fear of losing their 
invested money, almost no investments would have been necessary from those peasants 
if they had changed from raising pigs in the conventional way to raising them as happy 
pigs. There was no need for them to construct new pigsties in their courtyards, as they 
already existed (PYH, 2011-05-15:188–191). However, I was told that the visiting ur-
ban consumers apparently did not believe that the happy pigs were happy in the old 
concrete style pigsties in the peasants’ courtyards (HGQ, 2011-05-27a:125–127; FN, 
2011-05-12). 
8.4 The division of labor at the Happy Pig Farm 
Within the production cooperative-like section there was also a division of labor. Offi-
cially Huáng Guóqiáng was the person in charge of the HP farm (WW, 2011-05-
06:101–102). In practice the village cadres Wáng Wěi and Wáng Yàjūn and Wáng 
Wěi’s schoolfriend from the neighboring village were also involved in the management. 
The fifth shareholder, Sūn Yúnlóng, who worked at the HP farm, emphasized that the 
difference between a cooperative and a company was that in the cooperative everything 
was explored and studied together and discussed with each other at meetings (SYL, 
2011-05-18:384–387). However, he did not view himself as being in the same position 
as the other shareholders. He was the one doing the work for them (SYL, 2011-05-
13:1093–1098). He was responsible for carrying out everyday tasks at the HP farm, for 
example feeding the pigs and cleaning the stable. Sūn Yúnlóng had a friendship connec-
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tion with Huáng Guóqiáng, but he did not know Lín Hǎibō at all before the project 
started (SYL, 2011-05-13:1082–1091). That he was not in the same position as the other 
four shareholders became clear to me when I had dinner with them. Sūn Yúnlóng was 
not invited when Wáng Wěi, Wáng Yàjūn, Lín Hǎibō and Huáng Guóqiáng had dinner 
together (FN, 2011-05-10). During such occasions they, of course, also discussed mat-
ters concerning the HP farm. 
Whereas Sūn Yúnlóng was responsible for everyday tasks, sometimes the other 
shareholders also participated in some extraordinary tasks. Wáng Wěi and the other 
shareholders helped in giving injections to their happy pigs because Wáng Wěi was a 
veterinarian. For the everyday work Sūn Yúnlóng initially received a wage of 1,700 
CNY per month, later on 2,000 CNY when the number of animals and hence the work-
load increased (SYL, 2011-05-13:151–168,931–950; FN, 2011-11-12).72 He estimated 
that it would be possible to hire someone to do this work for a little more than 50 CNY 
per day, but he would not trust someone else to raise the pigs. The other shareholders 
could be sure that he was giving his best raising their pigs, because he was a shareholder 
himself (SYL, 2011-05-13:180–185). When asked why he and not the others did the 
everyday work, Sūn Yúnlóng explained that they already had their own money and that 
they were busy, for example, Lín Hǎibō was trading with grain, Wáng Yàjūn was vil-
lage accountant and involved in other parts of the Professional Cooperative, and Wáng 
Wěi, the village party branch secretary, was busy all the time anyway (SYL, 2011-05-
13:1015–1025). 
In contrast to the other shareholders Sūn Yúnlóng’s share consisted not only of 
money because he did not have that much.73 Instead, his wage and the maize that his 
family had cultivated and was used as input on the HP farm were calculated as his part 
of the investment (FN, 2011-11-12, 2011-11-14). Before working for the cooperative, 
Sūn Yúnlóng had been working in different cities as a migrant worker. He liked staying 
in the village, but he also liked to work in the cities because he could earn much more 
money there. If the HP farm did not work out he planed to work in a city again in 2012 
(SYL, 2011-05-13:11–118,443–473,836–844). 
In case of profits these were supposed to be shared among the shareholders as a 
dividend. According to Sūn Yúnlóng, the other four shareholders would be able to con-
                                                          
72 According to Huáng Guóqiáng, another shareholder with whom Sūn Yúnlóng had the closest relation-
ship, Sūn Yúnlóng initially received only 1,500 CNY and later on 1,800 CNY (FN, 2011-11-14). 
73 Hú Qǐhuá doubted if Sūn Yúnlóng was a shareholder, too. He thought that Sūn Yúnlóng only worked 
for the other ones (HQH, 2011-05-27a:96–103). 
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tinue even if they made no profit with the project in the first year. This was not true for 
himself as he was short of money (SYL, 2011-05-13:722–726). Hence, concerning fi-
nancial risks he also had a different perspective to the other shareholders. For example, 
he preferred to grow pigs using the conventional method at the new pig farm because it 
was not as risky as growing happy pigs (SYL, 2011-05-13:1031–1038; FN, 2011-11-
12). However, the other shareholders did not share this perspective with him and they 
did not grow any conventional pigs (FN, 2011-11-14).  
8.5 Selling happy pigs 
Turning to the relations of the HP group with the outside, I observed an allocation sys-
tem similar to the gòu mǐ bāo dì contracts of the Small Group for Ecological Rice, 
namely a form of community supported agriculture. Wáng Wěi signed the contracts 
with consumers in the name of the Professional Cooperative. The consumers booked 
happy pigs in advance by chosing specific pigs of specific peasants (or of the HP farm 
later on). A handful of urban dwellers came to the village to attend the happy pig book-
ing activities on April 30. On that day student volunteers came to the village in order to 
help. The consumers had to pay a booking fee of 500 CNY per happy pig and agreed to 
buy the pig meat for a price twice or two-and-a-half times as high as the usual market 
price later on, before Chinese New Year (HQH, 2011-05-25:518–521; WW, 2011-06-
08c:116–118; FN, 2011-04-30). The peasants on the other hand promised to grow the 
pigs using the happy pig method. The high price seemed like a big advantage at the first 
glance, however, the peasants emphasized the higher costs and risks of raising happy 
pigs (HYM, 2011-05-05:153–167). During the happy pigs activities I had the chance to 
talk some consumers. They told me that they bought this expensive meet only for the 
special occasion of New Year, when they invited friends for a meal. The meat was not 
supposed to be for everyday consumption, and some did not even want to eat the meat 
themselves but wanted to give it as a special present to other people (FN, 2011-04-30). 
Before the Chinese New Year 2011 some peasants of the HP group—not only Hú 
Qǐhuá—individually sold the happy pigs that had not been preordered by consumers 
through the channel of the cooperative. However, the other peasants only managed to 
sell their remaining happy pigs to people who came to the village because they had 
heard about the happy pigs project (HQH, 2011-06-05:1105–1140; FN, 2011-06-03). 
Only Hú Qǐhuá had enough social capital of a special kind, namely connections to urban 
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dwellers who were wealthy enough to buy such expensive products, in order to individ-
ually sell his pigs and other products directly via personal contacts. They knew him be-
cause he had made publicity for the happy pigs in the name of the cooperative previous-
ly (HQH, 2011-05-06b:479, 2011-05-25:557–573; WW, 2011-05-06:175–176). The 
other peasants depended on the Professional Cooperative, especially on Wáng Wěi, who 
had risen in political office due to the NRR projects in the village, for selling their hap-
py pigs at a high price to well-off urban consumers (HQH, 2011-05-06b:463–482, 
2011-05-25:327–328; WW, 2011-05-03:261–263, 2011-05-06:4–14). 
For marketing and selling the happy pigs the members of the small group had to 
pay a service fee of ten percent of the sales revenue to the Professional Cooperative 
(WW, 2011-05-03:251–253,282–293, 2011-05-06:42–64). According to Wáng Wěi, all 
of this money was used to cover the expenses of the marketing and sales activities. In 
2011 Wáng Wěi wanted to establish a new system according to which he, Mǎ Zhìyǒng 
and Wáng Yàjūn would receive a wage for their marketing work (WW, 2011-05-
03:295–299). 
8.6 Decision-making in the Happy Pig Small Group 
Although there were many meetings of the members of the HP group as already men-
tioned above, these meetings were mainly about raising pigs. Only sometimes it was 
about decision-making, or the confirmation of prepared decisions. Usually Mǎ Zhìyǒng, 
the student volunteer, prepared the meetings in consultation with Wáng Wěi (WW, 
2011-06-08b:366–367). Chén Yùjiàn, one of the village cadres, and Huáng Yǒumín, an 
older, ordinary villager who was a council member of the Cooperative for Mutual Fi-
nancial Aid, were responsible for the individual households involved in the HP group, 
Wáng Wěi told me (WW, 2011-05-06:101–102,173–174). Wáng Wěi decided how 
many happy pigs the individual peasants were allowed to raise using the happy pig 
method and to sell through the channel of the cooperative (HQH, 2011-05-25:416). 
Nevertheless, in spring 2011 participating peasants bought more pigs than proposed by 
Wáng Wěi (HYM, 2011-05-16:99–104; WW, 2011-05-03:265–272, 2011-05-06:132–
136). However, in November 2011 one member told me that they had to change raising 
some of their pigs with the conventional method because the cooperative was not able 
to sell as many pigs as they had bought in spring—in fact it was even less pigs than 
proposed by Wáng Wěi first (FN, 2011-11-14). Important decisions about prices were 
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often prepared by Wáng Wěi, Zhū Xiǎojuān and Mǎ Zhìyǒng, for example in informal 
conversations before and after the happy pig activities, when we had meals at the home 
of Wáng Wěi together with the journalist from CCTV, the state television broadcaster in 
mainland China, which stayed in the village for one week to make a report about the 
cooperative’s happy pig project (FN, 2011-04-27, 2011-05-01). 
8.7 The Happy Pig Small Group in comparison 
To summarize this short chapter I briefly compare the HP group to the other small 
groups of the Professional Cooperative. 
As already mentioned above, the HP group consisted of two parts in 2011. One 
part was organized like a marketing cooperative, similar to the small groups for ecolog-
ical rice and ecological minor food crops. The new additional part was organized like a 
very small production cooperative, similar to the Small Group for Organic Rice and 
Wheat and the Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs. As 
in the case of the other sub-projects of the Professional Cooperative, it was contested in 
the village whether or not these projects could be called “cooperative” at all. 
In the case of the marketing cooperative-like part of the HP group, the division of 
labor was—as in the other projects of this kind—roughly between owning, managing 
and selling village cadres, making up what was called the “cooperative” on the one side, 
and producing individual peasants, making up the members of the cooperative on the 
other side. However, there was one difference. In the case of the small groups for eco-
logical rice and ecological minor food crops, the peasants first sold their products to the 
cooperative and afterwards they received the market price plus the initial dividend. In 
contrast, in the case of the HP group, the peasants did receive the money directly and 
then had to pay a service fee to the cooperative. 
In the case of the production cooperative-like section of the HP group, the divi-
sion of labor was—as in the other projects of this kind—roughly between village ca-
dres, who owned and managed, on the one side, and working peasants on the other side. 
However, this conclusion has to be refined in two aspects. Officially there were two 
men involved in the ownership and management of the HP farm who were not village 
cadres. The first person was nevertheless closely connected to the village cadre as an 
old schoolmate and friend, even though he lived in another village. The second person 
that was not a village cadre but, nevertheless, officially included in the ownership and 
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management of the HP farm, was the worker who raised the pigs at the HP farm. Like 
the village cadres, he was one of the shareholders of the HP farm, contributing to it with 
capital, his wage and material inputs. However, informally he was not as involved in the 
circle of the village cadres as the old schoolmate of Wáng Wěi. 
In the other projects of the Professional Cooperative I found cases of a gender di-
vision of labor. As the cooperative sold the happy pigs primarily before Chinese New 
Year, I was not in the village at the right time to observe the slaughtering and packaging 
process. Concerning the feeding of pigs, I found both men and women doing this work 
in the individual households. Even in the case of the HP farm it was not always Sūn 
Yúnlóng doing this work. Sometimes his mother cared for the pigs when he was not at 
home (FN, 2011-11-12). 
Although officially other persons than Wáng Wěi were in charge of the two parts 
of the HP group, like in the other small groups, informally, major decisions were made 
by Wáng Wěi or according to his proposals, like the decisions concerning how many 
happy pigs the individual household were allowed to sell via the marketing channel of 
the cooperative, the price of the happy pigs, or Hú Qǐhuá’s exclusion from the HP 
group. 
As Wáng Wěi had managed to become well-known and to rise in political office 
due to the NRR projects in Shǔidàozhuāng, he had built many relationships to other 
officials and hence increased his social capital. Now he could use this social capital to 
sell special products for a higher price to people who could afford it. The other mem-
bers of the HP group were dependent on the Professional Cooperative, personalized in 
Wáng Wěi, to sell the ecological and healthy products they produced. Through selling 
the peasants’ products the reputation of the Professional Cooperative, and hence of 
Wáng Wěi, further increased. Although formally the members of the small group could 
participate in decision-making or the confirmation of decisions in the weekly meetings, 
they had good reason to do this without upsetting Wáng Wěi. There was only one per-
son who had enough social capital himself and hence managed to sell ecological prod-
ucts for a higher price directly to urban dwellers using personal contacts, namely Hú 
Qǐhuá. He was among the few who dared to speak out openly against Wáng Wěi and his 
practices. Although officially he was one of the persons (together with Chén Yùjiàn) in 
charge of the HP group, Wáng Wěi excluded Hú Qǐhuá from it. Hú Qǐhuá viewed the 
situation like this: “He wanted to kill a chicken to scare the monkey. Or one can say, he 
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wanted to kill the monkey to scare the chickens”,74 Hú Qǐhuá corrected himself, appar-
ently having in mind that he was in a more powerful position than the other members of 
the HP group. 
So far all the NRR projects examined seemed to be controlled by Wáng Wěi and 
the other village cadres. There was however an act of peasant resistance on my first day 
in the village. It was the day of the election of the council of the Mutual Financial Aid 




                                                          
74 他就是要杀鸡害猴。或者说杀猴害鸡。 Tā jiùshì yào shā jī hài hóu. Huǒzhě shuō shā hóu hài jī (Hú 
Qǐhuá, 2011-05-06b:465). 
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9 Mutual Financial Aid 
In order to complete the picture of the NRR projects in the village Shǔidàozhuāng, I 
briefly introduce the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid (资金互助社  zījīn 
hùzhùshè, hereafter Financial Cooperative or FC) at this point before turning to a more 
theoretical discussion of my empirical findings about the NRR experiments in economic 
cooperation in the next chapter. In this chapter I do not focus on the operations of the 
FC in detail, as this would open up a completely new field of discussion.75 Therefore, I 
discuss only one aspect of the FC, namely decision-making, by describing two im-
portant events, namely the election of the council of the FC and a meeting where new 
statutes for the FC were discussed, and by comparing the FC in terms of decision-
making and resistance with the other economic cooperatives in the village. 
I start this chapter with a short introduction to the history and operations of the 
FC. Then I describe the election and the statutes meeting. Finally, I compare the FC 
with the economic cooperatives in the village concerning decision-making and re-
sistance and ask what causes these differences. 
9.1 Outlining the Financial Cooperative 
The Financial Cooperative was founded in 2004 as the Cooperative for Economic De-
velopment. Zhào Yùgāng, who was also a council member of the former Association for 
Environmentally Harmless Rice (or Rice Association), was its first chairperson. Later 
on Chén Mùgēn replaced him in this position in an, according to Hú Qǐhuá, irregular 
election (HQH, 2011-06-05:850–868). Chén Mùgēn was an older villager who was also 
the chairperson of the seniors’ association. He was in a position between Wáng Wěi and 
the village cadres on the one side and the council members of the former Rice Associa-
tion on the other side (FN, 2011-04-20). In 2006 the name of the Financial Cooperative 
                                                          
75 A comparison between this new formalized form of financial cooperation in the village and cooperative 
borrowing practices between relatives, friends and neighbors, as well as a comparison between the Finan-
cial Cooperative and conventional banks, would be especially interesting and fruitful. 
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was changed to Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid (HQH, 2011-05-27b:467). Be-
sides Chén Mùgēn the council was made up of Hú Qǐhuá, Zhào Yùgāng, Gāo Shùnkāi, 
three council members of the former Rice Association, and Huáng Yǒumín, the person 
officially in charge of the happy pig group after Hú Qǐhuá’s exclusion. 
At the beginning about fifty members bought shares for 200 CNY each. Some vil-
lagers invested more money in the FC, for example Wáng Wěi 1,000 CNY, Wáng 
Wěi’s brother 500 CNY, and Hú Qǐhuá 600 CNY. People from the outside also invested 
money in the FC in order to support it. For example the intellectuals Wēn Tiějūn and 
Hán Déqiáng invested 5.000 CNY and 450 CNY respectively. Students from the agri-
cultural university bought shares worth 600 CNY. All together the FC’s funds that 
could be used for borrowing made up 22,950 CNY. 
The members had to pay interest for loans depending on the duration of the bor-
rowing period. No interest had to be paid for short term borrowing of less than ten days 
(HQH, 2011-06-05:923–925). The maximum possible borrowing period was one year. 
The interest payments made up the profits of the FC. One part, namely 30 percent 
of it, was used for collective accumulation as a kind of insurance in the case that a bor-
rowing member and its two guarantors were not able to pay back the loan. Another part, 
namely 70 percent, of the profit was used for the collective good and distributed as a 
dividend to the members (HQH, 2011-06-05:894–898). For the period from 2009 to 
2011 the dividend amounted to 33,7 CNY per share. 
Most members used loans from the FC either for agricultural production (more 
than 80 percent of all loans issued by the FC) or for family affairs like funerals, wed-
dings or tuition fees (HQH, 2011-06-05:918–923). However, the big problem was that 
the FC’s funds were limited and that members could only finance small agricultural 
investments through loans from the FC (HQH, 2011-05-06b:290–291, 2011-06-05:930–
947,1170–1172). 
Another problem was that, according to Hú Qǐhuá, the FC only existed in name, 
even though it operated and issued loans. By this he meant that the members were not 
involved in the operation of the FC. Since Chén Mùgēn was chairperson of the FC there 
has only been one meeting per year, when a few CNY were distributed to the members 
as a dividend. Many members said that after investing the first 200 CNY there had been 
no further activities. The members no longer viewed the cooperative as their coopera-
tive but as the cooperative of the council members because there were no more meet-
ings and studying sessions (HQH, 2011-06-07:612–621). 
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In April 2011 about fifty member households bought additional shares of 1,730 
CNY each. Some villagers, for example Wáng Wěi and Hú Qǐhuá bought more than one 
share. In total the villagers invested 100,000 CNY in order to get an additional 100,000 
CNY from the state. This state money was not supposed to be paid out to individual 
households. It was a kind of interest-free loan from the state to the cooperative without 
a defined time limit. The FC was only allowed to use this money for granting loans to 
its members (FN, 2011-04-20). However, when I returned to the village the FC was still 
waiting for the money from the state to come through (FN, 2011-11-14). During that 
waiting time the FC had put the money on a bank account and did not issue any loans. 
9.2 Majority shareholders or elected representatives? 
9.2.1 The election 
On my first morning in the village, the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid held the 
election of its council. At that time I did not yet know about the conflict-laden relation-
ships within the village. From conversations with members of the FC and from my pho-
tos, I know that Wáng Wěi and most of the other village cadres were not present at the 
meeting due to conflicts with the council members of the former Rice Association, 
namely Hú Qǐhuá, Gāo Shùnkāi and Zhào Yùgāng, who were all council members of 
the FC as well. According to Hú Qǐhuá, the village cadres did not show up at the elec-
tion because they had the feeling that they would not be elected to the council and that 
they would lose face (HQH, 2011-06-05:577–578). 
However, the village cadres had held a preparatory meeting with the NRR intel-
lectual Xiè Yǒngmó the previous evening. The following morning at about nine 
o’clock, one hour after the meeting was supposed to start, about twenty to thirty people 
gathered at the new building of the village committee. Chén Mùgēn, the chairperson of 
the FC, Hú Qǐhuá, the vice-chairperson, and the NRR intellectual Xiè Yǒngmó were 
sitting in front of the assembly. Men were sitting in the front of the room, women at the 
back. After a short introduction by Chén Mùgēn, Hú Qǐhuá explained the statutes and 
the new state supported project to the members for about one hour. From time to time 
Xiè Yǒngmó added some explanations. When he did so, he did not speak to the mem-
bers in the audience directly, but to Hú Qǐhuá instead. Both men and women asked 
questions after Hú Qǐhuá’s talk. Later on Xiè Yǒngmó made a short five-minute state-
ment about increasing the scale (规模化 guīmóhuà) of operation of the FC by increas-
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ing the funds from about 20,000 CNY to 200,000 CNY. He also stressed the advantages 
of the cooperative over conventional banks. After two more very short statements by Hú 
Qǐhuá and Mǎ Zhìyǒng, the student volunteer, the election process started (FN, 2011-
04-19). 
One council member, namely Huáng Yǒumín, read aloud the names of the mem-
bers of the FC. Another council member, namely Zhào Yùgāng, distributed little bits of 
papers to these members. Each member was allowed to write five names on the paper. 
When they were doing this, some people were talking to each other about whom to 
choose. Then the bits of papers were collected in a cardboard box. In front of all at-
tendees one villager took out the papers form the cardboard box and read out the names. 
From time to time other members were looking over his shoulder. Another villager, who 
was not a council member of the FC, wrote the names down on a big piece of paper and 
added one stroke to the character 正 (zhèng) for each announcement. In the end about 
twenty names were written on the paper. Those with the most votes had more than five 
zhèngs next to their name. As one zhèng is made up of five strokes this means that they 
received more than 25 votes each. When the result of the election was announced, not 
all of the attending members were still present. At the end washing powder was distrib-
uted to all member households irrespective of how many shares in the cooperative they 
held (FN, 2011-04-19). 
The election did not bring a change in the cast of the cooperative’s council. All 
five council members were re-elected. Hú Qǐhuá received 50 votes, Zhào Yùgāng 49, 
Chén Mùgēn 45, Huáng Yǒumín 39 and Gāo Shùnkāi 34 (HQH, 2011-05-06b:248–
260). Although Hú Qǐhuá won the election, he did not want to serve as the chairperson 
of the council because of his conflicts with Wáng Wěi. Hence, as in the case of the last 
election, Chén Mùgēn assumed the role of the chairperson without having the most 
votes (HQH, 2011-06-05:998–1000). According to Xiè Yǒngmó, Chén Mùgēn took a 
position between the fronts (FN, 2011-04-20). However, it was mainly Hú Qǐhuá who 
had managed the FC since 2004 (HQH, 2011-06-05:534–536). In 2006 Zhū Xiǎojuān, 
the intellectual who initiated the NRR projects in the village, proposed that the FC 
should pay him a wage of 50 CNY per month. Hú Qǐhuá, however, refused because 
from his point of view working for the cooperative was not about money. It was about 
being voluntarily willing (HQH, 2011-06-05:909–911). From Hú Qǐhuá’s point of view 
it was essential for a cooperative to operate strictly according to its own rules, even if 
this sometimes upset affected members, for example in the case of penalty payments if a 
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loan was overdue. Otherwise a cooperative did not work, he stressed (HQH, 2011-06-
05:969–982). In fact, Hú Qǐhuá himself thought that it made no difference if Chén 
Mùgēn was officially the chairperson of the cooperative or not, as long as Hú Qǐhuá 
was the one responsible for the accounts, he could protect the money of the members of 
the FC (HQH, 2011-06-07:60–64). 
According to Hú Qǐhuá, the members were only willing to participate in increas-
ing the scale of the FC if Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres did not collect the 
money the members invested. Many people said that they would only buy new shares if 
Hú Qǐhuá and the other council members in the FC took care of that money. The mem-
bers said that they would ask Hú Qǐhuá and the others to get their money back if the 
council members of the FC handed it over to the village cadres. According to Hú Qǐhuá, 
the villagers thought that Wáng Wěi had destroyed the Rice Association and that they 
were afraid that the same fate would befall the FC if it was taken over by Wáng Wěi 
and the village cadres (HQH, 2011-05-06b:233–245,368–374). 
The village cadres wanted to be in the council of the FC, but the members did not 
let them, Hú Qǐhuá said. With the exception of Chén Yùjiàn, who got two votes from 
his uncle, none of the other village cadres received a single vote (HQH, 2011-05-
06b:248–260, 2011-06-07:113–118). 
However, Xiè Yǒngmó and Mǎ Zhìyǒng told me that there was an inconsistency 
in the election as one member had voted for six absent members (FN, 2011-04-19). It 
turned out that this member was Hú Qǐhuá. When I asked him he told me that he 
thought there was nothing wrong with it. He only voted on behalf of other people who 
had asked him to do so. Two of his friends were busy pollinating their apple trees and 
had no time to participate at the meeting on that day. Furthermore Hú Qǐhuá helped one 
illiterate, who participated in the meeting but who was not able to write the names on 
paper himself. Hú Qǐhuá also filled out two ballot papers in behalf of the wife of Wáng 
Wěi’s elder brother, who also participated in the meeting but who was not able to fill 
out the ballots herself because her grandson was crying and she had left the assembly 
room with him. Hú Qǐhuá himself also had two and not only one ballot. Everyone who 
had bought more than one share in the FC got a second ballot. Wáng Wěi also belonged 
to this group of ten members who had two votes. Altogether Hú Qǐhuá filled out seven 
ballots. He put his deed in perspective by mentioning that he was not the only one who 
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had filled out ballots in behalf of others. Chén Mùgēn also filled out five ballots.76 Xiè 
Yǒngmó, the NRR activist, and Mǎ Zhìyǒng, the student volunteer, did not tell me that 
Hú Qǐhuá was not the only one who voted on behalf of others. From Hú Qǐhuá’s point 
of view the election was regular. He claimed that the village cadres only lamented al-
leged irregularities in the election because they were not elected themselves. He made 
clear that it was not him who distributed and counted the ballots. Moreover, although he 
filled out seven ballots, how could he possibly control all of the other attending mem-
bers, Hú Qǐhuá asked rhetorically. From his perspective the election result was clear. 
Wáng Wěi had lost the trust of everyone. Furthermore, Hú Qǐhuá accused the village 
cadres of holding irregular village elections themselves (HQH, 2011-05-06b:318–362, 
2011-06-05:575–576, 2011-06-07:118–123). 
Hú Qǐhuá further criticized the alleged plans of the village cadres to become 
members of the FC’s council. According to Hú Qǐhuá, the village cadres proposed that 
those who invested the most money should serve as the council members. However, the 
common people did not let them do it this way, Hú Qǐhuá emphasized. They said that 
no matter how much someone invested, the council members were to be chosen by the 
members. Hú Qǐhuá and the other council members guided (带领 dàilǐng) the resistance 
against the village cadres’ proposal and the aforementioned election was held (HQH, 
2011-05-06b:264–285, 2011-06-05:564–574). 
After the election Hú Qǐhuá and Zhào Yùgāng put the newly invested money on 
an account of a branch of the Rural Credit Cooperative (信用社 xìnyòngshè).77 They 
used Hú Qǐhuá’s name and let Zhào Yùgāng choose the password. This way a single 
person was not able to withdraw money from the account. From Hú Qǐhuá’s perspective 
Wáng Wěi was already defeated. He lost the election and was not in control of the mon-
ey. 
                                                          
76 In the meeting with the researcher and peasant advocate Lǐ Chāngpíng described below, the members 
of the Financial Cooperative agreed on his proposal that only one vicarious vote per member should be 
allowed in future (FN, 2011-04-28). 
77 The Rural Credit Cooperative made up for the vast majority of total rural deposits and loans. Since 
1996 the credit cooperatives were supposed to serve household finance, whereas the Agricultural Bank of 
China had focused on commercial loans and the Development Bank of China on agricultural policy loans. 
From 1996 to 2003 the credit cooperatives were managed indirectly by the central bank. Afterwards the 
provincial unions, who were effectively controlled by the provincial governments, took over the man-
agement of the credit cooperatives (Ong 2009:313). 
  Mutual Financial Aid 133 
9.2.2 The meeting with Lǐ Chāngpíng 
However, as Hú Qǐhuá went on to explain, Wáng Wěi had not yet given up. Wáng Wěi 
and Zhū Xiǎojuān invited Lǐ Chāngpíng to the village to introduce new statutes for the 
FC in a meeting. Hú Qǐhuá guessed that Wáng Wěi hoped that a famous person like Lǐ 
Chāngpíng would finally be able to persuade the members of the FC to accept Wáng 
Wěi’s proposal of major shareholders (大股 dàgǔ) automatically constituting the coun-
cil, a proposal that would, in Hú Qǐhuá’s opinion, change the cooperative into a share-
holding system. One or two days before the assembly in the village, Wáng Wěi and 
Chén Mùgēn met with Lǐ Chāngpíng in the county town to prepare the meeting (HQH, 
2011-06-05:722–740). 
The meeting was supposed to start at eight o’clock in the evening, but again only 
a few members of the FC arrived on time. More than half an hour later Wáng Wěi 
opened the meeting and introduced Lǐ Chāngpíng as former cadre, who was now doing 
research on rural China in Běijīng. This time all of the village cadres were present. Hú 
Qǐhuá was sitting on the opposite side to Wáng Wěi. Between 25 and 35 members of 
the FC attended the meeting. As in the other meeting there was a tendency for men to sit 
in front and women to sit at the back of the room. Most of the time during the meeting 
Lǐ Chāngpíng was reading out and explaining the individual paragraphs of the statutes 
of another financial cooperative. From time to time he asked the attendant members if 
they agreed. Most of the time, especially with self-evident parts, no one disagreed; oc-
casionally someone articulated understanding or agreement when Lǐ Chāngpíng asked 
the group. Sometimes members wanted amendments to be made, sometimes discussions 
started. For example Hú Qǐhuá confidently suggested that the FC should be independent 
of the cooperative association, while Wáng Wěi wanted that it was part of it. They 
agreed on independent cooperation (独立合作 dúlì hézuò), a compromise suggested by 
Lǐ Chāngpíng. Occasionally Wáng Wěi said that on this evening everyone could say 
something if they wanted. Thereupon silence followed. Concerning the question of dif-
ferent kind of members, Wáng Wěi wanted to introduce the category of major share-
holder members (大股社员 dàgǔ shèyuán). Hú Qǐhuá announced his disagreement on 
this point. There were also some discussions among the members concerning other 
forms of memberships. Lǐ Chāngpíng stopped these discussions and said that they 
would skip this point for the moment and that they could continue the discussions later 
on. After about one hour the first members left the meeting. Some time later all the 
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women had already left and only the men were left. Lǐ Chāngpíng nevertheless contin-
ued with his explanations of the paragraphs of the statutes that concerned what to do 
with the cooperative’s profits, who was allowed to borrow how much money for how 
long, and about how high the interest rate should be. Around midnight fourteen men 
were still present, more than two or three of them asleep or at least listening with their 
eyes closed. About one hour later Zhū Xiǎojuān arrived with two students and Lǐ 
Chāngpíng had gone through all parts of the statutes. The remaining members signed 
the notes that Mǎ Zhìyǒng had taken on big posters during the meeting. Hú Qǐhuá first 
did not want to do it but was persuaded by Zhū Xiǎojuān and accepted it with some res-
ervations (FN, 2011-04-28). 
Although Lǐ Chāngpíng supported the share-holding system, Hú Qǐhuá suspected 
that originally it was not his idea. Hú Qǐhuá had met Lǐ Chāngpíng before and at that 
time Lǐ Chāngpíng was not proposing that the major shareholders should be on the 
council of a financial cooperative. Anyway, even with the help of Lǐ Chāngpíng, Wáng 
Wěi did not manage to get a majority of the members to support his proposal, Hú Qǐhuá 
stated as a summary of Wáng Wěi’s intervention. Furthermore a final decision at the 
meeting would have been irregular, as only twelve members—less than a quarter of all 
members—were left at the end of the meeting, Hú Qǐhuá pointed out (HQH, 2011-06-
05:797–821). 
A few years ago Hú Qǐhuá had met Lǐ Chāngpíng at the Agricultural University of 
China in Běijīng. Lǐ Chāngpíng had given him his card and a book as a present. When 
Lǐ Chāngpíng came to the village in 2011 he immediately remembered Hú Qǐhuá. In 
retrospect Hú Qǐhuá told me that he did not challenge Lǐ Chāngpíng fiercely during his 
presentation, even though Lǐ Chāngpíng supported Wáng Wěi’s proposal, because this 
would have been impolite. Furthermore Hú Qǐhuá suspected that if the villagers had 
known more details about Lǐ Chāngpíng, they would have told him everything about 
what was going wrong in the village. However, Hú Qǐhuá did not tell them because he 
thought that it was better if Shǔidàozhuāng solved its own problems without help from 
the outside. Moreover, Lǐ Chāngpíng would have been put in an uncomfortable position 
between the village cadres and the villagers. Zhū Xiǎojuān and Wáng Wěi had invited 
Lǐ Chāngpíng and the villagers would have told him bad things about them. In this 
manner Zhū Xiǎojuān and Wáng Wěi would have lost face. These are the reasons Hú 
Qǐhuá gave me to understand why he did not trigger such a situation during the meeting. 
The next day Gāo Shùnkāi had arranged to meet Lǐ Chāngpíng to talk about the vil-
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lage’s and the cooperative’s affairs anyway. However, the meeting never took place. 
The next morning Zhū Xiǎojuān hurriedly left the village together with Lǐ Chāngpíng 
(HQH, 2011-06-05:741–795). 
Hú Qǐhuá complained that after this last meeting with Lǐ Chāngpíng, Chén 
Mùgēn, the chairperson of the FC, refused to hold another meeting, even though Hú 
Qǐhuá and other council members urged Chén Mùgēn to do so. If there had been anoth-
er meeting, the members of the FC would have had an opportunity to express their aspi-
rations and a common opinion could evolve. In Hú Qǐhuá’s eyes the opinion of every-
one was the strength of all the members. In this way not only Hú Qǐhuá or the council 
members, but also all the members of the cooperative could oppose Wáng Wěi. In such 
a situation Wáng Wěi would not be able to win, Hú Qǐhuá reasoned (HQH, 2011-06-
07:627–635). 
Concerning the question of the role of the chairperson of the cooperative’s coun-
cil, Hú Qǐhuá took a rather contradictory perspective. On one hand, Hú Qǐhuá com-
plained that without the chairperson initiating a meeting there was nothing he and the 
other council members could do. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Hú Qǐhuá 
himself chose not to serve as chairperson and even said that it made no difference if 
Chén Mùgēn was chairperson or not. 
When I came to the village again in autumn 2011 nothing had changed concerning 
the FC. There had been no meeting and the accumulated money was still lying in the 
bank account. Although the result of the election indicated that the members of the co-
operative did not trust their village head anymore, and that they opposed his proposal of 
introducing a share-holding system in the cooperative, this act of rightful resistance had 
not revitalized the FC so far. 
9.3 Decision-making and resistance in comparison 
The election of the council of the Financial Cooperative can be viewed as a highly visi-
ble act of resistance against Wáng Wěi and the village cadres taking control of this NRR 
project. Why was there no, or at least no visible, collective resistance against Wáng Wěi 
and the other village cadres controlling the other supposedly cooperative and self-
managed NRR projects in the village? If we compare decision making in the different 
projects we find the following similarities and differences that help to answer this ques-
tion. 
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9.3.1 Official and informal decision-making 
Although Wáng Wěi was officially—be it through election as he claimed or through 
self-announcement as some villagers claimed—in charge of the Professional Coopera-
tive for Ecological Agricultural Products (or Professional Cooperative) and of the vil-
lage’s Peasant Cooperative Association, he was not officially in charge of the different 
sub-projects of the Professional Cooperative. Officially Wáng Yàjūn was said to be in 
charge of the Small Group for Ecological Rice, Huáng Jiànguó was responsible for the 
Lotus and Crabs Small Group, Huáng Guóqiáng managed the Happy Pig Farm, Huáng 
Yǒumín and Chén Yùjiàn were allegedly in charge of the other part of the Happy Pig 
Small Group, namely of the individual households raising the happy pigs. Officially 
Wáng Wěi was also not in charge of the Financial Cooperative. Insofar there was no 
difference between the Financial Cooperative and the other economic cooperatives in 
the village. 
There was, however, one difference concerning who was officially in charge of 
the different NRR projects. Not Wáng Wěi but, nevertheless, the other village cadres 
were officially responsible for the small groups of the Professional Cooperatives. Only 
in the case of the Happy Pig Small Group was one of the two persons in charge not a 
village cadre, namely Huáng Yǒumín. In contrast, no village cadres were officially in-
volved in the management of the Financial Cooperative. 
If we turn from official leadership position to informal decision-making within the 
projects, it should have become clear in the preceding chapters that Wáng Wěi played a 
central role in the management decisions of the different small groups although this was 
officially not his role. In the case of the Financial Cooperative officially Chén Mùgēn 
was responsible as he was the chairperson of the council, but informally Hú Qǐhuá, who 
was at least council member of the Financial Cooperative, claimed to have played a 
central role in the operation of the Financial Cooperative. Wáng Wěi, who was not 
elected to the council of the Financial Cooperative, nevertheless tried to intervene by 
inviting Lǐ Chāngpíng to the village. It was Wáng Wěi and not one of the council mem-
bers who took the role of facilitator at that meeting. Thus, concerning the question of 
informal influence, there was apparently some but not a big difference between the 
small groups of the Professional Cooperative and the Financial Cooperative. 
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9.3.2 Opportunity and potential resistance 
The most obvious difference between the Professional Cooperative and the Financial 
Cooperative concerning decision-making was that there was no election held in the Pro-
fessional Cooperative during my time in the village. Furthermore, the responsible per-
sons of the different small groups were not chosen through election at all. Only the 
council of the Professional Cooperative was to be reelected in 2012, five years after the 
last election in 2008. Thus the opportunity for resistance to materialize in such a visible 
way simply did not exist in the case of the other NRR projects during my time in the 
village. 
In the case of the Financial Cooperative there existed mistrust and a potential of 
resistance because there was something the members could lose, namely the money they 
invested to buy new shares in the Financial Cooperative. The question arises whether 
there was potential for resistance, or mistrust in Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres, 
in the small groups of the Professional Cooperative. 
Concerning the small groups for ecological rice and minor food crops, many vil-
lagers simply did not view these small groups as their cooperative but as the business of 
the village cadres or just as another trader to whom they were selling their rice. They 
were almost not involved in the operations of these small groups. There was, at the 
most, one general assembly per year. Moreover, members were not connected to the 
small group through an investment (only some of them had made a small investment of 
20 CNY per mu in the first year of the Rice Association in 2005) or a membership fee. 
Almost nothing was at stake for them. Hence, the potential for resistance was probably 
smaller than in the Financial Cooperative. There was however something at stake for 
three council members of the former Rice Association, namely Gāo Shùnkāi, Hú Qǐhuá 
and Zhào Yùgāng. At the foundation of the Rice Association they had invested a few 
thousand CNY. Hence, they complained that Wáng Wěi and the village cadres had ap-
propriated the material and immaterial property of the former Rice Association by ille-
gal means. 
In the case of the Happy Pig Farm, the small groups for lotus and crabs and for 
organic rice and wheat, the individual workers/clients showed some mistrust in Wáng 
Wěi and the village cadres,78 especially concerning the alleged losses of these NRR pro- 
                                                          
78 I discussed the relations between the managing village cadres and the working villagers as both class 
and patron-client relations in chapter 7. 
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jects, and they were not completely satisfied with their wages. However, they only saw 
individual action as a possibility for change, if they saw any at all. The workers/clients 
at the Happy Pig Farm and at the lotus field thought about moving to the cities again if 
they were not satisfied with remuneration. This was not an option for the worker/client 
at the organic rice and wheat field. She simply wanted to continue to work for the vil-
lage cadres because of the non-monetary advantages of the cultivation of organic pro-
duce. She thought that alone she could not change anything. In comparison the members 
of the Financial Cooperative had a common interest and were not as individualized as 
these three workers/clients in the three separate small groups of the Professional Coop-
erative. 
The situation with the household members of the Happy Pig Small Group was 
again different. The members of this group were growing happy pigs individually, but 
they were not as individualized as the workers in the just mentioned small groups. There 
was more member involvement in that group than in any other during my stay in the 
village. A meeting was held nearly every week if there was not a lot to do in agriculture. 
The peasants in the Happy Pig Small Group did not complain to me about the village 
cadres. They only told me about the limited benefits and the higher risk of growing 
happy pigs in comparison with the conventional breeding method. However, they had 
good reasons to be careful with expressing complaints because they depended on Wáng 
Wěi for the sale of their happy pigs. With the exclusion of Hú Qǐhuá from the Happy 
Pig Small Group, Wáng Wěi had set an example concerning this question. In compari-
son to the members of the Happy Pig Small Group, the members of the Financial Coop-
erative did not depend on Wáng Wěi in this way because there was nothing to be sold to 
wealthy urban consumers on the market. 
In this chapter I identified several factors that help to explain why there was visi-
ble resistance against the leadership of Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres in one 
NRR project but not in the others. These factors were opportunity, involvement, indi-
vidualization and dependence. I pointed out that the opportunity for such a visible act, 
such as in the election of the council of the Financial Cooperative, did not exist in the 
small groups of the Professional Cooperative. The responsible persons were not elected 
and the next election of the council of the Professional Cooperative was some time 
away. Concerning the underlying question of latent dissatisfaction and mistrust, as well 
as potential resistance, I identified involvement, especially in monetary terms, as a cen-
tral factor for the existence or lack of concern and resistance. Furthermore, where there 
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was dissatisfaction, individualization prohibited the individual workers of three small 
groups from thinking about the possibility of collective action to change the present 
situation. When the peasant producers were not individualized, dependence on Wáng 
Wěi for selling their products hindered them from raising their voices if there was in-
deed any dissatisfaction with the leadership of the village cadres. These insights from 
intra-village comparison of NRR projects can be used for further comparison with other 
examples of experiments in NRR in China. Several Chinese language reports exist on 
different NRR projects written by NRR intellectuals and activists. However, a compre-
hensive review of these texts would go beyond the scope of this diploma thesis. Fur-
thermore, my experience with the NRR project in this village made me cautious about 
the possibility of NRR activists painting too much of an idealistic picture of their own 
NRR projects when presenting them to the outside world. Critical voices from the vil-
lage could go unheard. Acts of resistance could remain invisible. In the next chapter I 
put the results from my empirical research under a broader perspective of the anthropol-
ogy of cooperatives. 
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10 Anthropological Perspectives on Cooperatives 
 
In this chapter I analyze my empirical data presented in the preceding chapters. For my 
analysis I use theoretical approaches that were popular in anthropological studies of 
cooperatives in the 1970s and 1980s, namely a substantivist perspective inspired by 
Karl Polanyi, and a Marxist political economy perspective. The former focuses on the 
sphere of exchange, the later on the sphere of production. I complement my analysis 
with David Graeber’s (2001) anthropological theory of value in order to understand 
processes not covered by the other two approaches. 
I then discuss the concept of “ephemeral association” developed by anthropologist 
Gabriela Vargas-Cetina (2005) that approximately fits the NRR projects I studied. 
However, I have objections to her perspective of viewing these ephemeral associations 
as new forms of cooperatives. Instead I propose to view these organizations not as new 
forms of cooperatives but—building on Marc Edelman’s (1999) concept of “imagined 
organizations”—as “imagined cooperatives”. In this context I also disagree with Var-
gas-Cetina’s dismissal of “prospective anthropology”, proposed by June Nash and 
Nicholas Hopkins (1976), on theoretical as well as on political grounds. 
10.1 Developments in the anthropological study of cooperatives 
Anthropologists discovered rural cooperatives and collectives as a new field of study in 
the 1960s. In 1969 anthropologists, sociologists and economists organized a conference 
focusing on rural cooperatives as innovations in production and distribution. Empirical 
evidence from ethnography pointed out the challenges of transforming individualistic 
peasants or existing collective organizations into efficient and successful new coopera-
tives (Worsley 1971). Another conference concerning cooperatives, collectives and na-
tionalized industry initiated by June Nash and Jorge Dandler, was held in 1972 and re-
sulted in another volume published in 1976 (Nash et al. 1976). The questions focused 
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on the connections between local practice and the development projects from the na-
tion-state (Vargas-Cetina 2005:231–232). 
In the 1970s and 1980s most anthropologists studied rural cooperatives from the 
perspectives of political economy and institutional economics. These studies showed 
that while state support was often necessary for small collective organizations, state 
involvement often led to corruption in cooperatives. At that time cooperatives continued 
to be viewed as self-contained units. Members were involved in the cooperatives for a 
long time and the organization was understood as a community (Vargas-Cetina 
2005:232). 
In the face of the neoliberal focus on privatization and marketization, state inter-
vention and support for cooperatives has decreased since the 1980s. Many small pro-
ducers in the rural and urban area found themselves alone in the market and without old 
safety nets. They organized themselves in various types of cooperative organization and 
were supported by middle-class volunteers and NGOs. Anthropologists felt uneasy 
about the rush towards privatization in the 1980s and turned the focus of ethnography to 
working collective resource management systems that benefited its members. The in-
creasing role of NGOs and advocates that now supported cooperative organizations in 
place of the state became the focus of anthropological studies only in the 1990s and at 
the start of the 21st century. Furthermore, studies by June Nash showed how cooperative 
organizations in Chiapas became involved in struggles, for example for indigenous 
rights, that went beyond mere economic objectives (Vargas-Cetina 2005:233-234). 
10.2 Substantivism and the sphere of distribution 
Karl Polanyi differentiated between two meanings of “economic”, namely the substan-
tive and the formal: 
The substantive meaning of economic derives from man’s dependence for his living upon nature 
and his fellows. It refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment, in so far as 
this results in supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction.  
The formal meaning of economic derives from the logical character of the means–ends relation-
ship… It refers to a definite situation of choice, namely, that between the different uses of means 
induced by an insufficiency of those means. (Polanyi 1957:243) 
Polanyi argued that only the substantive meaning of economy is useful for comparative 
economics because formal economics is only applicable to the market system as one 
special kind of economy (Isaac 2005:15). 
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On the other hand the Formalists, for example Scott Cook and Harold Schneider, 
argued that microeconomic models concerning the key concept of maximization were 
universally applicable. First it seemed as if the Formalists had won the arguments of the 
1960s and 1970s. However, at the beginning of the 21st century, some anthropologists 
argue that the debate between Formalists and Substantivists had remained unresolved 
(Isaac 2005:18–21): 
Those who start by looking at society as a whole are left like the Substantivists, trying to explain 
how people are motivated to reproduce society; those who start by looking at individual desires 
end up, like the Formalists, unable to explain why people chose to maximize some things and not 
others. (Graeber 2001:12) 
Basic concepts employed by Karl Polanyi, for example reciprocity and redistribu-
tion, are nevertheless widely used in contemporary economic anthropology even though 
they are generally not attributed to him, exactly because they are now so commonly 
used. Hence, Barry Isaac argues that “the demise of substantivism was more apparent 
than real.” (Isaac 2005:22) 
All economies have mechanisms of distribution. Karl Polanyi argued that only 
capitalist market economies are first and foremost integrated through exchange on 
price-setting markets. Other economies are primarily integrated through other forms of 
distribution, namely through reciprocity, redistribution, and householding (Isaac 
2005:16). 
Overall market exchange plays a dominant role in contemporary China. However, 
other forms of distribution are still existent and relevant for our understanding of social 
relations. The intention of the NRR projects was to consciously replace (some but not 
all) market relations with cooperative relations at the local level. In this section I use 
Polanyi’s notions of different kinds of distribution to analyze the empirical data pre-
sented in the preceding chapters in order to have a better understanding of the de facto 
effects of the NRR experiments in the village. 
10.2.1 Market exchange 
The cooperative sold its products on the market, either directly to urban consumers, to 
supermarkets, or other companies that for example in turn gave the products as promo-
tional gifts to its customers. 
However, these market exchanges were not always pure forms of impersonal 
trade. Gudeman (2005) views economy as containing two realms, namely that of com-
munity and that of market. Both realms are existent in every economy, each has many 
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variations and both are complexly intertwined. He emphasizes that even though markets 
are about impersonal trade, these exchanges “may be mixed with communal ties… Alt-
hough trade may be modelled as an independent transaction, in practice it is surrounded 
by communities that enable it.” (Gudeman 2005:95–96). Many of the urban consumers 
who bought the cooperative’s products not only related with the cooperative for the 
short and limited relation of an market exchange, but were part of a community interest-
ed in the three rural issues.79 By buying the cooperative’s products they wanted to con-
tribute to the solution of these problems. 
On the input side the members of the marketing cooperative-like parts of the Pro-
fessional Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Products (or Professional Coopera-
tive) bought the means of agricultural production either directly on the market or the 
Professional Cooperative bought the input and sold it to the individual member house-
holds. 
The production cooperative-like small groups bought labor force on the local la-
bor market. The village cadres, who controlled these small groups, hired villagers or 
people from surrounding villages either as permanent or as temporary workers. As 
pointed out in chapters 5 and 7 some of these market relations between buyers and 
sellers of labor power were not impersonal but rather personal relations between patrons 
and clients or even between husbands and wives. 
10.2.2 Reciprocity 
David Graeber (2001), replacing Marshall Sahlin’s terms “generalized reciprocity” and 
“balanced reciprocity”, proposes to view reciprocity as relatively open or closed: 
Open reciprocity keeps no accounts, because it implies a relation of permanent mutual commit-
ment; it becomes closed reciprocity when a balancing of accounts close the relationship off, or at 
least maintains the constant possibility of doing so. (Graeber 2001:220) 
Graeber points out that the timeless relations of open-ended, communist reciproci-
ty can easily transform into hierarchical relations of patronage and exploitation. Bal-
anced forms of closed reciprocity can easily turn into either competition or forms of 
exchange, very close to less cutthroat forms of barter or trade (Graeber 2001:118–225). 
In chapters 4 and 5 I mentioned that the cooperative, most often in the person of 
Wáng Wěi, sometimes gave products from the cooperative as presents to officials, jour-
nalists, and intellectuals. In this manner Wáng Wěi created non-contractual relations 
                                                          
79 The three rural issues are the peasants, rural society, and agriculture. For more details see chapter 1. 
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with them, which he could use to receive state support, media attention, and support 
from intellectuals, but also to improve his social status and to rise in political office. On 
the spectrum of reciprocity this form of gift giving is located closer to closed reciprocity 
than to open-ended communism. 
Within the cooperative but rather autonomous from it, I observed another kind of 
reciprocity, namely mutual aid between neighbors and friends, as noted in chapter 6. 
Huáng Yùtíng, the women growing organic wheat and rice for the cooperative, helped 
her neighbor and friend planting rice seedlings and vice versa. Even though there was 
no accounting, their exchange of labor was rather balanced (using Sahlin’s term) or 
closed than open (using Graeber’s terms). 
In the case of the village cadres’ wives packaging rice for the cooperative (hence, 
for their shareholding husbands) as described in chapter 5, these market relations were 
based on community (Gudeman 2005), namely on the household. Obviously the rela-
tionship between village cadres and their wives did not end when the employer-
employee relationship between them stopped. Viewed from the perspective of commu-
nity, this market exchange of money against labor power appears as another form of 
exchange, namely reciprocity. Furthermore, even though accounting was used, this case 
seems to be indeed much closer to open reciprocity than the two mentioned above. 
Open reciprocity is an individual form of from-each-according-to-his-abilities-to-
each-according-to-his-needs communism. This open-ended responsibility usually exists 
between close kin or other people with very close relationships, Graeber points out: 
“[They] will do whatever they can to help the other, not because they expect repayment, 
but simply because they know that in a similar crisis, the other would do the same” 
(Graeber 2001:18–19). Asked why she and the other women did this work, Wáng Wěi’s 
wife told me that they did it “because no one else was doing it” (FN, 2011-06-02). If we 
interpret this statement about doing the packaging work along the just mentioned theo-
retical lines, it becomes clear that the (low) wage was not the main motivation for doing 
the work. Packaging needed to be done; otherwise the cooperative was not able to sell 
the rice. (If the rumors about fake ecological rice from outside the village were true, the 
need for someone with very close relations to the village cadres would be even more 
accentuated.) The wives helped their husbands because they needed their help and not 
because they expected to be repaid. Yet, as mentioned above, such relations of open 
reciprocity can turn into hierarchical relations of exploitations quite easily and some-
times it is hard to tell (both for analyst and actor) when the one definitely turns into the 
146 Imagined Cooperatives 
 
other (Graeber 2001:225). The hourly wage for the packaging work was rather low and, 
in contrast to managing the cooperative, the packaging work did not seem as empower-
ing or fulfilling. However, my empirical data on this concrete question of how the wives 
of the village cadres viewed this relationship is insufficient to discuss it in more detail 
without ending up in pure speculation. I discussed the problem of the researcher’s posi-
tion within the field in the chapter about methods and it seems reasonable to expect that 
female researchers would have been able to find out more on this issue. 
10.2.3 Redistribution 
Another form of exchange that is central for understanding the dynamics and the devel-
opment of the cooperative projects under study is redistribution. In his official position 
as village party branch secretary and chairperson of the village committee, Wáng Wěi 
(and to a much smaller extent the other village cadres) had access to resources which 
they could redistribute (or promise to redistribute, for example before elections) among 
the peasants of the village. Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres could allow the vil-
lagers or their children to have another child. They could allocate the villagers land for a 
house for their children. They could help the villagers to receive the minimum living 
security from the state. Although the money came from the state, it was the village 
committee that reported to higher administrative levels which households should re-
ceive state support. The village cadres could also promise to help organize a room for a 
villager’s elderly relative in an old people’s home, who would not be endowed to it oth-
erwise, and so on. 
This possibility of redistribution was the basis of patron-client relationships that in 
turn formed the community base of market relations between the village cadres as buy-
ers and some of the villagers as sellers of labor power, as discussed in chapter 7. More 
generally this control over redistribution was one influence on the reaction, or rather 
non-reaction, of the majority of the villagers to the village cadres’ de facto privatization 
of the market-oriented cooperative projects in the village. 
10.3 Political economy and the sphere of production 
So far we have focused only on the sphere of exchange but, from the perspective of po-
litical economy, value is not produced in this sphere. Value is generated in a different 
sphere to the sphere in which it is exchanged, realized and distributed (Robotham 
2005:49). Hence, I shall now turn to the sphere of production. In this section I put for-
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ward the thesis that, through the cooperative projects, a capitalist mode of production 
entered the village and led to relations between capitalists and workers (with the above 
made specification that these were not pure relations of buyers and sellers of labor pow-
er, but also relations between patrons and clients) within the village. 
10.3.1 Modes, relations, means and forces of production 
One central concept in political economy is that of “mode of production”. Marxist an-
thropologists have developed several different kinds of modes of productions based on 
their empirical data. A mode of production is made up of the “relations of production” 
and the “forces of production”. Relations of production are about who controls the 
“means of production”. From the point of view of political economy, this is the key to 
understanding economy and society (Robotham 2005:43). As Chris Hann (2005:111) 
points out, “managerial power and access to information are in some respects more crit-
ical than ownership per se.” This is why in the preceding chapters I focused on the divi-
sion of labor and who is involved in management decisions. 
The forces of production include the “means of production”, namely the “objects 
of labour” (e.g. land and raw materials), the “instruments of labor” (e.g. tools), as well 
as the most important force of production, namely “human labor power”, the ability to 
work (Robotham 2005:44), or more generally “a human being’s capacity to transform 
the world, their powers of physical and mental creativity” (Graeber 2001:55). 
Another important component of political economy is the Marxian labor theory of 
value, according to which value is created through labor (Turner 2008). If more value is 
produced than is needed for the reproduction of labor power, a surplus arises. Each 
mode of production with an internal class division has a characteristic form of extrac-
tion of this surplus: “Indeed, it is the very growth of an economy which has the capacity 
to produce a regular surplus that leads to class division.” (Robotham 2005:44). 
10.3.2 Modes of extracting surplus and social formations 
In the capitalist mode of production the capitalist class controls the means of production 
and labor power is commodified. Like all other commodities, it can be now bought on 
the market for a price that circles around its value, that is the value of labor socially 
necessary for its (re-)production. Capitalists buy the workers’ labor power on the market 
and pay them a wage. In return capitalists can extract the labor of the workers. Through 
their work, workers reproduce the value of their own labor power, replace the existing 
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stock of capital, and produce surplus value for capitalists, who appropriate this surplus 
as profit (if they successfully manage to sell the commodities produced by the workers 
on the market) and accumulate it as capital. However, the working day is not split up 
into separate sections and not labeled accordingly. Hence, it appears as if capitalists are 
paying workers for the entire value of their labor: “The organisation of the production 
process conceals the manner in which the surplus is extracted.” (Robotham 2005:47) 
This is a very short summary of Karl Marx’s theoretical examination of the gener-
ative mechanisms of a “pure” capitalist mode of production. However, Marx pointed 
out that, in the complex process of social production capitalists who extract the surplus 
from the workers are only the first appropriators of surplus value but not necessarily the 
ultimate owners of it. They have to share the surplus with other capitalists, landowners, 
merchants, and so on. Hence, surplus value splits up into various forms such as profit, 
interest, merchants’ profit, or rent (Marx 2005:589). 
Furthermore, in reality each social formation or society is made up of several 
modes of production, with one mode being the dominant one. This is expressed in the 
vocabulary of political economy with the term “articulation” of modes of production 
(Robotham 2005:53). Capitalist social formations are made up of a mixture of modes of 
productions; for example of capitalism, petty commodity production and household 
production, articulated in a way that capitalism dominates. In the case of the village 
studied here, these three modes of production can be detected. Many villagers migrate 
to the cities to work as wage laborers in capitalism. Those staying in the village produce 
agricultural products (mainly) on their own land (mainly) with their own labor. These 
products are in part produced for their own consumption (household production) and in 
part for sale on the market (petty commodity production). 
As just mentioned, surplus value appropriated by capitalists has to be shared with 
other groups in many cases, for example with merchants if capitalists need their help in 
order to realize the value, which was produced in the sphere of production by the work-
ers under the control of the capitalists, in the spheres of exchange and distribution. Ac-
cording to the labor theory of value, the merchants (and their workers) do not add any 
additional value to the product. However, their connecting work between producers and 
consumers may be needed in order to make the realization of the already produced val-
ue possible. If capitalists do not manage to sell their commodities, the complete value of 
the commodities (which includes the surplus value produced by the workers) is lost. 
Hence, they can concede to share the surplus with others. 
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Social scientists influenced by political economy and following the theory of an 
Asiatic mode of production, claimed to have identified a distinctive African mode of 
production, too. In this mode of production surplus was extracted through trade as well 
as through tribute. The relations of production within the lineage, clan or village group 
remained unchanged when this kind of extraction started (Robotham 2005:45–46). 
Similarly, merchants can appropriate surplus value produced by petty commodity 
producers like Chinese peasants if they do not have the capability to sell these products 
to the consumers directly. This is what NRR intellectuals want to change when they 
propose marketing cooperatives as one possible solution to the three rural issues. 
10.3.3 New surplus in the village 
I start my argument about the introduction of class relations within the village as a con-
sequence of the NRR projects by the observation that additional surplus became availa-
ble in (or was returned to) the village. As noted above, the growth of an economy and 
the production of regular surplus is the basis for class division (Robotham 2005:45). 
This argument from political economy is rather a statement about macro than about mi-
cro developments. Nevertheless, under the condition of keeping in mind that the micro 
processes described below are happening within a bigger picture, as provided in chap-
ters 1 and 3, it seems fruitful to apply it to what happened in the village under study. 
Through the initiation of the NRR projects in the village, two additional kinds of 
surplus became available in the village. Firstly, parts of the surplus produced by the 
peasants, which would otherwise have been appropriated by peddlers, merchants, and 
supermarkets outside of the village, were detained in the village. Secondly, the state 
gave financial support to cooperative projects. This money stemmed from surplus pro-
duced somewhere outside of the village. 
10.3.4 Controlling the means of exchange 
Here I treat the marketing cooperative-like parts and the production cooperative-like 
parts of the NRR projects separately. I start with the former, namely the Small Group 
for Ecological Rice (and the former Association for Environmentally Harmless Rice or 
Rice Association), the Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops as well as the 
household part of the Happy Pig Small Group. Officially the ownership of means of 
production remained unchanged in these marketing cooperative-like parts of the NRR 
projects in the village. Land as an object of labor was still collectively owned, that is  
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under the control of the local administration, with peasants having long-term land use 
rights and the right to transfer these rights to others. The households still privately 
owned instruments of labor. What changed was that agricultural inputs such as seeds, 
fertilizer, and agricultural chemicals were (partly) purchased together. Nevertheless, 
once bought, these objects of labor were private properties as well. 
What changed with the new marketing cooperative-like small parts was that they 
replaced peddlers, merchants, supermarkets, and other traders. Now the cooperative was 
in control of the means of exchange, e.g. certifications, registrations, its own trademark, 
as well as packaging machines and materials, which had to be acquired first. Officially 
the cooperative, and hence the surplus otherwise extracted by traders and the support 
granted to the cooperative projects by the state, should be controlled by its peasant 
members. The members handed over their decision making power for a fixed period of 
time to an elected council of the Professional Cooperative. Peasants told me about ma-
nipulations of these elections. Moreover, those responsible for the small groups were 
not elected at all but appointed by Wáng Wěi, the chairperson of the Professional Coop-
erative, who was also the village party branch secretary and the chairperson of the vil-
lage committee. Backed up with these official positions and the redistributive power 
connected to them, Wáng Wěi was able to effectively control the Professional Coopera-
tive (together with the other village cadres) without facing open resistance from most 
members. Most villagers viewed the Professional Cooperative just as another trader. 
Apparently it made no big difference for them who extracted the surplus they produced. 
However, some members resisted Wáng Wěi and the village cadres extracting 
surplus from their labor. According to these peasants, the Professional Cooperative 
made (merchant) profits. According to the village cadres they did not manage to make 
profits because they could not operate as effectively as other bigger and more estab-
lished merchants. The resisting villagers were the founders and council members of the 
former Rice Association, the forerunner organization of the Professional Cooperative. 
They had invested not only money but also creative energy into the marketing coopera-
tive. In contrast, most of the other peasants who sold their agricultural products to the 
Professional Cooperative had almost no additional expenses from being a member of 
the marketing cooperative. This explains why some villagers made an effort to resist 
Wáng Wěi’s control of the marketing cooperative while others did not. 
However, on a more basic level it is important to note that there was resistance 
against the extraction of surplus in the village, whereas there had not been such resis-
  Anthropological Perspectives 151 
tance before the existence of the marketing cooperative. The establishment of the mar-
keting cooperative-like projects in the village made possible this kind of contention sur-
rounding surplus. Before that the extraction of surplus had not been as visible and there-
fore not a field of contention. Peasants not only knew how much they sold their agricul-
tural products for, but also for how much the cooperative sold it to urban consumers. 
Concerning the alleged costs of packaging, marketing, and selling, peasants did not al-
ways trust the statements from the village cadres and made their own calculations and 
estimations. 
10.3.5 Controlling the means of production 
In the production cooperative-like parts of the Professional Cooperative, namely the 
Happy Pig Small Group, the Lotus and Crabs Small Group and the Small Group for 
Organic Rice and Wheat, the means of production were, with the exception of land, 
officially owned by the cooperative. As already mentioned, the land was collectively 
owned in rural China. However, the individual households held the land use rights and 
transfered them to the Professional Cooperative. The cooperative shared parts of its sur-
plus with these few individual households in the form of rent paid out in money or in 
kind. The pigsty of the Happy Pig Farm was built on the land of one of the shareholding 
village cadres, namely Huáng Guóqiáng. Organic wheat and rice was planted on the 
land of a working villager, namely Huáng Yùtíng. Lotus and crabs were cultivated on 
the land of peasants who were otherwise not involved in the operation of this small 
group. The members of the small group owned the other means of production collec-
tively, for example the pigsty, pigs, maize, seeds, crabs and fertilizer. If the value of the 
products that were produced by permanent workers and day laborers could be realized 
in the sphere of exchange, the surplus was to be controlled by the four to five members, 
mainly but not exclusively village cadres, of each of these three small groups. Further-
more, as in the case of the marketing cooperative-like part of the Professional Coopera-
tive, it was these managing members, especially Wáng Wěi in his position as village 
party branch secretary and chairperson of the village committee, who also controlled the 
second kind of additional surplus, namely the money the state gave as support to the 
cooperative projects. 
Only in the case of the Happy Pig Farm was the worker at the same time (at least 
officially) one of these shareholding members. However, informally all three production 
cooperative-like small groups were controlled by the village cadres under the leadership 
152 Imagined Cooperatives 
 
of Wáng Wěi. There existed a separation between shareholding village cadres on the 
one side and workers on the other. Even the one worker, who was officially on the same 
level as the other members of the Happy Pig Farm, did not view himself as being in the 
same position as the village cadres (SYL, 2011-05-13:1093–1098). Although from a 
quantitative point of view the low number of only three permanent workers and the 
handful of day laborers for planting and harvesting might seem negligible, this qualita-
tive change in the relations within the village as a consequence of the NRR projects is 
nevertheless remarkable, as it seems contrary to the intentions of these supposedly co-
operative projects. With these projects class relations between capitalists and workers, 
between buyers and sellers of labor force, entered this village. 
To be sure, there had been members of both classes—of course more workers by 
far—connected to households within the village before. In most households there was at 
least one migrant worker. On one hand, both Fāng Fēipéng, who worked at lotus field, 
and Sūn Yúnlóng, who worked at the Happy Pig Farm, had worked as a migrant worker 
outside of the village before. On the other hand, Wáng Wěi had had his own company 
together with a friend outside of the village before he assumed his office as village party 
branch secretary and chairperson of the village committee. Therefore, class division 
with the village was nothing new. However, direct relations between capitalist and 
workers within the village were something new. 
One might object to this claim by pointing out that even before the NRR projects 
some villagers had bought the labor power of other villagers. Indeed, some villagers 
paid other villagers to work for them. The claim made here is not that there had been no 
paid labor within the village before the advent of the NRR projects. Day laborers could 
be found both on the small construction sides within the village, as well as in the fields, 
planting rice seedlings or excavating lotus roots for example. There is one important 
difference between these day laborers and the small groups’ permanent workers and day 
laborers. In the case of house building it is clear that the villagers paid others to work 
for them not in order to sell their house on the market with a profit later on, but in order 
to live in it after completion. Even though wages were involved, these were not capital-
ist relationships as it was not about extracting surplus from the workers. In the case of 
work in the fields, the difference is subtler. As mentioned above, different modes of 
production make up a social formation. Hence, sometimes it is not possible to draw a 
clear line between different modes. Peasants usually consumed a small part of their har-
vest themselves within the household, but sold the remaining part on the market. Hence, 
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one might argue that villagers who bought the labor power of other villagers to work on 
their fields did this in order to benefit from the surplus value produced by their labor 
when the harvest was later sold and the value realized on the market. However, the 
peasants I talked to told me that they paid other villagers (or people from neighboring 
villages) to work for them as a substitute for family members who were working in the 
cities at the same time and who could not help with the cultivation or harvest on the 
fields. In contrast, the small groups of the Professional Cooperative produced with the 
goal of selling the products on the market and to get a return on the invested money. It 
was not about hiring someone as substitute for family members working in the city. 
Hence, I argue that it was the NRR projects that led to the development of capitalist 
class relations within the village.80 Using the terms of Nicos Poulantzas (1975) already 
introduced in the last part of chapter 7, new class places were socially produced in the 
locality of the village through the establishment of the production cooperative-like parts 
of the Professional Cooperative. 
The production cooperative-like small groups were foremost imagined, for exam-
ple by Mǎ Zhìyǒng, the student volunteer who assisted Wáng Wěi in the management of 
the Professional Cooperative, as a collective of investors that was, especially in the ini-
tial phase, to be managed by capable individuals rather than democratically by all mem-
bers, as this was considered more effective. It was not viewed as problematic that only a 
few capable people owned and managed the cooperative at that time, as later on, if suc-
cessful, more peasants would be allowed to join as shareholders with entitlements to a 
dividend. In this conception, the question of who did what kind of work was of no con-
cern. It could be members or non-members, Mǎ Zhìyǒng told me (MZY, 2011-06-
03:260–350). However, within the village there existed different conceptions of what a 
cooperative should be and how it should be organized. Hú Qǐhuá, council member of 
the former Rice Association and initiator of the happy pigs, who was excluded from this 
small group later on, imagined, for example, the creation of different social relations 
through the establishment of cooperatives. His social imagination challenged the ver-
sion of a cooperative that meant the creation of class places for capitalists/members of 
the cooperative (understood as shareholders in the “cooperative”) on the one side and of 
workers on the other (FN, 2011-11-11). Even though these alternative social imaginings 
                                                          
80 If one considers the relations between peasants who pay other peasants to work for them as substitutes 
for absent household members as intitial class relations between capitalists and workers, the production 
cooperative-like NRR projects furthered the development of capitalist class relations in the village. 
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have not been realized so far, they, and therefore the potential for the creation of new 
social relations, exist. 
10.4 Social action and value 
Terence Turner argues that most Marxist anthropologists created only a slightly differ-
ent version of Substantivism. Both Polanyi’s followers and those influenced by Marx’s 
political economy simply analyzed the “way in which a society materially provisions 
itself”. The former put the focus on different modes of exchange, the later on different 
modes of production. However, Turner questions if this sort of material production is 
indeed what is most important to the social systems examined. Instead, Turner suggests 
starting from the question of value. Based on “Marx’s insight that value ultimately 
measures the importance not of objects, but of actions” (Graeber 2005:350), Turner 
thought about “how to apply a Marxian theory of value to societies without a market” 
(Graeber 2001:68). 
10.4.1 Graeber’s anthropological theory of value 
David Graeber (2001, 2005) develops an anthropological theory of value that contains 
important elements of Terence Turner’s approach as well as an idea from Nancy 
Munn’s phenomenological approach, namely that value emerges in action. According to 
Graeber, 
value is the way our actions take on meaning or importance by becoming incorporated into some-
thing larger than ourselves. But almost always, this can only happen through some kind of material 
medium, a token of value like money. Fetishism occurs when we assume that the value comes 
from the token, rather than ourselves. (Graeber 2005:451) 
Different material tokens (or material performances) measure value through pres-
ence/absence, through ranking, or through proportionality. What is measured is the im-
portance of the expended creative energies (Graeber 2001:75–76). The importance of 
action is usually realized through material tokens at another place than where it was 
produced (Graeber 2005:452). 
Taking this anthropological theory of value as a theoretical starting point turns our 
attention from the mere production of material products and services to the question of 
why people who could do almost anything do what they are doing (Graeber 2001:47). 
Why are the village cadres continuing the cooperative projects in the face of (alleged) 
constant monetary loss? Why are the council members of the former Rice Association 
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still bound to the idea of establishing a “real” cooperative in the village in the face of 
the limited monetary benefits it provided so far? Below I answer these questions by 
taking my two main informants as exemplary figures of these two groups. 
10.4.2 Non-monetary tokens valuing cooperative social action 
Wáng Wěi, village party branch secretary, chairperson of the village committee and of 
the Professional Cooperative, portrayed himself as pioneer of cooperation. In his narra-
tive the village cadres selflessly take the lead and shoulder the losses until the coopera-
tive develops further and makes profit. Then the villagers, depicted by Wáng Wěi as 
rational profit maximizing actors who do not care about the collective, will follow au-
tomatically (WW, 2011-05-03:109–130). The question formulated above about what 
makes the village cadres continue with the cooperative projects is not easily answered, 
as I cannot tell which of the two stories was closer to reality. Village cadres told me that 
they lost money with the cooperative projects. Other villagers told me that the village 
cadres made profits. De facto profits would be a good reason to continue. However, the 
possibility existed that the value of creative energy expended on action in NRR experi-
ments could be realized in material tokens others than money, as we can see in the case 
of Hú Qǐhuá.  
As already mentioned above, tokens of value cannot only be objects but also ma-
terial performances. In the interviews Hú Qǐhuá mentioned several events when he was 
able to realize values that had been generated through action in connection with the 
NRR projects in the village. Hú Qǐhuá told me that in the initial stage of the NRR pro-
jects in the village one intellectual, namely the well-known economist Hán Déqiáng, 
invited him along with Gāo Shùnkāi, the chairperson of the former Rice Association, for 
a meal in Běijīng after they had presented a report about the Rice Association. Hán Dé-
qiáng did this because he appreciated that those two and the four other investors in the 
Rice Association took the risk and were willing to let everyone participate if successful, 
without demanding a dividend due to their investment (HQH, 2011-05-27a:522–549). 
The value that was realized in this case was concrete; hence, it was not mediated by 
some abstract material token like money but by something rather special and incom-
mensurable, namely a meal. The value was not measured in form of proportionality or 
ranking, but rather through the presence (in contrast to the absence) of this material per-
formance. While the value was generated through action in the village, it was realized 
somewhere else, namely in Běijīng city.  
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Another time Hú Qǐhuá wrote a report about his work in the financial cooperation 
and about one idea concerning the improvement of its operation. After the NRR intel-
lectual Jiāng Bǎilín had read this text, he gave Hú Qǐhuá a call and greeted him with 
“teacher Hú” (HQH, 2011-06-05:1198–1201). Hú Qǐhuá also told me that he once met 
Lǐ Chāngpíng at the Agricultural University of China in Běijīng. Lǐ Chāngpíng gave 
him a book as present and Lǐ Chāngpíng’s wife gave him their visiting card (material 
objects as a token of valuing Hú Qǐhuá’s active involvement in the NRR projects). 
When Lǐ Chāngpíng came to the county town in 2010 and to the village in 2011, a few 
years after their first encounter, Lǐ Chāngpíng showed that he still remembered Hú 
Qǐhuá (HQH, 2011-06-05:762–765). 
In addition to the field of NRR intellectuals and activists, the value of social ac-
tion in connection with the cooperative projects was also realized in the field of media. 
Positive news reports about the cooperative efforts made the value produced by the ac-
tions of the participating members material in a way that could be preserved. Hú Qǐhuá 
once told me that Wáng Wěi could try to delete him from the history of the cooperative 
projects of the village, but that he could not succeed because there already existed me-
dia reports with his name and the names of the other council members of the former 
Rice Association (HQH, 2011-06-05:869–872). 
These tokens of esteem that realize the value created through the active involve-
ment in the cooperative projects may offset a lack of realization of value in its monetary 
form. For example, Hú Qǐhuá did not want to receive a wage for his work in the Coop-
erative for Mutual Financial Aid (or Financial Cooperative; HQH, 2011-06-05:909–
911), although he later on explained to me that the economic conditions of his house-
hold did not improve from 2004 to 2006 because he was so busy with affairs of the Rice 
Association and the Financial Cooperative (HQH, 2011-06-05:1024–1051). Based on 
this information from Hú Qǐhuá, it seems plausible that, if the village cadres’ claims 
about losses were true, such kind of realization of value in the form of material tokens 
other than money might help to explain why the village cadres would continue in spite 
of unfavorable financial prospects. To prove this hypothesis one would, apart from clar-
ifying the question of monetary loss or profit, need to carry out participant observation 
not only inside of the village, as I have done, but also outside of it. It would be neces-
sary to leave the village together with members of the cooperative as encounters be-
tween them and NRR intellectuals, NRR activists and their NGOs often take place in 
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training sessions outside of the village.81 The roles played by NGOs and advocates are 
now increasingly at the center of attention in the anthropology of cooperatives. 
10.5 Ephemeral associations: new cooperatives? 
Gabriela Vargas-Cetina points out that the situation of cooperatives in different parts of 
the so-called developing world is similar today: 
The connection between rural and urban organizations (including cooperatives) and the market is 
now handled … mostly by non-governmental organizations, small entrepreneurs, private founda-
tions and individual volunteers who take it upon themselves to support indigenous peoples, rural 
producers and poverty-stricken people everywhere. (Vargas-Cetina 2005:239) 
In this situation, Vargas-Cetina argues, many grassroots organizations in Mexico trans-
formed themselves into what she calls “ephemeral associations”.  
Ephemeral associations are highly flexible and their structure, membership and 
goals change continuously. Membership in these associations is fully voluntary and 
members do not expect that these organizations last indefinitely. Internal governance 
structure is not strong and authority figures are contextual. Furthermore, these associa-
tions are, to a high degree, dependent on communications technology (Vargas-Cetina 
2005:247 n. 1). 
As empirical examples of such ephemeral associations, Vargas-Cetina describes 
the House of Weavings and other organizations of women weavers in highland Chiapas. 
These organizations served their members as marketing cooperatives (Vargas-Cetina 
2005:241–245). Here I compare the features she mentions with my own empirical data.  
A young weaver and draughtsman managed the organization like a private store. 
The relation between him and most weavers, including the members, was more like a 
patron-client relation than a relation between a democratically elected leader and his 
constituency. The organization did not run on a participatory basis and the weavers  
                                                          
81 In my research I focused on the processes within the cooperative and within the village. Hence, I have 
not written about the role of NGOs in the NRR projects in Shǔidàozhuāng so far. My interviewees did not 
seem to assess their role as relevant enough to talk about them. In the interviews they rather mentioned 
the role played by single NRR intellectuals and by student volunteers from certain universities. However, 
there were at least three NGOs in contact with the NRR projects during my time in the village (MZY, 
2011-06-03:109–154). Wáng Wěi only talked to me about an NGO once when I had my voice recorder 
switched off. He told me that he, as a council member of the NGO, should not say this but the utility of 
one NGO that was supposed to help solving the sales problem was zero (IR WW, 2011-06-08). Mǎ 
Zhìyǒng, the graduate with a degree in economics who supported Wáng Wěi in the management of the 
Professional Cooperative, was paid not by the Professional Cooperative but by the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, as part of a project for mutual help between the city and the countryside. The academy in turn 
had received the money for this project from an organization or institution from Canada (MZY, 2011-06-
03:83–104). 
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were not involved in important decisions. There were no general assemblies on a regu-
lar basis, and hence members tended to develop no sense of collective belonging. Mem-
bership was free as no membership fee was collected and no strict member list existed. 
Some members preferred to sell their textiles to private stores. Members obtained many 
benefits from selling their handicrafts to the organization. The organization organized 
programs for both members and non-members. The weaver organizations received help 
from altruistic individuals, government programs, and national and international foun-
dations. Furthermore, in-house advisers, NGOs or both, helped in the operation of the 
organizations. Depending on these advisers’ ideals they could direct the organization to 
participate in, or restrain from, attending political demonstrations. Overall the House of 
Weavings kept its promise of improving the life of its members. However, looking at it 
more closely, it was not a cooperative in the classical sense at all. Nevertheless, all these 
organizations called themselves “cooperatives” and invoked the spirit of cooperation 
and collective work (Vargas-Cetina 2005:242–244). 
Most of these features might as well be used to describe the different marketing 
cooperative-like NRR projects in the Chinese village I studied, especially the small 
groups for ecological rice and ecological minor food crops. While most features are also 
true for the marketing cooperative-like part of the Happy Pig Small Group, it was dif-
ferent from the two other small groups and the weaver organizations as there were regu-
lar meetings, member participation and the possibility to develop a sense of collective 
belonging. However, as in the other projects, Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres 
made the main decisions. One difference between the three small groups and the Mexi-
can weaver organizations was that the former only provided limited benefits to its 
members. Another difference was that Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres’ patron-
client relations with the members/villagers were based on both their position in the co-
operative as well as on their position in the village party branch and in the village com-
mittee. Moreover, the Professional Cooperative did not participate in political demon-
strations. 
To sum it up, some similarities, namely the free membership in the Small Group 
for Ecological Rice or the invention of new projects like the Lotus and Crabs Small 
Group, the Happy Pig Small Group and the Happy Pig Farm, on one hand, and the 
abandonment of old projects like the Professional Cooperative for Edible Mushrooms, 
on the other hand, provide reasons to argue that the NRR projects in Shǔidàozhuāng can 
be understood as ephemeral cooperatives as well. However, there were some stable and 
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permanent elements in the NRR projects that contradict the image of a continuously 
changing organization. For example, the members of the Happy Pig Small Group or the 
Lotus and Crabs Small Group were relative stable. Furthermore, the marketing of rice 
seemed to be a constant in the NRR projects in Shǔidàozhuāng. Last but not least, one 
authority figure, namely Wáng Wěi played a central role in the projects since the start. 
If one considers Shǔidàozhuāng’s cooperative projects as ephemeral association, one 
needs to add that it is so in a less flexible and fluid form than the example given by 
Vargas-Cetina, but it nevertheless approximates it. 
10.6 “Not a cooperative at all” 
Moreover, my own data allows a rough conclusion about the NRR projects in the Chi-
nese village that is very similar to Vargas-Cetina’s (2005) about the weaver organiza-
tions in Mexico, namely that the organizations called itself a “cooperative” even though 
it did not look like a cooperative in the classical sense any more.82 
In the 1970s June Nash and Nicholas Hopkins imagined the anthropological study 
of cooperatives as one part of a “prospective anthropology” that is concerned with “un-
derstanding the social forms into which we may be about to move”. They thought that 
cooperatives were especially interesting because they involved an “element of willful 
control of one’s own social forms” (Nash and Hopkins 1976:4). That was before the 
neoliberal turn. In the early 21st century, after more than thirty years of neoliberalism, 
after the alleged end of history and the final victory of capitalism and of the market, and 
after the repetitive claims of certain people that there is no alternative, Gabriela Vargas-
Cetina proposes to drop the idea of a “prospective anthropology”. In the face of the in-
creasing velocity of postmodernity, she claims that there is no other possibility: “our 
theoretical intentions now have to be humbler; where Nash and Hopkins wanted to look 
into the future, we find ourselves trying to grapple with the constantly changing pre-
sent.” Nash and Hopkins thought that it makes sense to keep in mind “the distinction 
between what is theoretically imaginable and what is concretely possible” (Nash and 
                                                          
82 Rather it approximated in reality what Mǎ Zhìyǒng’s vision of ideal cooperatives looked like, namely a 
shareholding company (股份制公司 gǔfènzhì gōngsī) of all peasants from the village (MZY, 2011-06-
03:264). The main difference between this vision and reality was that so far only the village cadres and 
two of their friends were shareholders in the shareholding cooperative. In fact, the idea of shareholding 
cooperatives is nothing new in China. It developed in the 1980s when peasants found that some collective 
properties could not easily be divided physically. Shares were issued to everyone on equal terms instead 
of selling these collective properties. Furthermore, some proportions of collective shares were held by 
outside private organization or state institutions (Zhao 2011:691). 
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Hopkins 1976:29). Hence, they proposed to use an ideal-type model of a cooperative for 
heuristic purposes (Nash and Hopkins 1976:27). Obviously the theoretical move pro-
posed by Vargas-Cetina has political consequences as well. Studying cooperatives 
would be no longer about imagining possible social relations that are different from 
what exists in the present. This creative tension would be lost. 
In fact, some villagers in Shǔidàozhuāng had an ideal-type model of a cooperative 
in mind. Otherwise they could not possibly call the cooperative of the village cadres a 
fake (HQH, 2011-05-06b:218). Of course we do not know if these peasants would be 
able to realize a cooperative, a social form in accordance with their imaginations.83 Be 
that as it may, if only one part of the people involved in an organization claim that it is a 
cooperative and others claim that it is a fake one, why would a researcher prefer the one 
over the other in a social setting where the meaning of cooperative is contended? 
Vargas-Cetina and I agree that the objects of our research called themselves coop-
eratives but that “they were structured and operated following very different principles 
from those supporting classical cooperatives” (Vargas-Cetina 2005:229). She takes the 
position that the ephemeral association she investigated should, nevertheless, be regard-
ed as a cooperative, albeit in a new form. By doing this she follows, at least implicitly, 
the categories of those who dominate the organization. Her argument is based on the 
idea that the meaning of cooperative has changed. On the other hand, one might argue 
that one is in fact dealing with an organization that is not a cooperative, but that is nev-
ertheless called a cooperative by some of those social actors involved in it. This per-
spective implicitly follows the perspective of other social actors in the field who claim 
that the cooperative is a fake. This perspective is based on the assumption that the 
meaning of cooperative has not changed. 
The perspective I propose to adopt here is based on critical realism (Bhaskar 
1998, 2008; Danermark et al. 2002; Sayer 1992), and the idea that a difference exists 
between the concepts people (of course including social scientists) have about reality 
and reality itself. This perspective is closer to that of those peasants who claimed that 
the cooperative is a fake. However, I refrain from using the term “fake” because it im-
plies intention. As what people think, say and do is different it is hard to judge whether 
                                                          
83 Maybe they would end up with a similar ephemeral organization if their nominal cooperative was ori-
entated to the market, faced with tough competition, and hence in need of individuals, groups, or organi-
zation in order to connect them with consumers or to acquire support from the outside, be it the state, 
private foundations, NGOs, or benevolent individuals. 
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or not the village cadres really wanted to build a cooperative, as they claimed them-
selves, or not, as other villagers claimed. 
My perspective harks back to early anthropological research on cooperatives that 
was interested in cooperatives because they may contain new forms of social relations 
(Nash et al. 1976). As mentioned in the introduction, I undertook this study out of my 
political interest in solidarity economy as practical experiments in self-organization that 
might point into a future society without hierarchy and without exploitation, a society 
where the good life is possible for everyone. The early studies about cooperatives were 
clear about the possibility that “institutions are subject to manipulation and exploita-
tion” (Nash and Hopkins 1976:7). Some of these studies analyzed how cooperatives 
were used and misused for personal advantage or for systematic oppression, as the so-
cial scientists studying the cooperatives were interested in the pitfalls and promises of 
certain forms of consciously created social relations.  
Vargas-Cetina points out that the House of Weavings in Mexico “has kept its 
promise to better the life of its members, although when looked at closely it is not a 
cooperative at all” (Vargas-Cetina 2005:244). The relations between those who run the 
marketing organizations and those who produce may appear as patron-client relations, 
as Vargas-Cetina points out (Vargas-Cetina 2005:243–244). Without the help of those 
running the marketing organizations, weavers and peasants would not be able to sell 
their respective textiles and rice for such high prices. It may appear as if both sides prof-
it from this relationship. However, the assessment changes if one, similar to the Marxist 
critique of patron-clients relationships in the 1970s, analyzes the patron-client-like rela-
tionship between those who run the marketing organization and the producers as inter-
woven with class. Rothstein argues that favors given by patrons to clients are payoffs 
that are supposed to avoid more payoffs (Rothstein 1979:33). 
By analyzing the NRR projects in Shǔidàozhuāng through the analytical lenses of 
substantivism, political economy, and David Graeber’s anthropological theory of value, 
questions of power and exploitation as well as of the reproduction and transformation of 
social structures through action come to the fore. 
Such an analysis can show that the help of those who run the marketing organiza-
tion is in fact based on the preceding work of weavers and peasants. The former is ulti-
mately dependant on the later, not vice versa as it may appear at the first glance. 
Through their creative actions, weavers and peasants generate value in the sphere of 
production that is later realized by those who run the marketing organization in the 
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sphere of exchange. In the sphere of exchange, abstract exchange value is realized in the 
abstract material token money on the market and the more concrete social values are 
realized in the community of benevolent individuals, activists and intellectuals, who 
value the fact that weavers or peasants organized in cooperatives create new cooperative 
social relations in the production and exchange process. Both in the case of the weavers 
in Mexico and the peasants in China, the value is usually realized in the cities as this is 
the place where the wealthy urban consumers live who can afford to buy their niche 
products. The city is also the place where the supporting intellectuals and NGOs are 
situated, who value cooperation. One part of the value that is now materialized as mon-
ey, or in more concrete material tokens or material performances of recognition, are 
returned to the weavers and peasants in the countryside. Those who control the market-
ing organization appropriate the other part of the value that was produced by weavers 
and peasants. They accumulate these material tokens, both money and reputation, that 
will enable them to successfully realize the values produced by weavers and peasants in 
the next circle of production on the market and in the community of supporters. At first 
sight it might seem as if weavers and peasants benefit from their relation with those who 
run the organizations. In fact, ultimately, it is the other way around. 
In Shǔidàozhuāng, where those who dominated the organization still lived in the 
village, the place where the values were produced, some peasants thought that the vil-
lage cadres benefited from the organization and not the peasants. However, not all, but 
some of them started to resist the village cadres extracting value (both exchange value 
and more concrete social values) they produced. Traders had extracted value from the 
peasants before the establishment of the cooperative in the village, and they are still 
doing so. However, none of the peasants seemed to think about resisting this kind of 
exploitation. Those who extracted a big share of the surplus, and these were not the 
small peddlers who came to the village but wholesalers and supermarkets, were out of 
reach of the peasants. With the establishment of the new organization this changed. 
Those who appropriated the value produced by the peasants in order to realize it in the 
sphere of exchange were now more visible and feasible. This spatial change, in combi-
nation with the organization’s claim to be a cooperative, opened new possibilities for 
struggles concerning the appropriation of value. Some peasants started to challenge the 
cooperative and those who dominated it, with the alleged aim to transform it into what 
they referred to as “real cooperatives” (真正的合作社 zhēnzhèng de hézuòshè). The 
“real cooperative” these Chinese peasants aspired to was a cooperative in the classical 
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sense (HQH, 2011-05-27a:12–24). Contrary to Vargas-Cetina’s observations in Mexico, 
they were still inspired by the notion of utopian community: “We should consider the 
cooperative as our own family, the members of our cooperative are, in fact, all of the 
same family.”84  In fact, the NRRM explicitly aims at reviving community spirit (Pan 
and Du 2011:455). Whether or not the peasants in Shǔidàozhuāng succeed in transform-
ing the ephemeral organization in this direction, and do not simply reproduce it by only 
replacing the individuals who dominate the organization at present, remains an open 
question.85 
10.7 Imagined cooperatives 
In his study about rural social movements in Costa Rica, Marc Edelman coined the term 
“imagined organizations” to refer to the 
existence of “organizations” without members that nonetheless subsist through mutually reinforc-
ing exchanges between donors (and sometimes urban-based social scientists) and “leaders.” ... The 
mere fact (yes, fact!) that an organization is not all (or even anything) that its “leaders” claim does 
not necessarily mean that they cannot transform themselves into something else and, paradoxically 
perhaps, be a fount of commitment, creativity, and solid, practical ideas about development. 
(Edelman 1999:40) 
Instead of viewing the ephemeral organizations, called “cooperative” by those 
who dominate it, in Shǔidàozhuāng as new forms of cooperatives, Edelman’s notion of 
“imagined organization” points to a difference between what people involved imagine 
an organization to be and what the organization is, while at the same time recognizing 
the very real effects of these imaginations. However, to characterize both the marketing 
cooperative-like and production cooperative-like small groups of the Professional Co-
operative in Shǔidàozhuāng more accurately, I alter Edelman’s term a little. I use the 
term “imagined cooperatives” to refer to the kind of organizations I described and ana-
lyzed here. There are four central features. An imagined cooperative is a nominal coop-
erative, (1) referring to the organization’s self-representation as a cooperative as well as 
to the imaginings the organization’s leaders, involved activists, donors and other outside  
                                                          
84 我们应该把合作社当成自己的家，我们合作社的社员其实都是一家人。 Wǒmen yīnggài bǎ hé-
zuòshè dāngchéng zìjǐ de jiā, wǒmen hézuòshè de shèyuán qíshí dōu shì yī jiārén (HQH, 2011-06-
07:595–596). 
85 While Hú Qǐhuá accused Wáng Wěi of using the cooperative for their personal gain, Wáng Wěi ac-
cused Hú Qǐhuá of using the contacts he had built through the cooperative to urban consumers for his 
personal advantage by selling his products directly to them and not through the channel of the cooperative 
(WW, 2011-05-06:174–192). 
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supporters have about the organization. An imagined cooperative is a non-cooperative, 
(2) referring to unequal and exploitative relations, for example class and patron-client 
relations, between those involved in the organization. This is what social scientists can 
discover under the surface of a nominal cooperative. It is about social relations and not 
about judging whether or not the nominal cooperative is a cooperative in legal terms. 
Both “non” and “nominal” (3) do not indicate what the term “fake” would indicate,86 
namely a judgment that those involved in the organization necessarily use the term “co-
operative” consciously to deceive others. The two terms “non” and “nominal” keep the 
question of intention open. It might be the case or not. The actors involved may or may 
not try to build a cooperative in its classical sense. Moreover, an imagined cooperative 
is a potential cooperative, (4) referring to the possibility that (potential) 87 members, 
based on the internal contradiction of the imagined cooperative being both a nominal 
cooperative and a non-cooperative, start to struggle to transform it under certain circum-
stances. Note that I do not argue that this potential exists based on a contradiction be-
tween reality and a concept that exists out of space and time. Rather this contradiction 
(and hence the potential for transformation) is real if the existing imagined cooperative 
with its unequal social relations is different from members’ imaginings of what a coop-
erative ought to be. These imaginings might be influenced by different factors such as 
social movements like the NRRM, by state policies like the new law on cooperatives 
from 2007, or by social scientists studying imagined cooperatives. 
                                                          
86 Vargas-Cetina warns us against making the “mistake to see the organizations as trying to take on fake 
new features” in order to meet the characteristics sought by donors and supporters (Vargas-Cetina 
2005:246). 
87 In the case of the happy pig group, as mentioned in chapter 8, other peasant households than those 
already involved could not become members, while at the same time the Happy Pig Farm as a new pro-
ject was established. Furthermore, the small group for lotus roots and the Happy Pig Farm were com-
prised of village cadres (and their friends) but no more members. 
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11 Conclusion 
The Chinese people are like tofu, the state like an iron hook. 
People with good intentions attempt to use this hook to help the tofu, 
but this causes only harm, so no help at all would be better. 
Liàng Shùmíng quoted in Pan and Du 2011:458 
I looked for cooperation, but what I found was competition, conflict and (rumors about) 
corruption. This is how I might, in one sentence, summarize my research on the suppos-
edly cooperative NRR projects in a Chinese village. Of course, this is overstated. I also 
found forms of cooperation in the village. 
I undertook this study because I was interested if there were any practices or initi-
atives in China that were similar to solidarity economy projects, with their focus on self-
management and cooperation, in other parts of the world. Indeed, the NRRM promotes 
cooperation in the countryside as an alternative to utopian marketization and privatiza-
tion (see chapter 1). 
In this diploma thesis I focused on NRR projects in one Chinese village in a poor 
county in the Hénán Province. Following a modified version of grounded theory meth-
odology, I used interviews and participant observation as methods of data collection and 
already started with data analysis during the process of data collection. Furthermore, I 
used existing anthropological theories and concepts to make sense of my empirical ma-
terial (see chapter 2). 
My main interests were the internal organization of those NRR projects that fo-
cused on economic cooperation, their connection to the outside world, as well as the 
chances, risks, and limitations of these experiments in NRR. 
11.1 Internal Organization 
In this section of the conclusion I summarize who is (not) participating, who is involved 
in decision-making, as well as how work is divided and remunerated in the NRR pro-
jects in the village. 
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Initially the NRR intellectuals had formulated a rule according to which village 
cadres were not supposed to participate in the leadership of the cooperative. However, 
since the initiation village cadres have been involved in the NRR projects in the village 
under study (see 4.1). As they were the local link to the state, the village cadres had 
redistributive power that formed the basis of patron-client relations between village ca-
dres and peasants (see 7.6). 
Many peasants were involved in the marketing cooperative-like Association for 
Environmentally Harmless Rice (or Rice Association) in the initial phase, and there was 
more participation in meetings and training sessions than later on. However, from the 
beginning the council members, namely those who made the initial investment, were 
more involved in the operation of the Rice Association than ordinary members (see 
chapter 4.1). Later on in the small groups for ecological rice and minor food crops, be-
ing a member basically meant selling products to the cooperative. Relatively few peas-
ants had a deeper involvement with the cooperative (see 5.2.1). The cooperative, name-
ly those who sold the products to wholesalers, companies, and supermarkets, or directly 
to urban consumers, was more or less identical to the members of the village committee 
(see 5.2.2). 
In the Happy Pig Small Group the village cadres, influenced by state money, 
made a decision in favor of a production cooperative-like Happy Pig Farm, instead of 
letting more households participate in the marketing cooperative-like part (see 8.3). 
In the production cooperative-like small groups of the Professional Cooperative 
for Ecological Agricultural Products, mainly village cadres were members, to be under-
stood as shareholders. Peasants from Shǔidàozhuāng or neighboring villages were hired 
as permanent workers or day laborers (see chapter 6 to 8). 
Officially different village cadres were responsible for different small groups, 
however, informally Wáng Wěi, the party secretary and chairperson of the village 
committee, had a big influence on many decisions (see 8.6 and 9.3.1). 
There existed a gender division of labor within the cooperative. The husbands 
were managing and their wives were working, for example packaging rice and minor 
food crops or working at the lotus fields (see 5.4 and 7.5). Furthermore, the village ca-
dres were managing and the peasants were working (see chapter 6 to 8). 
In the production cooperative-like small groups, the working peasants sold their 
labor power to the cooperative. If the products were successfully sold on the market, the 
shareholders of the cooperative, almost exclusively the managing village cadres, could 
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appropriate the surplus value produced by the working peasants (see chapter 6, chapter 
7, 8.4 and 10.3). 
In the marketing cooperative-like small groups the peasants sold their products to 
the cooperative and received a limited monetary benefit in the form of the so-called 
initial dividend (see 4.1, 5.2.1 and 5.5). 
While other villagers claimed that the shareholders of the cooperative made profit 
with the NRR projects and benefited from state support, the village cadres claimed that 
they made no monetary profit at all. As pioneers of cooperation they only opened the 
marketing channel and the other peasants would be able to benefit later on when the 
cooperative had the capacity to sell the agricultural products of more peasants. Be that 
as it may, what is important to note here is that the reader should not imagine the village 
cadres as very rich; in comparison with the urban middle class in China, they are not 
wealthy. 
In the marketing cooperative-like small groups the control of the means of ex-
change, and in the production cooperative-like small groups the control of the means of 
production, were essential for (potentially) appropriating the values produced by the 
peasants and were usually materialized in the city, into money or other material tokens 
of appreciation (see 10.3.4, 10.3.5, 10.4 and 10.6). 
11.2 Connections to the outside world 
Here I turn to the role played by outside actors and their connections to the NRR pro-
jects in the village. First of all, it is very likely that without the influence of NRR intel-
lectuals, the cooperatives would not have been established in the village (see 4.1). 
Through the establishment of the NRR projects, new surplus became available in 
the village. Firstly, the state supported cooperative projects through rewards and tax 
exemption. NRR intellectuals and activists tried to channel money from the state (the 
iron hook in the introductory quote from Liang Shuming) to the NRR projects they ini-
tiated among the peasants in the village (the tofu). Secondly, through cutting out other 
intermediaries, surplus, which they had previously appropriated, became available to the 
cooperative. NRR intellectuals also plaid a crucial role in establishing contacts between 
the cooperative on the one side and urban consumers and other companies on the other 
(see 4.2, 7.1.4, 7.6.2, 8.5, 10.2.3 and 10.3.3). 
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One striking example of what kind of influence the availability of potential mone-
tary support from the outside had on the NRR project in the village was the establish-
ment of the Happy Pig Farm. Peasants who already raised conventional pigs had pig-
sties in their own courtyards and only needed to change the method of feeding in order 
to be able to raise happy pigs. However, instead of using these already existing re-
sources Wáng Wěi felt that they could not reject the offer made by the state. Further-
more, urban consumers did not feel that the happy pigs were really happy in the con-
crete pigsties in the courtyards. In the end only five shareholders invested in the new 
Happy Pig Farm as the other peasants did not want to take the risk of the investment 
(see 8.3). 
11.3 Chances, risks and limits 
The competition the cooperative faced on the market was tough (see 4.2). The benefits 
for the ordinary peasants were limited, even in comparison to the low income from 
wage labor as migrant workers in the city, and connected with risks (see 4.1, 5.5, 6.5 
and 7.1.3). In this case NRR intellectuals who warned against promising that the peas-
ants could significantly raise their monetary income through market-oriented economic 
cooperation were right (see 1.3.4). In the case of the Small Group for Organic Rice and 
Wheat, the peasant who cultivated rice and wheat for the cooperative stressed the non-
monetary benefit of not using agricultural chemicals for her body (see 6.1). 
The village cadres, especially Wáng Wěi, controlled the cooperative. The village 
cadres thought that this was a good thing; other villagers thought that it was not (see 
4.3). Through the NRR projects existing unequal relations were reinforced and inequali-
ties reproduced. Patron-client relations between village cadres and peasants had existed 
before the NRR projects were initiated. Different villagers had occupied different class 
places outside of the village, some as owners of their own business, more as migrant 
workers (see 7.6). With the production cooperative-like projects, new direct class rela-
tions within the village were established (see 10.3.5). The marketing cooperative-like 
projects partly replaced intermediaries like wholesalers and supermarkets. These small 
groups of the cooperative now had the possibility to extract the surplus value other trad-
ers had extracted from the peasants before, albeit a little less as the cooperative paid the 
peasants the initial dividend. Furthermore, the village cadres claimed that the coopera-
tive had a hard time realizing this surplus value as money on the market (see 10.3.4). 
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Those peasants who had invested work and money in the Rice Association resist-
ed the village cadres’ control of the economic cooperatives; others did not. In the case 
of the Financial Cooperative, resistance against the village cadres controlling the NRR 
projects became apparent when they were not elected to the council (see 9.2). This was 
not the case in the other projects. There was not such a opportunity for potential re-
sistance to materialize like during the election of the council of the Financial Coopera-
tive. Moreover, I identified several factors such as involvement, individualization, and 
dependence on patrons as explanation for potential resistance (see 9.3.2). Hú Qǐhuá’s 
exclusion from the Happy Pig Small Group demonstrated that Wáng Wěi could decide 
whom to exclude from the cooperative, and hence from the possibility of selling the 
products for a better price to urban consumers (see 8.2). 
According to the village cadres and the NRR intellectuals involved, the organiza-
tions discussed here were cooperatives. Some villagers said that it was a fake coopera-
tive. In chapter 10 I proposed to view the NRR projects in the village that focus on eco-
nomic cooperation as “imagined cooperatives” with the following characteristics: They 
were nominal cooperatives and imagined as cooperatives by those who dominate them 
and by those who support them. They were non-cooperatives in the sense that patron-
client and class relations existed between those involved in the organizations. Further-
more, the NRR projects were potential cooperatives due to the tension between what the 
imagined cooperatives were at that moment and what some (potential) members of the 
organizations imagined a cooperative to be. There existed different concepts of what a 
cooperative ought to be, either a shareholder cooperative or a cooperative in the classi-
cal sense (see 10.5, 10.6 and 10.7).  
11.4 Dealing with the challenges to cooperation 
The peasants who viewed the existing imagined cooperative as a fake have to face the 
same challenges to cooperation if they want to transform the organization. Some of the-
se challenges were external, some, however, were internal to the organization of the 
existing imagined cooperative. It would probably not be enough to change the leader-
ship of the organization in order to transform it into a “real cooperative” like some 
peasants imagined. 
If the cooperative continues to produce for the market, competition would still be 
tough, benefits limited in comparison to incomes from wage labor in the cities, and the 
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risk of not being able to sell (niche) products for a good price would still exist. Hence, 
some intellectuals in the NRR movement propose economic cooperation that is not ori-
ented to the market, for example public work to improve the material condition of the 
village (see 1.3.4). However, if the peasants choose to produce for the market, there are 
some things they might want to change in order to arrive at cooperation. 
As I showed in my analysis there was outside support both from the state and 
from non-state actors. The state supported the NRR projects with rewards and tax ex-
emption. Urban intellectuals, social activists and benevolent individuals supported the 
NRR projects with social capital (for example, contacts to journalists, companies, or 
officials in order to channel state support to the NRR projects) as well as through buy-
ing the cooperative’s products. Involved NRR intellectuals told me that it was not pos-
sible for them to speak with all the peasants. Instead they chose to speak to the leaders  
(领袖 lǐngxiù) in the sense of models, namely to those peasants whom they expect to be 
able to guide the other peasants. In the NRR projects focusing on economic cooperation 
there existed a division of labor between managing village cadres and working peasants. 
Wáng Wěi, who was the village party branch secretary, the chairperson of the village 
committee as well as of the cooperative, controlled most of those links to the state as 
well as to the urban intellectuals and other benevolent individuals. Informally he influ-
enced many of the cooperative’s decisions. 
From my perspective, the abolition of this division of labor within the cooperative 
projects is necessary for them to be successful. To officially have the right to elect a 
council or even to have a direct say in decision-making (instead of electing a leadership) 
is probably not enough. Concerning informal decision-making, it seems to be crucial 
who did empowering tasks such as managing and especially who controled the contacts 
to the outside and, hence, to outside resources. The power of my two main informants 
stem from these contacts, both Wáng Wěi’s power to control the NRR projects that fo-
cused on the market (this was not the case in the Financial Cooperative, which was not 
oriented towards the market to sell something) and Hú Qǐhuá’s power to resist as he 
could use these contacts to sell niche products without the cooperative. Other peasants 
did not have this power as they dependend on Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres. 
Therefore, I suspect that if Hú Qǐhuá (and the other members of the former Rice Asso-
ciation) simply replaced Wáng Wěi and the other village cadres, this unequal distribu-
tion of power would still exist. A possible solution would be the rotation, or even distri-
bution, of crucial tasks such as the contact to officials, intellectuals and businessman, 
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among all members of the cooperative. If one focuses on the division of labor in con-
nection with decision-making, one gets back to the basic meaning conveyed in the Eng-
lish word cooperation as well as in the Chinese word hézuò (合作), namely “to work or 
to do together” rather than “to own together”. 
If self-management and cooperation could be realized through the abolition of the 
division of labor within the cooperative NRR projects in the village, indirect effects 
might offset the direct, limited benefits these projects could offer the peasants in a mon-
etary form, within the bigger context of global capitalism. If new social relations came 
into existence in the village, they would probably open up new imaginings about possi-
ble social relations in other places as well. Probably, as many peasants are migrant 
workers too, these counter-imaginings of cooperation would migrate to the cities and 
connect new rural reconstruction to the social struggles of (migrant) workers in the cit-
ies. 
11.5 Further research on New Rural Reconstruction 
Some authors argue that the new cooperative movement in China, referring to a move-
ment broader than the NRR movement, namely to the recent increase of peasant profes-
sional cooperatives, “influenced the re-organization of the economic structure, increased 
the income of farmers and influenced judicial legislation” and that the emergence of the 
new cooperative model “has once again proven itself to be the most sustainable model 
in times of rural crisis” (Zhao 2011:697–698). Although from my own political perspec-
tive, I wish I could share this assessment, some of these conclusions seem to stand on a 
weak empirical base. While it is of course undeniable that a new National Cooperative 
Law was passed in 2007, I propose caution regarding claims about tangible benefits for 
the peasants. Of course my empirical findings about limited benefits for peasants might 
be an exception. However, my two main informants, two fierce adversaries concerning 
the cooperative projects within the village, shared the view that many of China’s new 
professional cooperatives did not benefit the peasants, and that in many cases private 
enterprises only changed their name in the wake of the new law on cooperatives (WW, 
2011-05-15a:279–285; FN, 2011-04-23). If this was really the case, and becoming a 
professional cooperative was mainly about changing the name of an organization, then 
one could hardly claim that the cooperative movement influenced the reorganization of 
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the economic structure. Therefore, lacking more in-depth empirical evidence, I suggest 
being cautious about such general conclusions.  
Concluding from my own research experience, it is probably not enough to stay at 
a village for a few hours, or even a few days, to conduct interviews with leaders of the 
cooperative, village cadres, other local officials or those who initiated the projects if one 
wants to find out about what is really going on in the cooperative and the village.88 
Hence, I want to emphasize the need for empirical studies about the new cooperatives 
that are not only based on questionnaires and interviews with leaders of the coopera-
tive,89 but that are in-depth, including informal conversations with villagers as well as 
participant observation. Informal talks with villagers, like the ones I had during my first 
two weeks in the village (see 2.2), may seem pointless if they cannot tell you anything 
about the village’s cooperative. However, is this not already important information 
about an organization that is supposed to benefit its members and to be self-organized 
by them? Probably the best way to study new peasant professional cooperatives and 
NRR projects would be, as in many other fields in social sciences, a combination of in-
depth qualitative methods with quantitative methods. 
In contrast to the above mentioned positive evaluation of the new cooperative 
movement, the results of my research rather fit into the critical overall picture about the 
state policy drawn by the Research Group on ‘Constructing a New Socialist Country-
side’ as quoted by Pan and Du (2011:458): 
In the allocation of this program’s resources, most state guidance has already been reduced to 
guidance in the interest of state ministries, not the maximization of public interest. Rural elites 
have taken advantage of state policies to benefit themselves. Such policies thus do not contribute 
to improving the status of ‘peasant subjects,’ and they may lead to new problems such as exacer-
bating the class polarization of rural society by helping ‘big peasants to eat small peasants,’ and by 
supporting the development of capitalist enterprises masquerading as ‘peasant cooperatives.’ 
                                                          
88 Many quantitative studies about peasant professional cooperatives, for examples those of Zhang et al. 
(2009), Deng et al. (2010), Jia et al. (2010), and Bijman and Hu (2011), are based on interviews with 
village cadres and leaders of cooperatives. I mention these articles here as examples of interview- and 
questionnaire-based research on new cooperatives in China. By doing so, I do not have the intention of 
judging the quality of these specific articles or denying the usefulness of such quantitative studies. These 
studies were informed by different research questions to my own. While these studies focused on formal 
organizational characteristics and functional activities, I turned my attention to social relations, to the 
division of labor and decision-making processes, to questions of value, power and exploitation. 
89 Jia et al. themselves note that future quantitative studies about peasant cooperatives need to include 
interviews with peasants (Jia et al. 2010:9). This would definitely be an important and necessary step. 
However, short-term stays with quick questionnaire interviews in order to cover a great number of peas-
ants are maybe not enough. Some peasants might be cautious in telling what they really think about the 
cooperatives if one keeps in mind the possible class and patron-client like relation between leaders of 
cooperatives and their members which I have described and analyzed here. Building trust takes some 
time. 
  Conclusion 173 
Based on interviews with leaders of cooperatives Jia et al. already found several 
“empty-shell” cooperatives that did not provide services to its members but still re-
ceived support from the government (Jia et al. 2010:4 n. 12). However, the cooperative 
projects I studied would have not fallen into this category. Rather it would have fallen 
under the category of cooperatives were the founding members held most of the cooper-
ative’s shares. Researchers found that in most cooperatives “share-ownership is concen-
trated in the hands of the founding members, with the chairman the largest shareholder” 
(Bijman and Hu 2011:109). It seems reasonable to me to suspect that the class and pa-
tron-client relations I identified within the cooperative projects can be found in many of 
these cooperatives as well. 
This does not mean denying the existing potential of the cooperative model and 
the new cooperative movement to become a sustainable model for dealing with the three 
rural issues. As I have argued in the theoretical chapter, imagined cooperatives, like the 
ones I studied in Shǔidàozhuāng, have the potential to be transformed to cooperatives in 
the classical sense under certain circumstances if peasants struggle for it. 
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Short Descriptions of Involved Persons 
All names below are fictitious and not the real names of the persons involved. 
Chén Mùgēn 
Chairperson of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid and the seniors’ association. 
Chén Yùjiàn 
Village cadre, responsible for the Happy Pig Small Group, member of the Happy Pig 
Small Group, shareholder in the Small Group for Ecological Rice, the Small Group 
for Ecological Minor Food Crops, and the Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation 
of Lotus Roots and Crabs, member of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid. 
Fāng Fēipéng 
Worker in the Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs. 
Gāo Shùnkāi 
Council member of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid, former village cadre, 
former village accountant, chairperson of the former Association for Environmentally 
Harmless Rice, council member of the former Cooperative for Economic Develop-
ment. 
Hú Qǐhuá 
Council member of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid, previously responsible 
for the Happy Pig Small Group, former member of the Happy Pig Small Group, coun-
cil member of the former Association for Environmentally Harmless Rice and of the 
former Cooperative for Economic Development. 
Huáng Guóqiáng 
Village cadre, responsible for the Happy Pig Farm, shareholder in the Happy Pig 
Farm, member of the Happy Pig Small Group, member of the Cooperative for Mutual 
Financial Aid. 
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Huáng Jiànguó 
Village party branch cadre, former village cadre, responsible for the Small Group for 
the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs, shareholder in the Small Group 
for Ecological Rice, the Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops, and the Small 
Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs, member of the Coop-
erative for Mutual Financial Aid. 
Huáng Yǒumín 
Council member of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid, responsible for the 
Happy Pig Small Group, member of the Happy Pig Small Group. 
Huáng Yùtíng 
Worker in the Small Group for Organic Rice and Wheat, member of the Cooperative 
for Mutual Financial Aid. 
Lín Hǎibō 
Shareholder in the Happy Pig Farm from a neighboring village. 
Mǎ Zhìyǒng 
So-called student volunteer, graduated in Economics, assisting Wáng Wěi in manag-
ing the cooperative projects. 
Péng Yùhùi 
Member of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid. 
Sūn Yúnlóng 
Worker at the Happy Pig Farm. 
Wáng Wěi 
Village party branch secretary, chairperson of the village committee, member of the 
Standing Committees of the People’s Congresses of Dàhé County as well as of Píng-
yuán Municipality, chairperson of the Peasant Cooperative Association, and the Pro-
fessional Cooperative for Ecological Agricultural Products, shareholder in the Small 
Group for Ecological Rice, the Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops, the 
Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs, and the Happy 
Pig Farm, member of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid, husband of Zhèng 
Guìhuā. 
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Wáng Yàjūn 
Village cadre, village accountant, responsible for the Small Group for Ecological 
Rice, and the Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops, shareholder in the Small 
Group for Ecological Rice, the Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops, the 
Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs, and the Happy 
Pig Farm, member of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid, and the Happy Pig 
Small Group. 
Zhào Yùgāng 
Council member of the Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid, chairperson of the for-
mer Cooperative for Economic Development, member of the former Association for 
Environmentally Harmless Rice. 
Zhèng Guìhuā 
Worker in the Small Group for Ecological Rice, and the Small Group for Ecological 
Minor Food Crops, wife of Wáng Wěi. 
Zhū Xiǎojuān 
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Abbreviations 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
ER group Small Group for Ecological Rice 
FC Cooperative for Mutual Financial Aid (or Financial Cooperative) 
HP farm Happy Pig Farm 
HP group Small Group for Raising Happy Pigs (or Happy Pig Small Group) 
LC group Small Group for the Integrated Cultivation of Lotus Roots and Crabs (or 
Lotus and Crabs Small Group) 
MFC group Small Group for Ecological Minor Food Crops 
NRR New Rural Reconstruction 
NRRM New Rural Reconstruction Movement 
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Abstract 
The New Rural Reconstrution (NRR) Movement promotes cooperation in the Chinese 
countryside as an alternative to neoliberal marketization and privatization. In this di-
ploma thesis I focus on NRR projects initiated by a NRR intellectual in one Chinese 
village in a poor county in the Hénán Province. I use interviews and participant observa-
tion as methods of data collection. In the analysis I use concepts from economic anthro-
pology, for example from Karl Polanyi, from political economy, and from David Grae-
ber’s anthropological theory of value. Furthermore, I discuss anthropologists’ concepts 
about cooperatives, namely Gabriela Vargas-Cetina’s “ephemeral associations” and 
Marc Edelman’s “imagined organizations”. My main interest is the internal organization 
of those projects that focused on economic cooperation, their connection to the outside 
world, as well as the chances, risks, and limitations. 
In the projects there was a rough division of labor between the managing share-
holders of the cooperative, mainly the village cadres on the one side, and working peas-
ants on the other. Furthermore, a gender division of labor existed within the cooperative 
between managing husbands and working wives. In the marketing cooperative-like pro-
jects, being a member basically meant selling products to the cooperative. In the pro-
duction cooperative-like projects the peasants sold their labor power to the shareholding 
village cadres. In the marketing cooperative-like small groups, the control of the means 
of exchange, and in the production cooperative-like small groups, the control of the 
means of production, were essential for (potentially) appropriating the values produced 
by the peasants in the countryside and materialized into money and other material to-
kens of appreciation in the cities. The competition the cooperative faced on the market 
was tough. The benefits for the ordinary peasants were limited, even in comparison to 
the low income from wage labor as migrant workers in the city, and connected with 
risks. 
Through these projects, new surplus became available in the village, namely state 
support and surplus other intermediaries previously appropriated. The village cadres, 
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especially Wáng Wěi, who was village party branch secretary and chairperson of the 
village committee, had a big influence on many decisions and controlled the coopera-
tive. The village cadres themselves thought that this was a good thing; other villagers 
thought that it was not. They claimed that the village cadres made profit with the NRR 
projects and benefited from state support; the village cadres themselves claimed that 
they made no monetary profit. 
Through the NRR projects, existing unequal relations were reinforced and ine-
qualities reproduced. Before the NRR projects were initiated, different villagers had 
occupied different class places outside of the village and patron-client relations between 
village cadres, who, being the local link to the state, had redistributive power, and peas-
ants had already existed. With the production cooperative-like projects, new direct class 
relations within the village were established. The marketing cooperative-like projects 
had the possibility of appropriating the surplus value other intermediaries had extracted 
from the peasants before. 
Concerning informal decision-making, it was crucial who carried out empowering 
tasks and controlled the contacts to the outside and, hence, external resources. The pow-
er of my two main informants stemmed from these contacts, both Wáng Wěi’s power to 
control the NRR projects and Hú Qǐhuá’s power to resist, as he could use these contacts 
to sell niche products without the cooperative. Thus, unlike other peasants, he did not 
depend on the village cadres. 
There was disagreement in the village as to whether the NRR projects were real or 
fake cooperatives. I propose to view the NRR projects in the village as “imagined coop-
eratives” with the following characteristics: They were nominal cooperatives and imag-
ined as cooperatives by those who dominate it and by those who support it. They were 
non-cooperatives in the sense that patron-client and class relations existed between 
those involved in the organizations. Furthermore, the NRR projects were potential co-
operatives due to the tension between what the imagined cooperatives were at that mo-
ment and what some (potential) members of the organizations imagined a cooperative to 
be. 
The results of my research fit into a critical general picture of the state policy of 
“Constructing a New Socialist Countryside” that points out that rural elites take ad-
vantage of this state policy and the NRR movement to benefit themselves. This does not 
mean denying the existing potential of the movement. Imagined cooperatives could be 
transformed under certain circumstances if peasants struggle for it. 
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Kurzdarstellung 
Die Bewegung zum neuen ländlichen Aufbau (NLA) fördert Kooperation im ländlichen 
China als Alternative zu neoliberaler Vermarktlichung und Privatisierung. In dieser 
Diplomarbeit beschäftige ich mich mit den von einer Intellektuellen initiierten NLA-
Projekten in einem chinesischen Dorf in einem armen Kreis in der Provinz Hénán. Als 
Methoden verwende ich Interviews und teilnehmende Beobachtung. In der Analyse 
arbeite ich mit Konzepten aus der ökonomischen Anthropologie – unter anderem von 
Karl Polanyi – aus der politischen Ökonomie und aus der anthropologischen Theorie 
des Wertes von David Graeber. Außerdem diskutiere ich Konzepte von AnthropologIn-
nen zu Genossenschaften, nämlich “ephemeral associations” von Gabriela Vargas-
Cetina und “imagined organizations” von Marc Edelman. Mein Interesse gilt vor allem 
der internen Organisation der Projekte, deren Verbindungen zur Außenwelt, sowie ihren 
Möglichkeiten, Risiken und Grenzen. 
In den NLA-Projekten gab es eine grobe Arbeitsteilung zwischen einerseits ver-
waltenden Anteilseignern der Genossenschaft, hauptsächlich Dorfkader und den arbei-
tenden Bauern und Bäuerinnen – beziehungsweise den arbeitenden Ehefrauen der Dorf-
kader – andererseits. In jenen Projekten, die Vermarktungsgenossenschaften ähnlich 
waren, bedeutete die Mitgliedschaft in der Genossenschaft, Produkte an die Genossen-
schaft zu verkaufen. In den Produktionsgenossenschaften verkauften die Bauern und 
Bäuerinnen ihre Arbeitskraft an die Genossenschaft. In ersteren war die Kontrolle der 
Tauschmittel und in zweiteren die Kontrolle der Produktionsmittel essentiell für die 
(potentielle) Aneignung der von den Bauern und Bäuerinnen am Land produzierten 
Werte und deren Materialisierung in Geld und andere materielle Token der Anerken-
nung in den Städten. Am Markt war die Genossenschaft mit starker Konkurrenz kon-
frontiert. Die Vorteile für die gewöhnlichen Bauern und Bäuerinnen waren begrenzt und 
mit Risiken verbunden. 
Durch diese Projekte wurde neuer Mehrwert im Dorf verfügbar, nämlich staatli-
che Unterstützung und der Mehrwert, den sich früher andere Zwischenhändler angeeig-
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net hatten. Die Dorfkader, allen voran Wáng Wěi, der Parteisekretär und Vorstand des 
Dorfkomitees, hatten großen Einfluss auf viele Entscheidungen und kontrollierten die 
Genossenschaft. Die Dorfkader selbst dachten, dass das eine gute Sache sei, andere 
DorfbewohnerInnen sahen das jedoch anders: Sie behaupteten, dass die Dorfkader mit 
den NLA-Projekten Profit machten und ihnen die staatliche Unterstützung zugute käme; 
die Dorfkader selbst gaben an, dass sie keine monetären Profite machten. 
Durch die NLA-Projekte wurden bestehende ungleiche Verhältnisse verstärkt und 
Ungleichheiten reproduziert. Unterschiedliche DorfbewohnerInnen nahmen unter-
schiedliche Klassenplätze außerhalb des Dorfes ein und Patron-Klient-Beziehungen 
zwischen den Dorfkadern und den Bauern und BäuerInnen existierten bereits bevor die 
NLA-Projekte initiiert wurden. Mit den Projekten, die Produktionsgenossenschaften 
ähnelten, wurden neue direkte Klassenbeziehungen im Dorf geschaffen. Die Vermark-
tungsgenossenschaften hatten die Möglichkeit, Mehrwert anzueignen, den früher andere 
Zwischenhändler von den Bauern und Bäuerinnen abgezweigt hatten. 
Bezüglich informeller Entscheidungsfindung war es entscheidend, wer die er-
mächtigenden Tätigkeiten erledigte und die Kontakte zur Außenwelt, und daher externe 
Ressourcen, kontrollierte. Die Macht meiner beiden Hauptinformanten entsprang diesen 
Kontakten: sowohl Wáng Wěis Macht, die NLA-Projekte zu kontrollieren, als auch Hú 
Qǐhuás Macht, Widerstand zu leisten, weil er diese Kontakte verwenden konnte, um 
Nischenprodukte ohne die Genossenschaft zu verkaufen und daher nicht wie die ande-
ren Bauern und Bäuerinnen von den Dorfkadern abhängig war. 
Im Dorf gab es Uneinigkeit darüber, ob die NLA-Projekte echte oder gefälschte 
Genossenschaften waren. Ich schlage vor, die NLA-Projekte im Dorf als imaginierte 
Genossenschaften (imagined cooperatives) mit den folgenden Charakteristikern zu se-
hen: Sie waren dem Namen nach Genossenschaften und wurden von denen, die sie do-
minierten und unterstützten als Genossenschaften vorgestellt. Sie waren Nicht-
Genossenschaften in dem Sinn, dass zwischen den involvierten Personen Patron-
KlientInnen- und Klassenbeziehungen existierten. Darüber hinaus waren die NLA-
Projekte potentielle Genossenschaften aufgrund der Spannung zwischen dem was die 
vorgestellten Genossenschaften im Moment darstellten und was sich einige (potentielle) 
Mitglieder der Organisation unter Genossenschaft vorstellten. Imaginierte Genossen-
schaften könnten unter bestimmten Umständen transformiert werden, wenn Bauern und 
Bäuerinnen dafür kämpfen. 
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